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Abstract 
Crowdfunding is a global phenomenon for funding new ventures and projects, through the 
utilisation of crowdfunding platforms. This work focusses on the creation of a theoretical 
framework for determining success and failure within crowdfunding platforms. The 
framework is built utilising the existing crowdfunding literature and integrating it within a 
wider context considering signalling theory, social capital theory, network analysis, 
competition effects and backer motivations. The contextual framework, designed to be 
applicable regardless of type of crowdfunding platform examined, is applied to two separate 
crowdfunding platforms, Kickstarter and Kiva. This framework is then utilised for 
developing specific hypotheses for each platform around each of the salient themes identified 
from the relevant literature. These hypotheses are empirically tested on original data from 
over 55,000 crowdfunding campaigns, collected using web crawlers and API protocols. 
Moreover, by introducing the ideas of enforced and voluntary signals within a Crowdfunding 
context, this work also extends the set of relevant concepts originally derived from signalling 
theory. This thesis also introduces the concepts of formation of latent networks, and the tools 
for their analysis, to examine the internal social capital of a crowdfunding platform. With this 
work arguing, and providing evidence, that increased internal social capital has a positive 
impact on crowdfunding success. Finally, these findings are utilized in creating a set of 
recommendation to the crowdfunding participants. 
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1 Introduction 
Crowdfunding platforms have become a key source of funds for ventures and projects 
across the entire globe, after initially emerging across a number of developed economies as a 
response to the limited capital available after the financial crash (Bruton et al, 2015). The 
online crowdfunding market expanded rapidly from 2009-2015, doubling in capacity every 
year to an estimated 34.4 billion dollars in 2015 (Massolution, 2015), with some predictions 
expecting crowdfunding to increase to an estimated 300 billion dollars in 2025 (Ma and Liu, 
2017). Crowdfunding platforms quickly diversified themselves, enabling key differences 
between the platforms to be identified (Bruton et al, 2015).  
The main aim of this research is to create a broad conceptual model for identifying the 
key determinants of success, or failure, within these crowdfunding platforms which is 
relevant and applicable to the majority of crowdfunding platforms. The research is driven by 
an underlying research philosophy of pragmatism (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Dewey 1958), 
to create actionable and usable policy to assist the participants of the crowdfunding 
ecosystem. With the participants consisting of backers, creators and the crowdfunding 
platform itself (Ordanini et al, 2011). Backers provide the money for projects, creators set up 
the projects and the crowdfunding platform enables the interaction between backers and 
creators. While simultaneously providing a specific contribution through the creation of a 
new theoretical framework which is informed from several theoretical perspectives 
(signalling theory, social capital theory, competition theory and network analysis), for 
identifying the underlying determinants of success within crowdfunding platforms. This 
theoretical model was utilised to identify potential hypotheses which were further developed 
through observing and synthesizing various theoretical models and perspectives for both 
examined crowdfunding platform Kiva and Kickstarter.  
The thesis is data-driven with over 53,000 crowdfunding projects on Kiva and 
Kickstarter, this data was collected through the usage of web crawling techniques. The 
datasets included projects from every single continent and over 100 countries. A quantitative 
approach was utilised in the analysis of the data, with the Kiva dataset analysed using a 
truncated regression and the Kickstarter dataset analysed using a logistic regression. These 
different methods were chosen based upon the underlying features of the crowdfunding 
platforms and collected datasets. 
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 These results were used to test the developed hypotheses surrounding each of the 
theoretical perspectives. For example, consider H1a which states: Creators’ overconfidence 
has a negative impact on the probability of the project’s success. This hypothesis was 
developed using insights relating to signalling theory and the entrepreneurship literature in 
section 3.3.2.1. The results in section 4.2.1.1, provide support for this hypothesis, through 
increased confidence having a statistically significant and negative impact on the likelihood 
of a project succeeding on the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. This finding enables the 
creation of a recommendation that creators should aim to limit the level of confidence they 
signal in reward-based crowdfunding platforms.    
A key hypothesis in the examination of the Kiva platform, centered around how social capital 
within a crowdfunding platform can impact success within the platform. HB1 stated: Higher 
levels of internal social capital within Kiva has a positive impact on the amount of funds 
raised. This was developed in section 3.4.3.1, utilising literature on network theory and social 
capital. Social capital was captured within the platform by the creation of a latent network 
built from the inherent connections between participants of the crowdfunding network. This 
latent network enabled the usage of network analysis techniques to capture the social capital 
of each project. With the results in section 4.1, supporting the hypothesis HB1, as the proxy 
used for social capital had a positive and significant impact on the amount of money raised in 
Kiva. 
These empirical patterns/ findings are further used in the formulation of a key set of 
recommendations to the participants within the crowdfunding ecosystems. Additionally, this 
work identifies future areas of research, based on the concepts developed and analysed within 
this thesis and the inherent limitations of the study. This rest of the introduction provides a 
systematic overview into the overarching design of the research and is separated into the 
following four sections.  
Context of the research: Provides the context of crowdfunding, by exploring the history of 
crowdfunding, outlining the current major crowdfunding platforms and the key crowdfunding 
participants.  
Aim and objectives: This section outlines the main research aim of the thesis, before 
considering a set of more specific objectives to achieve this aim.   
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Chapter design: This section considers how the chapters of the thesis were designed in order 
to achieve the objectives outlined in the previous section. Providing a summary of the design 
of each chapter and allocating objectives to each chapter.   
Rationale: Outlines the underlying rationale for the research, identifying how the research can 
benefit specific groups and how it can contribute to the existing literature.  
1.1 Context of the research 
In attempting to understand the context of crowdfunding the first step taken by the 
author was to consider a formal definition of crowdfunding, this was achieved through an 
empirical collection and examination of the key interactions between participants in the 
crowdfunding ecosystem (section 2.1.5). There are three main participating groups within 
crowdfunding, i) the creators, ii) the backers and iii) the crowdfunding platform itself 
(Ordanini et al, 2011). Creators refers to anyone who is seeking funds for a project; it can 
refer to an individual, a group or an organization, dependent upon the platform and the 
crowdfunding project. The term backer refers to anyone who is providing money to the 
creators via the crowdfunding platform; this generally refers to an individual but can also 
represent a group or organization. Finally, the platform or crowdfunding platform, is the 
entity which enables and facilitates the exchange of funds, and signals, between the creators 
and backers. Crowdfunding can thus be described as when: 
Creators seek to obtain funds for a project, backers decide whether to provide those 
funds, and the platform acts as an exchange between the backers and creators, without itself 
making funding decisions (developed in section 2.1).  
This specific definition was utilised as it enables a clear point of distinction between 
traditional funding and crowdfunding. That point is where the platform starts making funding 
decisions, i.e. choosing who receives funds, rather than the backers making this decision. And 
it is the inclusion of this final condition which is the major addition to the definition provided 
by the author of this work.       
1.1.1 History of crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is not a completely new phenomenon, but rather an expansion of a 
system, for raising money which has existed for hundreds of years (Tavi, 2014). A prominent 
historical example of crowdfunding is the plinth upon which the statue of liberty stands. 
While the statue itself was a diplomatic gift from France, the granite plinth pedestal had to be 
purchased by New York. However, the Governor at the time, Grover Cleveland, rejected the 
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use of city funds to pay for the plinth and the American Congress was unable to pass a 
spending bill including the Plinth. New York almost lost the statue of liberty with Baltimore, 
Boston, San Francisco and Philadelphia all offering to build the plinth in exchange for 
movement of the statue to their city. At this point, Joseph Pulitzer utilised his newspaper the 
New York World, asking for money from readers of the paper to support the building of the 
plinth, in exchange for a set of rewards to the readers, according to their donation, for 
example, large donations received a decorative gold coin. This raised the remaining 100,000 
dollars and the plinth was built, and New York became the permanent home of the Statue of 
Liberty (Pitts, 2010).  
This author tests whether this example can be considered crowdfunding by applying 
the set of required interactions for crowdfunding to occur that are outlined in the definition. 
Thus the creator can be viewed as Joseph Pulitzer seeking money for building the plinth, the 
backers as the readers of the paper providing the money for the building of the plinth and the 
platform, as the New York World newspaper enabling the readers and Joseph Pulitzer to 
exchange funds, without making any decisions about who receives the funds. Thus, the 
required interactions occur, and the funding of the plinth of the Statue of Liberty can be 
considered to be crowdfunding. More specifically, this early example, can be considered as a 
type of reward-based crowdfunding where backers are incentivised to back the project by the 
perspective of receiving rewards based upon how much money they have given.  
Reward-based crowdfunding is one of the four main types of crowdfunding, as 
crowdfunding can be divided into subcategories based on the backer participation right of 
crowdfunding platforms (Giudici et al, 2012). The four main types of crowdfunding 
platforms identified through differing backer participation rights are reward-based, donation-
based, equity-based, and lending-based. In reward-based platforms, backers are offered a 
reward dependent upon the amount of money they provide. In equity-based platforms, the 
backers are given percentage equity in the project or company as an incentive for backing. In 
lending-based crowdfunding, money is returned at a later date and interest may be accrued 
based upon the crowdfunding platforms. Finally, in donation-based, backers are given no 
rewards, equity or interest for supporting the project, this type can be viewed more as a 
charitable donation. These different crowdfunding subdivisions are examined and expanded 
upon within (section 2.2).              
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1.1.2 Current state of crowdfunding 
As mentioned previously, crowdfunding has now primarily moved online reaching an 
estimated 34.4 billion dollars in 2015 (Massolution, 2015). Crowdfunding is still expected to 
continue to grow with Ma and Liu (2017) predicting that crowdfunding will reach 300 billion 
dollars by 2025, an increase of 30.2 percent per year. Furthermore Technavio (2019) reported 
a similar rate of expected growth of 30.9 per cent annually until 2022. Thus, crowdfunding 
has decreased from the doubling rates seen between 2009-2015 (Massolution, 2015), but is 
still growing at a substantial rate. This can be seen through the wide range of online 
crowdfunding platforms across the globe, the following are a few prominent examples:  
a) Kickstarter: A reward-based crowdfunding platform, launched on the 28th of April 
2009, over 4.1 billion dollars have been raised for projects within the platform (Kickstarter, 
2019d). Kickstarter has an all-or-nothing requirement which means that a project must reach 
their funding goal for creators to receive any funds. There is no specific restriction on what 
sort of projects can be run on Kickstarter (Kickstarter, 2019a).  
b) Kiva: An interest-based platform which offers loans in the developing world, 
launched in 2005, 1.3 billion dollars of loans have already been raised on Kiva with a 96.8 
percent repayment rate. Kiva has provided loans to 3.2 million people across 81 countries 
(Kiva, 2019a).  
c) Indiegogo: A reward-based crowdfunding platform, founded in 2008, raised over 1 
billion dollars from over 11 million backers. There is no specific restriction on what sort of 
projects can be run on Indiegogo as long as they are legal. Indiegogo utilises both keep-it-all 
and all-or-nothing funding, a project which chooses keep-it-all will receive their funds 
regardless of whether they reach their funding goal (Indiegogo, 2019). 
d) GoFundMe: A donation-based crowdfunding platform, which focuses on providing 
socially aware funding for individuals or groups. For example the platform engages in 
medical crowdfunding, raising funds for individuals who would be unable to pay for medical 
treatment. It has raised over 5 billion dollars since being founded in 2010 (GoFundMe, 2019).  
e) Crowdcube: An equity-based crowdfunding platform, primarily used by 
entrepreneurs expanding their businesses. Crowdcube projects are based within the UK and 
have raised over 600 million pounds since being founded in 2011. This 600 million is split 
between 821 successful projects, leading to each project on average raising 674 thousand 
pounds (Crowdcube, 2019). 
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f) Unbound: Is a reward-based crowdfunding platform, which only crowdfunds books. 
Since its founding in 2010, 317 books have been successfully funded on Unbound. One 
curious feature of this platform is that it does not show the funding goal of a project; instead 
it only showed the percentage achieved towards the funding goal. Thus the goal which the 
project is aiming for is obfuscated (Unbound, 2019). 
g) Prosper: Is an interest-based crowdfunding platform, where creators can ask for 
loans to businesses or individuals. Since being founded in 2005, Prosper has provided over 14 
billion dollars in loans to over 889,000 individuals. Of note, Prosper is one of the platforms 
where a single backer can easily provide the entire funding for a crowdfunding project 
(Prosper, 2019).  
This not an exhaustive list of crowdfunding platforms, rather it aims to show some 
examples for the subdivisions of crowdfunding platforms, previously discussed, and the scale 
at which these platforms are operating, with these seven platforms collectively raising over 
29 billion dollars in their lifetimes.  
The crowdfunding platforms can be further classified into additional subsets by 
considering the creator participation requirements alongside the backer participation rights 
(See section 2.2). 
One of the key aspects of online crowdfunding is the transformation of crowdfunding 
from being a local to becoming a global phenomenon, with crowdfunding platforms such as 
Kiva, Kickstarter, Indiegogo, Prosper, providing funds across the globe. This does not imply 
that all crowdfunding platforms are global, some platforms may only serve a specific region 
due to differing legal requirements between the platforms, for example, Crowdcube, an 
equity crowdfunding project only raises money from projects within the United Kingdom 
(Crowdcube, 2019).  
Thus, online crowdfunding can be viewed as a revamping of crowdfunding, with the 
internet encouraging more crowdfunding to occur on a global scale, thus enabling 
crowdfunding to move from being local phenomena to a global phenomena.  
1.1.3 Context of the literature utilised within this thesis 
This section outlines how the crowdfunding and connected literature were utilised to 
form the relevant conceptual framework for this thesis, as discussed in more detail within the 
literature review in section 2.4. 
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One of the key works on crowdfunding is Mollick (2014) that examines the dynamics 
of crowdfunding, which provides an introduction into some of the underlying drivers of its 
success and failure, this work also focuses on Kickstarter from 2009 to 2012. Mollick (2014) 
additionally identifies limitations within the current literature, such as the lack of a broad 
definition for crowdfunding. This highly cited work can be seen as the theoretical starting 
point of the thesis. For example, the concept of utilising signalling to address crowdfunding is 
introduced by Mollick (2014) and extended upon by introducing the concept of multiple 
signalling partners in Kromidha and Robson (2016). This is then further expanded within this 
thesis by introducing and considering the differences between enforced and voluntary signals 
and the introduction of the platform itself, as a third signalling agent. While also examining 
how the effect of enforced signals can be interpreted as proxies for the human capital of the 
creators.  
Another relevant example of the influence of this seminal work is that on the impact 
of social media, Mollick (2014), considered that the number of Facebook friends of the 
creator can be utilised to examine success within the crowdfunding platform, with further 
empirical papers both supporting (Beier and Wagner, 2015; Colombo et al, 2015) and 
providing evidence against this argument (Moisseyev, 2013; Kromidha and Robson, 2016), 
leading to this thesis adoption of utilising Facebook shares over Facebook friends (Kromidha 
and Robson, 2016) as the key metrics for capturing the external social capital of a 
crowdfunding project.  
Another work of great importance to the development of the thesis is the work of 
Colombo et al (2015). They identified that crowdfunding platforms can generate their own 
internal social capital, and thus that there are two types of social capital to be considered in 
relation to their impact on the success of crowdfunding platforms: internal and external 
social capital. This crucial dichotomy is expanded upon within this thesis by considering how 
the internal social capital of a crowdfunding platform can be captured through the inherent 
connections within the crowdfunding network. These connections can be utilised to create a 
latent network through the crowdfunding platform, later utilised to provide proxy metrics for 
the internal social capital of a crowdfunding project. Colombo et al (2015) also introduced 
the key concept of utilising an early funding period, to analyse the initial effects of the start of 
the campaign on the final success of the campaign. This concept of an early funding period is 
also utilised in this thesis and expanded upon by including the early pledge per backer 
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metrics. This measure was previously utilised in measuring crowdfunding success by 
Kromhida et al (2016) into their examination of signalling.  
Outside the immediate field of crowdfunding many other contributions helped in 
forming the theoretical framework of this thesis, for example in regards to the impact of 
social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Kim and Aldrich, 2005; Westlund and Bolton, 2003; 
Borgatti and Halgrin, 2011) were examined. The literature used outside of the field of 
crowdfunding is outlined in more detail within section 2.4.1.  
1.2 Aim and objectives  
As previously stated, the main aim of this research is to create a broad conceptual 
framework for identifying the key determinants of success within crowdfunding platforms, 
which is applicable to all types of crowdfunding platforms. In order to achieve this aim a set 
of more specific objectives was established, these are outlined below alongside the rationale 
for each specific objective: 
Objective 1: Identify/develop a broad definition of crowdfunding. 
In order to determine success within crowdfunding platforms, it is necessary to 
provide a broad definition of crowdfunding. This enables the author to clarify which 
platforms are crowdfunding platforms under the provided definition and thus determine 
which platforms can be examined utilising the frameworks established within this work.    
Objective 2: Identify methods of subdividing crowdfunding platforms based upon 
type.  
The second objective is to consider how to distinguish between crowdfunding 
platforms, considering the possible ways to subdivide crowdfunding platforms based upon 
the backers' participation rights and creator requirements. This step is necessary to highlight 
the many possible ways that success can be measured within a crowdfunding platform, hence 
enabling the creation of a theoretical framework which is relevant for the analysis of all of the 
different crowdfunding platforms.  
Objective 3: Create a theoretical framework for understanding success in 
crowdfunding platforms. 
In order to achieve the aim of identifying success across a range of crowdfunding 
platforms, a theoretical framework needs to be developed which can be utilised to examine 
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the different types of crowdfunding platforms. By synthesizing the various theoretical 
elements, the author aims to create a more informed model. Enabling the model to be more 
generally applicable across crowdfunding platforms.    
Objective 4: Apply said theoretical framework to existing platforms, to develop a 
specific conceptual framework and set of hypotheses for each platform. 
As each crowdfunding platform has its own unique features and characteristics, the 
general theoretical framework needs to be applied to each platform creating a specific 
conceptual framework for that platform. This can then be utilised to derive the key 
hypotheses for the platform.   
Objective 5: Collect data to test the developed hypotheses across each examined 
crowdfunding platform. 
In order to test the hypotheses for each platform, a dataset must be developed for each 
platform, utilising the hypotheses to identify the key pieces of information that are required 
from the platform and developing the relevant methods required to capture this information.    
Objective 6: Identify a methodology to analyse the data collected for each platform to 
test the hypotheses. 
Alongside identifying a data collection methodology, it is necessary to determine the 
best possible methodology for testing the developed hypotheses. Each platform may require 
its own different modelling strategy, due to the inherent differences in measuring success 
between platforms.  
Objective 7: Test the set of hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework.  
After testing the theoretical hypotheses, it must be considered whether the model 
predictions are applicable and thus whether the conceptual framework has achieved its 
desired function. 
Objective 8: Develop a generalized set of findings based upon the combined results 
of the crowdfunding models. 
From the empirical results, a key set of findings can be developed, demonstrating the 
specific contributions provided by this thesis to the existing crowdfunding literature and an 
underlying assessment of the ability of the conceptual framework.  
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Objective 9: Develop a key set of recommendations for the three key parties in 
crowdfunding. 
A key set of recommendations can be developed based upon the findings, for each of 
the three major parties involved in crowdfunding, i.e. backers, creators and the crowdfunding 
platform itself.   
Objective 10: Outline a key set of recommendations for future research into the topic 
Due to the inherent limitations of any study, it is necessary to provide a consideration 
for future research which will further boost the understanding of the examined area.  
1.3 Chapter design  
The chapters of the thesis were designed to achieve these objectives. Their 
overarching design principles and the objectives they were designed to address are outlined in 
the following sub-sections. 
1.3.1 Literature review  
The three objectives addressed in the literature review are as follows:  
Objective 1: Identify/develop a broad definition of crowdfunding 
Objective 2: Identify methods of subdividing crowdfunding platforms based upon type. 
Objective 3: Create a theoretical framework for understanding success in crowdfunding 
platforms. 
To develop the literature review, an initial examination of the existing state of the 
crowdfunding literature was considered. As a first step, a citation network around the 
crowdfunding literature was constructed (a citation network creates a network based on the 
citations of the articles (Garfield et al, 1964). In such a network, two articles are connected if 
one article references the other article, this is a directed connection with the article which is 
cited, and it does not imply the reverse direction of the connection. To create this citation 
network, first, the term “Crowdfunding” was searched in google scholar with the top ten 
articles by citation count captured in November 2016. Second, all the citations for these top 
ten articles were also captured. With the citations for the original ten collected, the process 
was then repeated for all the articles identified as references of the first ten. This was 
achieved through using import.io, a web crawling software which was utilized to extract the 
citations from google scholar. Alongside extraction, the papers, the titles of the papers were 
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also extracted and used to identify key themes within the titles. The citations and terms used 
to create the visualization of the network in Figure 1-1 below.  
Figure 1-1 Crowdfunding citation matrices 
 
Created by the Author, 16946 links (edges), 2589 crowdfunding projects (nodes). 
The colour of the link on the diagram was chosen to show different groups within the 
crowdfunding literature, with pink links showing 133 links between equity crowdfunding, 
green ones showing the 93 links between business centered crowdfunding papers, the 10 gold 
links show medical crowdfunding papers. The 95 black links donate papers which contain the 
term social in their title, while the 18 dark green links donate papers focusing on the more 
specific term social capital. The 977 green links donate papers which simply used the term 
crowdfunding. The 1243 white links simply denote linked papers which don’t have 
crowdfunding or other subcategories in their titles. This analysis was utilised to consider what 
were the current key papers, based on citations and centrality and thus used as a starting point 
for the literature review. Additional articles were identified as the research went on, through a 
continuous monitoring processes, one such monitoring process utilised google alerts which 
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was set up such that whenever a new article concerning crowdfunding was released on google 
scholar the author was informed by email (Google alerts, 2019). Obviously, in addition to this 
automated search criterion, articles were also identified more fluidly throughout the 
traditional manual research process, by researching specific topics and reading papers from 
other connected themes. 
With the key literature identified, the section was then structured around four key 
sections. The first section defined crowdfunding, the second outlined how crowdfunding can 
be subdivided, the third considered what is meant by success in crowdfunding and finally the 
fourth considered how these could be brought together to develop the theoretical framework. 
Each of these sections was necessary to address objectives 1-3 and they provided a structure 
in which to critically analyze the existing literature.    
1.3.2 Methodology  
The three objectives addressed in the methodology are as follows:  
Objective 4: Apply said theoretical framework to existing platforms, to develop a specific 
conceptual framework and set of hypotheses for each platform. 
Objective 5: Collect data to test the developed hypotheses across each examined 
crowdfunding platform. 
Objective 6: Identify a methodology to analyse the data collected for each platform to test 
the hypotheses. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the methodology chapter was separated into four 
key sections:  
In the first section (3.1), the underlying research philosophy and connected research 
design were outlined. Pragmatism was selected as the underlying research philosophy as it 
aligned both with the author’s personal viewpoint on the ontological construction of the 
universe and enabled practical application to the examination of crowdfunding (Creswell and 
Clark, 2007; Dewey 1958). Applying the basis of utilising the best measure available under 
the pragmatic world view, lead to the selection of a quantitative process over a qualitative 
process. Additionally, applying a pragmatic approach, it was outlined that each platform 
should be examined separately, due to the innate difference between the crowdfunding 
platforms.  
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The second section (3.2), outlines how the quantitative data can be collected for each 
of the crowdfunding platforms through the utilisation of web crawling software in collecting 
primary data and through multiple secondary data sources. Critically assessing the ethical 
impacts of the utilisation of each data collection method. 
The third section (3.3) outlines the specific methodology surrounding the Kickstarter 
crowdfunding platform (Kickstarter, 2019a). The chapter first applies the theoretical 
framework to Kickstarter, developing a conceptual framework for the platform and deriving a 
set of hypotheses to be tested within this framework. The specific data procedure for 
Kickstarter is then outlined based on the data required to address the developed hypotheses. 
This was followed by a selection of the different methods for data analyses in relation to the 
specific format of the collected data.  
Finally, section (3.3.13) outlines the specific methodology utilized for the Kiva 
crowdfunding platform. This consisted in applying the general theoretical framework for the 
creation of a new Kiva-specific conceptual framework and set of hypotheses. Before 
outlining the data new collection and data analysis procedure for the platform. By completing 
these four sections, it was possible to address objectives 4-6 discussed above.    
1.3.3 Results 
The objective addressed in the results is: 
Objective 7: Test the set of hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework  
Section 4.1 contains the results from the logistics regression carried out to examine the 
Kickstarter dataset. Section 4.3 contains the truncated regression results examining the Kiva 
model. Each platform was examined with multiple model specifications, to enable the 
comparision of said models in order to ensure that the most appropriate model would have 
been utilised in the testing of the relevant hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested against the 
collected results in section 4.2 for Kickstarter and section 4.4 for Kiva, whereby the 
hypotheses are ordered based on the parts of the conceptual framework they are dervied from. 
In detail, these hypotheses were separated into four groups based on whether they were 
derived using signalling theory, competition theory, social capital or backer incentives. Thus 
aiming to achieve the outlined objective through the analysis of the proposed hypotheses 
based on the empirical evidence and results for each model.    
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1.3.4 Findings  
Objective addressed in the findings section are as follows: 
Objective 8: Develop a generalized set of findings based upon the combined results 
of the crowdfunding models 
Objective 9: Develop a key set of recommendations for the three key parties in 
crowdfunding. 
Objective 10: Outline a key set of recommendations for future research into the topic 
This section combines the results from the examination of the hypotheses developed 
for both Kiva and Kickstarter and creates a set of generalized findings structured around the 
different elements of the theoretical framework. These findings are then critically analysed 
with consideration to the literature and the inherent limitations of the study, in the 
formulation of a set of recommendations for the different components of crowdfunding 
ecosystems: backers, creators and the crowdfunding platform itself. Furthermore, a set of 
possibilities for future research is outlined based on the findings and the limitations.   
1.3.5 Conclusion  
The final section of the thesis entails the conclusions of this work. This section serves 
to consider whether the main aim and objectives of the research have been achieved and to 
what degree. It also highlights the key points of this works’ contribution to the literature, 
before drawing the work to a close with a set of final remarks.   
1.4 Rationale 
The previous two sections consider the context and underlying design choices of the 
thesis; however, they don’t address the underlying rationale for carrying out the thesis. The 
author distinguishes the rationale into two distinct sections, one focusing on the personal 
rationale and the second on the external rationale. Personal rationale considers the underlying 
reasons why the author is intrigued by the topic area and connected literature, which drove 
his desire to research this area. Conversely the section on external rationale considers why the 
research should be carried out regardless of the personal motivations of the author, by 
considering who may benefit from the research and how this research can contribute to the 
existing literature.  
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1.4.1 Personal rationale   
The author’s interest in crowdfunding was first raised by considering how it can be 
utilised to overcome asymmetric information between suppliers and consumers (Agrawal et 
al., 2011). Specifically, how crowdfunding could overcome the age-old problem of how 
suppliers can identify how much to spend on developing a product if the demand for that 
product cannot yet be seen. Crowdfunding enables future demand not only to be identified 
but utilised in directly funding the creation of the product and thus enables the development 
of new products without the need to forecast unknown demand (Mollick, 2014). This drew 
the author’s interest to the topic area, but what sustained and grew this interest was the 
versatility demonstrated in crowdfunding both within the literature and through examinations 
of crowdfunding platforms.  
The broad nature of crowdfunding enables it to be examined from a multi-disciplinary 
approach. Leading to papers ranging from how crowdfunding can be utilised to overcome 
medical bankruptcy (Burtch and Chan, 2014), to whether crowdfunding was just an attempt 
in fleecing the masses out of their money (Griffin, 2012) or to how it could be considered a 
way of democratizing innovation (Mollick and Robb, 2016). This breadth of literature 
intrigued the author and greatly contributed in choosing to research the topic area. 
Additionally, the author is a pragmatist and took into consideration two key factors, firstly 
how crowdfunding can enable both failure and success to be observed, compared to other 
cases whereby failure can be obfuscated and only success viewable. Secondly, as 
crowdfunding platforms are primarily online, the data can be collected with relative ease, 
compared to offline companies which may often wish to obfuscate data for the benefit of the 
business or individual. Thus, the author’s personal motivations for choosing to examine this 
topic was drawn from the breadth and expanse of the literature and the practicality of 
obtaining data.    
1.4.2 External rationale 
Regardless of the whims of the author, this research is of relevance due to how it can 
benefit the participants of crowdfunding and contribute to the existing crowdfunding 
literature. The three different participants within the crowdfunding ecosystems, creators, 
backers and the platform itself, can each benefit from an examination into success in 
crowdfunding which observes how crowdfunding functions. This is demonstrated through the 
set of tailored recommendations provided to each of the participants (section 5.5). This set of 
recommendations is possible due to the findings identifying specific actions which can be 
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taken by each set of participants to increase the likelihood of them achieving their goals. A 
possible additional rationale in carrying out crowdfunding research is in addressing and 
considering how crowdfunding could be regulated. Regulation affects how crowdfunding 
platforms are designed and what types of crowdfunding are legally possible. These effects are 
of relevance for each of the crowdfunding participants, from protecting backers, to ensuring 
the long-term stability of platforms and to improve the ability for creators to obtain funds. 
Additionally, one could also consider how wide-ranging fraud could permeate crowdfunding 
platforms and whether the existing ways in which platform structures, are currently 
separating creators and backers, enable or limit the possible emergence of fraud.  
Furthermore, this specific research can contribute to the crowdfunding literature in 
multiple ways; Firstly, by providing a broad definition of crowdfunding which can be utilised 
regardless of the type of crowdfunding examined, such a definition may then enable the 
development of a more informed conceptual frameworks. Secondly, by considering how 
human capital can be utilised to address the impact of enforced signalling and by highlighting 
how latent network conceptualisation can be utilised in the identification and measurement of 
social capital. Detailed evaluations of these and other contributions are explained in detail 
within the findings (section 5), while the ongoing impact of the paper is highlighted in the 
conclusions (section 6).   
Thus, the underlying rationale for carrying out the research can be attributed to the 
personal desire of the author, the ability for the research to serve as a practical tool for 
assisting the participants of crowdfunding and finally to how it can contribute to the existing 
literature, increasing our understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
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2 Literature review 
The literature review is divided into four key sections along specific themes, as 
follows: 
1.1) Defining crowdfunding: this section critically considers the existing crowdfunding 
definitions. It examines the individual characteristics which comprise each of the existing 
definitions, before creating a general definition of crowdfunding via critically analysing the 
interaction between the three-key parties in crowdfunding, the creators, the backers and the 
platform itself. This general definition provides a key point of distinction between 
crowdfunding and other traditional funding methods.   
1.2) Subdividing crowdfunding: This section considers the existing subdivision methods for 
crowdfunding, of reward-based, donation-based, equity-based and lending-based. These sub-
division are constructed based upon the backer participation rights of the crowdfunding 
platforms. The theoretical framework of the thesis is developed through critically analysing 
the existing literature, with each section being dedicated to existing and new subdivision 
within crowdfunding. Additional subdivisions were added based upon creator and backer 
participation rights. The last part of this section shows this subdivision methodology in action 
across a set of crowdfunding platforms.   
1.3) Success in Crowdfunding: This section develops the broad definition of success which 
is crucial in developing the theoretical framework, in section 1.4. And considers the impact of 
failure in crowdfunding. 
1.4) Theoretical framework development: This section considers the development of the 
main theoretical framework for the thesis, based on five key theoretical areas. These areas are 
signals, incentives, social capital, competition and backer motivations. Each area critically 
utilises the developing crowdfunding literature to consider how crowdfunding success may 
occur. The findings from this section are combined to create a theoretical framework, which 
becomes the core of the creation of the conceptual frameworks for each crowdfunding 
platform.  
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2.1 Defining crowdfunding 
Finding a distinct definition of crowdfunding has been an unmet goal, as Mollick 
(2014, pg2), stated: “a broad definition of crowdfunding is therefore elusive, especially as 
crowdfunding covers so many current (and likely future) uses across many disciplines.” This 
thesis aims to offer such a broad definition through challenging the existing definitions and 
creating a more-focused, precise and informed definition. This is achieved firstly, by 
critically considering the existing definitions of crowdfunding and the underlying restrictions 
each definition imposes, and then suggesting an alternative method for defining 
crowdfunding, based upon the interactions between creators, backers and the platform. 
2.1.1 Characteristic 1: Number of crowdfunding participants 
One of the key characteristics utilised within existing crowdfunding definitions is the 
concept that funds are raised via a large group of people, as shown by the following non-
exhaustive list of examples: 
“The idea of crowdfunding is to obtain funding from a large group of people where each 
individual provides a small amount, instead of raising money from a very small group of 
experienced investors.” (Voorbraak et al, 2011, pg V) 
“Crowdfunding can be defined as the collection of funds, usually through a web platform, 
from a large pool of backers to fund an initiative.” (Wilson and Testoni, 2014, pg 1). 
“The basic idea is always the same: instead of raising the money from a very small group of 
sophisticated investors, entrepreneurs try to obtain it from a large audience, where each 
individual will provide a very small amount” (Belleflamme et al, 2010, pg 1). 
 
Across these definitions, there is a continuous characteristic of a large number of 
participants being key to the crowdfunding process. The author considers that a large number 
of crowdfunding participants can refer to two different scenarios, firstly it can refer to a large 
number of backers directly supporting the project. Or it can be considered to refer to a project 
that must have the potential to be supported by a large number of backers regardless of 
whether a project is or isn’t supported by the backers. As the first condition is more 
restrictive than the second condition, this was critically considered first.  
2.1.1.1 A large number of backers supporting a campaign 
Suggesting that a large number of backers are always needed to support a 
crowdfunding campaign is flawed as a campaign could be supported by a single backer. For 
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example, consider a crowdfunding project which aims to raise 100 dollars. This project can 
be founded by 1 person who provides 100 dollars or 100 people that each fund 1 dollar. Both 
of these projects sit on a crowdfunding platform on the web, however, under this 
characteristic, only the second scenario would be crowdfunding, without any other aspect of 
the platform or project having to change. If this condition is upheld, then only completed 
projects could be assessed to be crowdfunding projects. Within crowdfunding projects, 
backers can join or leave at any point in time. Therefore one could only be certain that the 
project has a large number of backers at the end of a campaign. This restriction of only being 
able to define completed projects is problematic due to the existence of continuously funded 
crowdfunding projects which don’t have a clear completion point (see section 2.2.6.2). A 
second point rendering this characteristic undesirable is that one needs to be able to define 
what is meant by large. Large could be defined as 100 people or a 1000 people, or 10000? 
For example, if one were to argue that a large campaign has over 1000 backers, then this 
would mean that the average crowdfunding campaign on Kickstarter doesn’t have a large 
number of backers, as the average campaign has 102 backers extrapolated from (Kickstarter, 
2019a). Furthermore, using a number of backers in defining the platform creates an odd 
scenario where at a specific point in a crowdfunding campaign, a single backer supporting the 
project transforms the project from a non-crowdfunding project into a crowdfunding project.  
2.1.1.2 The large potential pool of backers 
In the aforementioned scenario, it thus becomes necessary to define who are the pool 
of backers. However, defining the pool of backers becomes difficult when considering online 
crowdfunding platforms, as does this refer to the users of the platform or anyone using the 
internet? Without defining who forms the pool of backers, it becomes impossible to 
determine whether this is large or small. However, even when the pool of backers is clearly 
defined there is no reason that crowdfunding has to have a large pool of backers. Consider a 
new crowdfunding platform that has just started and only has five visitors a day; it has one 
open project which is seeking a hundred dollars. These five backers support the project with 
twenty dollars each, and it is successfully funded. In this theoretical example, there have only 
been five potential backers, yet they have fully supported the project. Leading to two 
plausible outcomes, either this platform is not a crowdfunding platform or using size as part 
of the definition of crowdfunding is flawed. The author argues the latter and thus considers 
that the number of backers should not be a component of a crowdfunding definition, 
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regardless of whether this is referring to the potential number of backers or an actual number 
of backers. 
2.1.2 Characteristic 2: An online aspect of crowdfunding. 
One characteristic utilised in defining crowdfunding is the usage of the internet demonstrated 
by the non-exhaustive list below: 
 “Crowdfunding is an emerging internet fundraising mechanism for soliciting capital from the 
online crowd to support innovative projects” (Li and Duan, 2014, pg 2). 
“Crowdfunding is a relatively new phenomenon that merges modern social web technologies 
with project-based fundraising” (Wash, 2013, pg 631).  
 
“Crowdfunding is a new funding practice through which people, often living in different 
geographical areas, contribute to funding a project they share an interest in. Money is raised 
via online platforms, thus, utilising the Web 2.0 technologies” (Borello et al, 2015, pg 1). 
 
There is no doubt that the internet is key to the current form of crowdfunding as 
demonstrated by the expansive network of online crowdfunding platforms, for a specific list 
of platforms, please see (Röthler and Wenzlaff, 2011, pg 52). Although this is not an 
exhaustive list of platforms as they can be added or removed from the web at any moment, 
making it difficult to state the exact size of the online crowdfunding network. Nevertheless, it 
demonstrates the large variety of sites involved in crowdfunding.  
However, the use of being online as an implicit part of a broad crowdfunding 
definition is flawed due to how crowdfunding has occurred historically. A prominent 
example of historical crowdfunding is the pedestal upon which the statue of liberty stands. 
The money for the pedestal was raised by New York newspaper asking its readers for a sum 
of money, and in return they received a wide range of reward-based on the amount given, one 
such reward was a small statuette of the Statue, thus providing a historical example of 
reward-based crowdfunding (Pitts, 2010). 
A second example is of Alexander Pope who in 1713 wanted to translate 15,693 lines 
of ancient Greek poetry, to do this he asked for two gold guineas, and in return, those who 
backed his project were listed in an early edition of the book (Kazmark, 2013). The 
translation of the poems formed an English version of Homer’s Illiad which endures to this 
day. Even the great musicians of history utilised crowdfunding, Mozart’s first attempt to 
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utilise crowdfunding to fund the creation of his concertos failed. It was only on his second 
attempt that he was successful (Kazmark, 2013). A more general example is charities that 
have used donation boxes to enable people to support their cause anonymously. These 
donation boxes can be placed in streets or public places to attract the attention and funds of 
the public crowd (Perrine et al, 2000). It can also be noted that offline crowdfunding is not 
only historically, but also can be occurring within Modern business, Muller et al (2013) 
demonstrated, both theoretically and via a trial system within a large multinational company, 
that crowdfunding could be utilised within a business, enabling employees to spend their 
money on specific organisational needs. Demonstrating offline crowdfunding by a 
multinational company, however, the business did utilise their internal intranet as a 
replacement for the internet, in this case, nevertheless still highlighting the theoretical 
possibility of modern offline crowdfunding.   
Crowdfunding utilising the internet is thus not desirable as part of a broad 
crowdfunding definition; however, the internet has enabled substantial larger amounts of 
crowdfunding to occur. Cumming et al (2014, pg 25), argued that “thanks to the emergence 
of Internet platforms, crowdfunding has become accessible to a large number of 
entrepreneurs as an alternative form of funding.” This growth has led to the crowdfunding 
market being worth over 16.2 billion dollars in 2014, and an expected 32 billion in 2015 
(Massolution, 2015). Thus, although crowdfunding often utilises the internet, it doesn’t have 
to use the internet, and as such, it shouldn’t be used as a key characteristic in its definition. 
This distinction can be noted within the crowdfunding literature, where new additions to the 
literature add the suffix online when referring to crowdfunding which takes place on the 
internet (Li and Duan,2014; Meer, 2014; Althoff and Leskovec, 2015). 
2.1.3 Characteristic 3: Building from the concept of crowdsourcing 
One of the suggested ways to frame the definition of crowdfunding is to utilise the 
already existing form of crowdsourcing, as shown in the following non-exhaustive list of 
definitions; 
“the concept of crowdfunding finds its root in the broader concept of crowdsourcing, which 
uses the “crowd” to obtain ideas, feedback and solutions in order to develop corporate 
activities. In the case of crowdfunding, the objective is to collect money for investment 
(Belleflamme et al, 2010, pg 1). 
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“The term crowdfunding itself is derived from the better-known term crowdsourcing, which 
describes the process of outsourcing tasks to a large, often anonymous number of individuals, 
a "crowd of people” (here: the Internet community) and drawing on their assets, resources, 
knowledge or expertise. In the case of crowdfunding, the objective is to obtain money.” 
(Ibrahim, 2012, pg 392) 
 
However, utilising crowdsourcing to obtain a broad definition of crowdfunding when 
examined in detail shows that it can lead a specific set of restrictions. This is demonstrated 
via Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-De-Guevara (2012), definition of crowdsourcing:  
 
“Crowdsourcing is a type of participative online activity in which an individual, an 
institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a group of individuals of 
varying knowledge, heterogeneity, and number, via a flexible open call, the voluntary 
undertaking of a task. The undertaking of the task, of variable complexity and modularity, 
and in which the crowd should participate bringing their work, money, knowledge and/or 
experience, always entails mutual benefit. The user will receive the satisfaction of a given 
type of need, be it economic, social recognition, self-esteem, or the development of 
individual skills, while the crowdsourcer will obtain and utilize to their advantage what the 
user has brought to the venture, whose form will depend on the type of activity undertaken.” 
(Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-De-Guevara, 2012, page 197) 
 
This definition was characterised as having eight key characteristics, which were then 
considered across multiple platforms which self-identified as crowdsourcing sites, with the 
majority supporting at least half of these characteristics. Demonstrating that even a very 
developed crowd-sourcing definition is not consistently applied across crowdsourcing sites. 
Leaving it uncertain which characteristics should be utilised in the process of defining 
crowdfunding.  
Furthermore, one of the major characteristics is being online, which has already been 
shown to be unnecessary in crowdfunding. Demonstrating that key differences between 
crowdfunding and crowdsourcing must be identified. Creating a fundamental problem with 
utilising crowd-sourcing to define crowdfunding, that requires an implicit understanding of 
what crowdfunding is. Which can only really be obtained by creating a definition of 
crowdfunding. Therefore crowd-sourcing can be utilised as a source of characteristics for 
crowdfunding, but fundamentally cannot be used to create a definition by itself. 
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A second point is raised in (Belleflamme et al, 2010) definition which suggested that 
money collected by crowdfunding must be used for investment. However, this then means 
that any crowdfunding purpose which is not raising money for investment is no longer 
crowdfunding. Including a requirement to how the money raised in crowdfunding is used 
dramatically restricts the possible crowdfunding platforms. Instead, the usage of the money 
could be seen as a method of subdividing crowdfunding, subdivisions methodology is 
considered in (section 2.2).   
2.1.4 Characteristic 4: utilising the concept of the crowd. 
Another term which has been utilised across multiple definitions is “the crowd”. As 
demonstrated in the non-exhaustive list of definition below; 
 “Crowdfunding is an emerging internet fundraising mechanism for soliciting capital from the 
online crowd to support innovative projects.” (Li and Duan, 2014, pg 2)  
“Entrepreneurs and businesses can utilise the crowd to obtain ideas, collect money, and 
solicit input on the product, overall fostering an environment of collective decision-making 
and allowing businesses to connect with potential customers.” 
“Crowdfunding is a nascent ecosystem for early-stage innovation and finance enabling 
businesses to utilise the Crowd to obtain resources. Such as ideas, money and feedback on the 
product” (Scholz, 2015, pg vii) 
If the term “crowd” is to be utilised as part of the definition, then it must be clearly 
defined. However, the definition of the crowd will change based upon the surroundings it is 
based as demonstrated by Ibrahim (2012) which consider the crowd to be the internet 
community, while crowds have also referred to the social group surrounding young adults 
(Cross and Fletcher, 2009). In utilising the term as part of a general definition creates 
uncertainty in the meaning of the definition, as it can refer to multiple different definitions.  
The inclusion of the crowd term can thus be considered to only transform the problem 
from how to broadly define crowdfunding, to how to broadly define the crowd. The author 
would argue that this reshaping of the problem makes it even more difficult to find a broad 
definition, due to how the term crowd can be used with multiple different meaning as 
discussed above. Therefore, the inclusion of a crowd term is not considered to assist in the 
creation of a broad definition of crowdfunding.  
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2.1.5 The three players involved in Crowdfunding 
Fundamentally, focusing on the characteristics of the crowdfunding networks does not 
enable a succinct way of defining crowdfunding, which achieves the goal of creating a 
distinction between crowdfunding and traditional funding methods. Hence, instead of 
considering the characteristics of the crowdfunding platform themselves, the author proposes 
to follow a different approach. Kromidha and Robson (2016) paper on signalling within 
crowdfunding noted that there are two different signalling parties active within the 
crowdfunding platform, the creators of the crowdfunding projects and the backers (those 
providing funds) of the crowdfunding project. Moreover, that these parties both utilise the 
platform to signal potential future backers into supporting the project they have supported or 
created. This interaction is considered in detail in the development of the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, but the important point for the development of a key definition of 
crowdfunding is that the concept that crowdfunding contains three distinct parties, the 
backers, the creators and the platform itself, this three different parties originally outlined in 
Ordanini et al (2011). The author proposes that crowdfunding can be defined via considering 
interactions between these groups. Before considering the interaction, it is necessary to 
clearly define each group, the author defines the groups as the following:  
1) The ‘creators’ are the core of crowdfunding. They are a person or group who is 
seeking money for any venture, task, idea or concept, who decides to utilise a platform to 
raise said money. 
2) The ’backers’ are the fund providers; they provide money via the platform to 
support the creators. The backers can support the projects for any reason. 
3) The ‘platform’ exists to connect the creators and the backers; each platform can set 
its own rules for both the creators and the backers, it enables money to be transferred without 
the necessity of a direct connection between backers and creators. However, a platform does 
not make funding decisions (who receives funds) as these are made by the backers. 
The author considers that a definition for crowdfunding can be created solely through 
considering the relationship between these three parties. Specifically, that all that is necessary 
for crowdfunding to occur is backers to be able to provide funds to creators through using a 
crowdfunding platform. Thus this can be formally defined as the following:   
Crowdfunding is the interaction between three parties: creators, backers and a 
platform. Creators seek to obtain funds for a project, backers provide those funds, and the 
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platform acts as an exchange between the backers and the creators, without itself making 
funding decisions.  
Under this definition, creators can be anyone seeking to fund any project for any 
purpose. As can backers - for example they could be long-established investors or people 
who have never invested before. The platforms can be anything from an offertory box outside 
a church to the entirety of the World Wide Web, as the only condition is that it enables 
backers to support creators without specifically deciding who receives funds. This last 
condition is incredibly important, as it is this condition which enables a clear point of 
separation between crowdfunding and traditional financing. The condition stems from the 
concept that crowdfunding can be disassociated with traditional financing through 
disintermediation, i.e. the removal of intermediaries between producers and consumers 
(Beaulieu et al, 2015). This condition is necessary for backers to choose which projects 
succeed and which don’t, enabling the claim that crowdfunding is democratising the access to 
finance (Nasrabadi, 2016). The distinct point at which crowdfunding becomes traditional 
funding is demonstrated in the following examples created by the author: 
Example a) A church offertory box, sitting on a public street. The creator of the box is the 
church, the potential backers are anyone who passes it, and the platform is the box. The box 
can make no funding decisions; it is, in the end, a box, the backer can put money into the box 
which will be transferred to the church. Therefore, under the definition given this is a clear 
case of crowdfunding. 
Example b) Venture capitalism, in this case, the venture capitalist raises money from its 
investors and then invest this money in multiple start-ups, the venture capitalist could be 
defined as the platform, the start-ups as the creators and the backers as the investors. The 
decision on whom to invest in is made by the venture capitalist company, the backers are not 
choosing whom they are backing, and thus this is not crowdfunding. To turn this traditional 
funding form into crowdfunding, the decision on who is funded would have to change from 
the venture capitalist company to the backers.  
Example c) Online funding platforms: Within online funding platforms, the creators can be 
seen as anyone attempting to raise money on the platform, the backers can be seen as the 
online internet users who support the project. The platform is the website itself. For the 
platform to be a crowdfunding platform, it must enable backers to fund projects without 
interfering in how the funds are used. As soon as there is interference in how the funds are 
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allocated, the platform it is no longer a crowdfunding platform, but instead a traditional 
funding platform. Example of such interference would be directly choosing which projects 
receive funds or pooling together funds and then assigning the money to projects based on the 
platform’s whims.  
These examples show that this definition can be utilised across both offline and online 
crowdfunding. This condition of funding choice being in backers’ control is vital for the 
usage of signalling theory in explaining crowdfunding success, this theory has been utilised 
across all classical subdivision of crowdfunding (Ahlers et al, 2015; Boudreau et al, 2015; 
;Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Moss et al, 2015; Vismara, 2018). Signalling quality between 
backers and creators can only matter if the backers are making the funding decision. Thus this 
condition must hold for signalling to be key in understanding success in crowdfunding. 
This definition proves two clear points of distinction between crowdfunding and 
traditional financing. The first is when the platform starts making funding decision, i.e. 
choosing who receives backing. The second is when the number of parties involved is 
reduced to two, by removing the platform and having a direct exchange between backers and 
creators. Therefore, achieving the goal set out in providing a broad definition of 
crowdfunding with clear points at which it can be distinguished from traditional funding. The 
next section considers the traditional methodology of subdividing crowdfunding and then 
builds upon them suggesting further subdivision methodology based on creator participation 
rights.  
2.2 Subdividing Crowdfunding: -  
Crowdfunding can be subdivided into multiple different categories, the main approach 
to the classification of crowdfunding, was suggested by Giudici et al (2012). This author 
argued that each crowdfunding platform is administered under different, individual, rules 
affecting the set of permissible actions for both backers and creators of innovation projects 
and that they can be divided based on the backers’ participation rights leading to the creation 
of four major categories: 
i. Equity-based crowdfunding, where a backer is entitled to a share of the company or of the 
product they are backing and are thus entitled to a residual income from the product or title.  
ii. Lending (debt) based crowdfunding, where backers are given an interest payment for their 
backing. 
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iii. Donation-based crowdfunding, where no physical return is given to the backer, this is 
mainly used for charitable causes. 
iv. Reward-based crowdfunding, in which the backer is given a reward, based on the size of his 
donation which can be, for example, a product, art work, game. The reward can be anything 
specified by the project creator. (adapted from, Giudici et al, 2012, p. 8) 
 
This method of sub-division can be used to identify the different section of the 
crowdfunding literature. The following sections of this chapter consider each of these types 
of crowdfunding separately, identifying prominent platforms of each type of crowdfunding as 
well as key themes and concepts highlighted in the existing literature.  
2.2.1 Reward-based crowdfunding 
2.2.1.1 Definition and visualisation  
Reward-based crowdfunding is considered the most prominent as of 2017 and can be 
identified via creators not having to provide any financial incentive to the backers in return 
for their funds, instead backers receive a specific reward-based on the amount of funds given 
to the project (Bi et al, 2017). Alternatively, regarding backer participation rights, the backer 
has the right to a specific reward-based upon the amount of funds given to the project. Any 
legal products or service can be funded on a reward-based crowdfunding platform. However, 
they may be restricted by the crowdfunding platform, for example, reward-based 
crowdfunding on Unbound.com can only be utilised in funding books (Unbound, 2019). The 
rewards can be any legal product or service and are often grouped together into reward levels, 
which contain a set of rewards. A project can set multiple rewards or reward levels, and 
backers are free to choose between any of these. It has been considered within the literature 
that rewards are one of the key motivators in reward-based platforms (Bretschneider and 
Leimeister, 2017). Rewards do not have to be provided during the project. Instead, they can 
be given to the backer at a future date, this can be compared to pre-ordering phenomena 
observed in video games and the technology market: where users purchase a project with the 
knowledge that they will not receive the product for at least a certain period of time which 
can be extended due to delays in production (Hernandez and Handan, 2014). This expected 
delay means that reward-based crowdfunding can be divided into two different sections: the 
funding period and delivery period, the funding period considers when the project is raising 
its funds, and the delivery period considers when rewards are delivered, these may occur at 
the same time or at different times. From this information Figure 2-1 below is created. 
35   
 
Figure 2-1 Visualising reward-based crowdfunding 
 
This visualisation shows the scenario when the creator of a reward-based crowdfunding 
project offers three different rewards for his project. The second period demonstrates the 
delivery of the rewards to the backers; each reward is delivered at a different time. It is worth 
noting that the reward delivery is not tied to the crowdfunding platform, as at this point the 
direct connection between backer and creators has been established, the reward is sent 
directly to the backer.  
2.2.1.2 Moral Hazard in reward-based crowdfunding 
This visualisation in Figure 2-1 highlights the moral hazard problem that can occur 
within reward-based crowdfunding, as the rewards only have to be delivered after the money 
is received (Agrawal, 2014). This raises the following key questions around reward-based 
crowdfunding: do the projects successfully deliver the rewards and are platforms open to 
fraudulent projects where the creator has no intention or ability to deliver the rewards? 
Mollick (2014) recorded that in a set of 471 Kickstarter projects, only 3.6% failed to deliver 
the rewards, although 75 % of the projects were delayed in their delivery. Mollick (2015) 
then expanded his original study, in this new study he surveyed 47,188 backers from 
Kickstarter, within which he found that failure to deliver accounted for 9% of all projects, 
with a possible range lying between 5-14%. Highlighting that even in the most pessimistic 
scenario, only 14% of crowdfunding projects failed to deliver. In understanding whether this 
figure of 14 % is good or bad, one can consider the failure rate of start-ups based upon 
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different failure conditions. 30-40 percent of United States of America start-ups fail to return 
any money to investors. 75 percent fail at returning all of the original investment and 95 
percent fail at reaching profit expectations (Gage, 2012). The failure of start-ups is not a 
perfect comparison as they are under different constraints and delivering the rewards does not 
mean that the individual or crowdfunding company will not fail, especially considering that 
this was only looking at start-ups within the United States of America. However, the author 
still argues, it gives a basis for arguing that a 14 % failure rate is low and thus that moral 
hazard of not delivering rewards is not an inherent problem in reward-based crowdfunding.  
2.2.1.3 Kickstarter: the most prominent reward-based crowdfunding platform 
One point to consider is that the crowdfunding platform which Mollick addressed was 
Kickstarter, which is considered to be the most prominent example of a reward-based 
crowdfunding platform (Belleflamme et al, 2013). Kickstarter was founded on the 28th of 
April, 2009. Over 140,000 projects have been supported providing over 3.7 billion dollars to 
crowdfunding projects with the support of 15 million backers (Kickstarter, 2019a). Smaller 
less established reward-based crowdfunding platform may have different characteristics and 
may not benefit from the number of backers and thus inherent crowd wisdom on Kickstarter 
(Sadiku et al, 2017). Kickstarter has been utilised across multiple papers in identifying factors 
of success in reward-based crowdfunding.  
Kromidha and Robson (2016) utilised signalling theory to examine the 5000 projects 
who attracted the most funds on Kickstarter. Arguing that the greater the number of signals 
which were exchanged between the creators and backers the more successful the projects 
were in raising funds. The specific signals they considered were the numbers of comments 
and updates of the crowdfunding project. Comments are the online questions posed by the 
backers of the projects; these comments are displayed on the crowdfunding page, 
representing signals sent by the backers to other backers and the creators of the campaign. 
While updates are information provided by the creator of the campaign after the start of the 
campaign that are used to represent signals sent by creators to the current backers and 
potential backers. The dependent variable tested in this paper was the pledge to backer ratio, 
with a higher pledge to backer ratio considered to be more successful. Numbers of comments 
was statistically significant and had a positive correlation, however number of updates, 
although positively correlated, was not significantly significant. Conversly, a high number of 
updates at the end of successful projects was observed in (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2018). It 
must be taken into consideration that Kromidha and Robson (2016) only examined the most 
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successful campaigns and thus it can be questioned whether the same result would be 
considered in less successful and unsuccessful campaigns. Especially considering how 
signals sent by backers could be used to also identify flaws in the lower quality campaigns, 
persuading other backers not to support these campaigns. Thus, an extension of this research 
which considers a more varied set of project outcomes would enable a clearer role of these 
creator and backers’ signals to be identified. Furthermore, within Kickstarter, signalling 
theory can also be used to identify proxies for human capital, such as experience, which was 
a key theme of a paper written during the construction of this thesis (Davies and Giovannetti, 
2018).  
Alongside signalling theory, Kromidha and Robson (2016) also identified how social 
capital is key to success in crowdfunding, arguing its importance through the lens of the 
expansive social identity theory. They found that the number of friends on Facebook had a 
positive and significant effect on the success of campaigns, supporting results in (Mollick, 
2014; Zheng et al, 2014), and the authors’ work (Davies and Giovannetti, 2018). Colombo et 
al (2015) further expanded this concept by making a specific distinction. They distinguished 
that there were two types of interacting social capital, external and internal social capital. 
The external social capital was the type provided by an external network such as Facebook 
or LinkedIn. They, however, proposed that the crowdfunding platform itself could start to 
create internal social capital. Arguing that internal social capital could be captured by 
considering the numbers of previously backed campaigns by the creator of the new project. 
This measure of internal capital was found to have a positive and significant impact on the 
number of early backers and the amount of early funds received for campaigns. The author 
considers that if a crowdfunding platform is generating internal social capital, then it could 
be considered a pseudo social network. If it is possible to connect projects based on latent 
links given within the platform then the latent network can be mapped, enabling network 
analysis techniques to be considered in assessing success in crowdfunding. 
Wessel et al (2016), considered how social information can be manipulated within 
Kickstarter to create false signals. This false information was noted to have a positive short-
term effect, but negatively affecting projects in the long run. They demonstrate that fake 
social information usage occurs more on projects with higher quality indicators rather than 
projects with low-quality indicators.   
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Colombo et al (2015) also considered that early backers and early funders were key 
indicators of a successful crowdfunding campaign. They set the early funding period at 1/6th 
of the duration the campaign, such that a 30-day campaign, would have an early funding 
period of 5 days. Finding that both of these were significant and positively correlated to the 
amount of funds raised in a campaign. However, the choice of 1/6th of duration seems rather 
arbitrary, is the early backing period best defined as a 1/6th of the duration, why not a 1/8th 
or a 1/10th. Solomon et al (2015) and Kuppuswamy et Bayus (2018) noted that Kickstarter 
reports a boat/bathtub shaped funding pattern with both the beginning and the end of the 
cycle having the highest point of return, with the middle of the boat having a lower amount of 
backing, as displayed in Figure 2-2. 
Figure 2-2 Boat shaped funding period, extrapolated from (Kuppuswamy et Bayus, 2018) 
 
Thus, the early funding period could be considered to be at the point where the curve 
starts to flatten out; it may be possible to endogenously capture this point across each 
project’s campaign. This boat-shaped funding period also highlights that the beginning of the 
campaign is crucial to the success of the campaigns. Kuppuswamy et Bayus (2018) also 
supported Mollick (2014) finding that once projects reach 50 % funding, they are highly 
likely to succeed. 
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 The early funding period effect is increased, due to the occurrence of herding within 
crowdfunding (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2018). Herding is the phenomenon whereby there is 
a behavioural similarity brought about through the interaction of individuals. Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2003) argue that herding was originally restricted to a physically delimited space, but 
this restriction was removed by economists, in favour of any actionable space. Herding can 
be seen as a form of momentum trading, where after a project receives some initial interest, it 
will receive increased interest from other groups and parties for the rest of its duration (Park 
and Sabourian, 2011). Whereby the individual action is no longer determined by interpreting 
the private information signal they receive, but rather the observation of the other 
(Bikhchandani et al, 1992). Herding can have many implications for the affected individuals, 
due to the following factors:  
Idiosyncrasy: Signals sent by the first few individuals, which impact behaviour, can 
drastically affect behaviour of the individuals who follow.  
Fragility: When cascades occur, they are fundamentally fragile and can be sensitive to small 
shocks.  
Simultaneity: Endogenous events can lead to sudden changes, leading to vast increases or 
decreases in the observed actions. 
Paradoxicality: That the act of herding itself can limit the effects that public information 
might otherwise have on the likelihood of rational support.  
Path-dependency: The probability process driving the outcome paths of the event depends on 
the temporal order at which the information arrives.      
 (See Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003, pg 32) 
 
These five factors can clearly be linked to crowdfunding, Idiosyncrasy can lead to 
early funders having larger than rational effects on the likelihood of a project to succeed, 
which should be considered when capturing success (Oh and Baek, 2016). Fragility could 
suggest that crowdfunding platforms and projects could be very susceptible to shifts of 
information. This may have an impact on the long-term sustainability of platforms, if serial 
creators are unable to consistently utilise crowdfunding, due to fundamental instability caused 
by fragility. Simultaneity could lead to crowdfunding platforms being greatly affected by 
shifts of information from outside the platform. Paradoxicality could imply that high quality 
crowdfunding projects may be unable to successfully signal their quality due to the herding 
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effects. Path-dependency suggests that specific project information and advertising efforts 
will be more impactful if provided at the very beginning of the campaign, otherwise specific 
investors may be missed (Agrawal et al, 2011). Thus, the herding phenomena deeply affect 
crowdfunding through these phenomena.   
Mollick (2014) work highlights that geographic location may affect success within 
Kickstarter in two specific ways, firstly via observing that projects are concentrated in 
specific geographic locations, with individual categories of projects more concentrated than 
general crowdfunding concentrations. Thus, projects of the same category are more likely to 
be geographically concentrated. While also noting that campaigns located within an area of 
higher population were more likely to succeed. Contrary to this point, Kromidha and Robson 
(2016) tested the impact of success on the top 5000 projects across 13 different regions in the 
world, only discovering that only two of them were statistically significant in affecting the 
pledge/backer ratio of the top 5000 crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter. These geographical 
considerations all focus on the creator locations; however, it may be that the relative 
geographical differences between backers and creators are key to capturing the effects on 
crowdfunding. Agrawal et al (2011) did consider the effects of distance between creators and 
backers on the equity crowdfunding platform Sellaband, finding that distance related funding 
frictions were removed. However, Sellaband failed and became bankrupt in February 2010, 
thus causing the result not to be generalisable, especially considering the expansion of 
crowdfunding, where it doubled every year between 2009-2012 (Massolution,2015).  
Other explanatory variables can be explored across geographic divides, Zheng et al 
(2014) demonstrated this by considering the differences in the impact of social capital on 
success in crowdfunding between the US and China. Utilising Kickstarter for the US and 
Demohour for China. Concluding that social capital had a positive and significant impact in 
both cases, however, it had a stronger impact in China than in America.  
2.2.1.4 Other Platforms 
However, as all these papers utilise Kickstarter as the major source of data and 
Kickstarter is the most or one of the most prominent examples of the reward-based 
crowdfunding sites (Belleflamme et al, 2013), it could be that these results are only true for 
Kickstarter. Crosetto and Regner (2018), examine the biggest German reward-based 
crowdfunding platform Startnext, in this platform 75% of the projects that eventually succeed 
only manage to succeed in the final 25 percent of the duration. Leading to the conclusion that 
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the final periods of funding are essential, in contrast to the results for Kickstarter which 
focuses on the early funding period (Colombo, 2015). Cumming et al (2016) examined 
Indiegogo, a crowdfunding platform which enables both keep-it-all and all-or-nothing creator 
crowdfunding rights. Keep-it-all funding refers to when the creator of a project receives all of 
the money backed at the end of the project, even if the funding goal was not reached. 
Conversely in all-or-nothing funding creators only receive the money if the funding goal is 
reached. The inclusion of both types of funding mechanisms enabled a comparison between 
these two factors which would not have been possible on Kickstarter, coming to the 
conclusion that all-or-nothing funding would on average raise more money than keep-it-all 
funding.   
Bi et al (2017) examined the Chinese crowdfunding platform Demohour, utilising the 
elaboration likelihood model. This model, developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), argues 
that there are two different routes of communications which can be utilised to explain how 
people are persuaded to support a position. There is a central route of persuasion in which a 
person utilises the actual information provided to them to change their opinion and a 
peripheral route which considers a concept of induced value. The latter is not connected to 
the actual information provided, but rather associated with some underlying aspects of the 
communication, such as the quality or credibility of the broadcaster. Bi et al (2017) identified 
that this model could be utilised to consider crowdfunding, suggesting that the signals of 
project quality can be considered central root factors, capturing this quality by the inclusion 
of videos and the number of words utilised in the campaign page. Peripheral effects were 
captured by the electronic word of mouth, utilising the number of like of the project and the 
number of reviews as a measure of electronic word of mouth. They carry out a combination 
of correlation analysis and linear regression models with their preliminary results suggesting 
that each factor had almost equal effects on success within Demohour.  
However, when the specific category of the project was also considered, science 
technology and agriculture projects were more greatly affected by the central route factors 
than the peripheral routes. On the other hand, entertainment and art were more greatly 
affected by the peripheral routes than the central routes. Therefore, demonstrating key 
differences to success based upon the category of the project. However it may be argued that 
this work does not accurately capture project quality, as it only considers word count and 
video count, while other variables should also be included. One possible additional variable, 
specifically for text, could be the impact of spelling errors, as demonstrated by Dorfleitner et 
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al (2016) who took into account spelling errors as an additional measure while considering 
peer-to-peer lending. Upon saying this it is worth noting that including spelling errors is not a 
simple process with Chinese characters, as there are no word delimiters, and the length of 
each word is very short, although this problem can be addressed as done within Wu et al ( 
2013), it may not be practical to carry out on large-scale research. In light of this, different 
languages may restrict the signals which can be captured from the crowdfunding platform 
based upon the structure of the language. Some may naturally use far fewer words or be more 
punishing for mistakes, this makes using analysis of text between platforms increasingly 
complex as the language differences would have to be taken into account. 
Language has also been utilised in considering differences in gender outcomes in 
crowdfunding. Gorbatai and Nelson (2015), examined the differences between female and 
male funding outcomes within Indiegogo. To the contrary, for offline funding they 
discovered that female lead funding was more likely to succeed then male lead funding. 
Arguing that the language differences between male and female creators are a key factor in 
affecting the success of a project. Utilising past literature which suggested that men and 
women have different writing styles (McMillan et al, 1977). They separate languages into 
four separate categories, a language which is inclusive, a language which contains positive 
emotion, business language and vivid language. Finding that positive emotion and inclusive 
language have a positive effect on crowdfunding projects, while business language has a 
negative effect, whilst not finding a significant effect for vivid language. Further 
investigating the differences in language between men and women they identify that women 
utilise more emotive inclusive and vivid language but less business-related terms. Concluding 
that gender has a 15-20 percent effect on money raised in favour of women, demonstrating 
that women raise more money in crowdfunding, partially based on their language usage. This 
can be linked to the concept of how crowdfunding can democratise access to capital 
providing capital to those who have been traditionally denied access to capital (Mollick and 
Robb, 2016).  
2.2.1.5 Backer motivation in reward-based crowdfunding 
The rewards have been identified as a key motivator of backers in reward-based 
crowdfunding (Belleflamme et al, 2013; Bretschneider and Leimeister, 2017) and their 
effects are shown to be positive across the literature. Mollick and Nanda (2015), identified a 
positive effect on success of increased reward levels and Qiu (2013) identified that projects 
which utilise a public good as a reward are 5 to 10 percent more likely to reach their funding 
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goal. Where a public good in this context is considered one which when supported will be 
given freely to the rest of the public. The specific example utilised was a DVD which would 
also be uploaded to YouTube. Enabling both the backers and the general public to view the 
content, while only the backers paid for the content. Zhang and Chan (2019) argued that the 
reward level may not accurately calculate the different number of rewards, as they considered 
that reward levels can include multiple rewards. Therefore a project with one reward level 
can plausibly have more rewards than a project with two reward levels, therefore arguing that 
the number of rewards should be considered over the number of reward levels. They find that 
the average number of rewards has a u-shaped effect on the number of backers. However 
separating reward levels into rewards may be problematic as it then introduces the problem of 
specifically defining different rewards. Consider the example of a set of videos, is this one 
reward or several, or take the case of a day trip, is this one reward or multiple rewards based 
upon the activities in the day. 
Furthermore, it may be impossible to view the number of rewards, for example 
suppose there is a gift box offered as a reward, this box could contain any number of smaller 
rewards. Furthermore, backers may calculate rewards entirely differently based on subjective 
preferences. Therefore, the author argues that reward levels which are clearly defined should 
be used over the uncertain variable of number of rewards, even though they may in some 
cases underestimate the number of rewards.  
2.2.1.6 Competition effects in reward-based crowdfunding.  
The evolution of competition in crowdfunding can be considered via how creators 
have moved from being funded on their websites (Belleflamme et al, 2013) which would 
have very limited competition, to competing within online crowdfunding platforms, with over 
16.2 billion dollars of funds being raised in 2014 (Massolution, 2015). The crowdfunding 
platforms can be considered to be two-sided markets, with two separate groups of economic 
participants, the backers and the creators with both benefitting from increased cross platform 
network effects (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Specifically, the creators benefit if more backers 
are drawn to the platform as it increases the chance that their project will be funded, while 
backers benefit from increased numbers of creators as it increases the probability that a 
project which reflects the backer preferences will be fulfilled. Additionally, the crowdfunding 
platform benefits as they receive a small percentage of each successful project and assuming 
that the additional projects increase the overall number of success, then the owners of the 
platform also benefit (Viotto, 2015). Two sided markets need to overcome the chicken and 
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egg problem, i.e. which of the creators or backers are drawn in first. However, in 
crowdfunding, this is not greatly problematic as one can focus on creators, as each creator has 
their social capital and can draw in backers from this, therefore platforms can focus on 
drawing in creators and then backers (Viotto, 2015). One possible future impact on the two-
sided market approach, is to consider the transfer of ownership of the platform from a third 
party to the users of said platform, bringing ownership of the platform to the users would 
remove the extra cost to the third party organising the platform and may overcome monopoly 
rent issues (Scholz, 2014).  
 Crowdfunding platforms are also affected by competition from within the paltform 
itself. Liu et al (2015) demonstrated how projects which greatly overperform, which they 
defined as blockbusters, can affect the success of the surrounding projects within the same 
category of Kickstarter. This utilises the internal structure of Kickstarter where projects are 
separated into categories, the categories a project belongs to is chosen by the creator of the 
project. Conversely, projects outside the category were considered to be negatively affected 
by the existence of a blockbuster in another category. These hypotheses were then tested on a 
dataset of 735 observations from November 2010 to November 2014, with each observation 
representing a category within Kickstarter. With their results supporting the aforementioned 
hypotheses. 
2.2.2 Lending-based crowdfunding 
2.2.2.1 Definition and visualisation  
In lending-based crowdfunding backers lend the money out to creators with the 
expectations that the money will be returned in the future. The rate at which the money is 
returned and whether interest is accrued will depend upon the platform and project 
(Meyskens and Bird, 2015). The backer’s money is thus at risk as if the loan is defaulted on, 
the platform may not cover the debt (Everett, 2015). Two periods can thus be considered, the 
original delivery of the funds and the return of the funds as displayed in the following 
visualisation:  
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Figure 2-3 Lending-based crowdfunding visualisation 
 
In the visualisation displayed in Figure 2-3, the creator asks for 100 dollars, in return, 
the backers are given 120 dollars of debt, which is then paid back in the second period. In this 
example, it is paid back in three occurrences, and 20 dollars of interest was accrued. The 
major risk to the backers is default which can be caused by moral hazard issues within debt-
based crowdfunding.  
2.2.2.2 Moral Hazard and Hold up problems within debt-based crowdfunding 
Everett (2015) examined how the crowdfunding platform Prosper attempts to 
overcome moral hazard via the grouping of creators (in this case creators are those seeking 
loans). At the time Everett collected their data Prosper utilised an internet adapted Dutch 
auction approach, where loan return rate went up until the debt was bought by backers, 
conversely to the traditional function of the Dutch auction where the price dropped until a 
product was sold (Rockoff et al, 1995). Creators within the platform at the time had the 
option to join self-monitoring groups; these groups could be joined before the Dutch auctions 
were carried out and were identified to reduce uncertainty when personal links were used in 
the creation of these groups. These groups created by personal connections led to lower cost 
loans and lower default rates, benefiting both creators and backers. Suggesting that the moral 
hazard of the creators may be overcome via peer to peer monitoring between creators. 
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Conversely, Everett (2015) also examined how the hold-up problem that results from 
current lenders only seeing the quality of firm they lend to is still prevalent within debt-based 
crowdfunding. The informational holdup problem originates from how banks can obtain 
proprietary positive information regarding borrowers (Fama, 1985). Sharpe (1990) formally 
developed the hold-up concept from utilising this propriety information. Sharpe (1990) 
developed a model considering the relationship between firms and banks, with the 
assumption that only the current bank can see the actual quality of the firm. The bank will 
hold on to this information rather than passing it to other banks as this would aid competitors 
in obtaining their clients. Therefore, the true quality of the firm cannot be observed outside of 
the bank, enabling the bank to charge higher rates of interest compared to if the actual quality 
of the firm was known across the market. Everett (2015) found evidence that hold-up 
problem is still pervasive within Prosper, based upon the informational level of the backers, 
this problem was worsened with users with low credit ratings. Thus, traditional hold-up-
problems are still a relevant issue within debt-based crowdfunding.       
2.2.2.3 Kiva: Lending-based crowdfunding platform 
One of the most established of these platforms is Kiva which was founded in 2005. 
Kiva delivers microloans to alleviate poverty around the world; it has enabled 2.9 million 
borrowers to access in excess of 1.16 billion dollars’ worth of loans. Moral hazard has not 
been a problem within Kiva, with a repayment rate of 96.9 %, one possible key to this high 
repayment rate is the usage of partners who facilitate the delivery of the loans and are based 
in the local country (Kiva, 2019a). This form of microlending has been proposed as a solution 
to fund and develop small business across the developing world (Ibrahim, 2012). 
Contrary to this expectation Allison et al (2015) research into Kiva itself noted that 
projects are more likely to be successful if the narrative of the venture focuses on the intrinsic 
value generated by the project rather than the extrinsic values, furthermore arguing that 
business ventures were less likely to succeed than ventures which were seen as opportunities 
to help people. Even though Moss et al (2015) work demonstrated that business ventures 
returned investment faster than virtuous projects. Highlighting that backer participation for 
Kiva is not solely driven by seeking a stable return to investment but can be suggested to be 
more altruistic. Kiva runs an all-or-nothing policy, with money only going to the creators if 
they successfully reach the funding goal. The creators of the projects on Kiva in most 
circumstances are not the end users receiving the loan but instead are the partner 
organisation, who run the projects as representatives of the creators. The author would argue 
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this is still crowdfunding as the backers can choose which project they are supporting and 
thus signalling can still occur. However, it is signalling between the partner organisation and 
the backers, not the end user. The platform still acts as an exchange without making funding 
decisions. 
Rate Setter and Prosper offer a very different direction for debt-based crowdfunding. 
They focus on the interest rate offered to the creators (those seeking funds), which can be 
used for any purpose, they deem themselves to be peer to peer loan platforms. Rate Setter has 
facilitated 3 billion dollars in lending, with over 600,000 investors and borrowers (Rate 
Setter, 2019). While Prosper has leant over 12 billion dollars (Prosper, 2019).  
However, under the definition of crowdfunding discussed in the previous section, 
Rate Setter would not be considered a crowdfunding platform. This is due to how in Rate 
Setter backers do not get to choose which specific project they fund, when funding they get to 
choose from between 5 different yearly markets, with different rates of return, but not where 
their funds are utilised within these markets. Thus, the backers are not deciding who receives 
funds, the platform decides who receives funding, thus under the definition developed within 
this thesis this is no longer crowdfunding. Compare this to Prosper, which is functionally 
very similar to Rate Setter, backers can look at each project and choose which projects they 
wish to support. Prosper thus still satisfies the definition and can be considered a 
crowdfunding platform. Highlighting how peer to peer lending platforms can be either 
crowdfunding or traditional funding.  
2.2.2.4 Signalling in lending crowdfunding 
Moss et al (2015) examined how signalling can be considered in the lending-based 
crowdfunding platform Kiva. They argued that creator signals could be identified via the 
specific narratives utilised within the project page of the Kiva platform. Specifically 
identifying two key narrative areas of entrepreneurial orientation and virtuous orientation. 
Entrepreneurial orientation captures a firm’s strategic level, managerial and strategic 
decisions which are entrepreneurial in nature, in general referring to decisions focused on 
innovation, proactiveness and risk-taking (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). While virtuous 
orientation refers to a set of characteristics which can be seen as virtuous in nature, defining 
the individual ethical character traits and virtuous behaviour (Payne et al, 2011).  
Furthermore, they proposed that virtuous orientation can be seen as a signal of the 
creator’s reliability and ethicality, thus increasing the speed at which microloans reach there 
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funding goal. Entrepreneurial orientation signalled via five key terms, is considered to have a 
positive effect via making investment more desirable and reducing asymmetric information 
between creators and backers. A textual analysis was used to identify these aspects through 
an examination of 400,000 projects from Kiva. Their results were contrasting, with some 
elements of virtuous orientation being supported and other elements having a negative 
impact. Entrepreneurial orientation had similarly mixed results, with some terms having 
significant effects and others no affect at all. One of the limitations of this paper is that the 
role of the partner organisation was not taken into consideration, within Kiva partner 
organisations can be seen as the creators, as the partners are the ones who set up the 
campaigns. The reason for this is a result of the assumption that digital and physical literacy 
rates of the poorest are likely to mean that they would be unable to run a campaign. Thus it is 
more likely to be run for them by a partner organisation. Nevertheless, this work 
demonstrates the concept of utilising signals to capture factors of success in lending 
crowdfunding. Another key result from the literature regarding signals is that they can be 
indirectly generated, Gonzalez and Loureiro (2014), identified that the photos of users can act 
as signals, with those who are younger, or individuals who are more attractive being offered 
more money. This work does have the problem of defining attractiveness, which can be 
somewhat subjective. 
2.2.3 Equity-based crowdfunding 
2.2.3.1 Definition and visualisation 
In equity crowdfunding creators offer a form of equity to the backer in return for their 
funding, this could be a portion of equity in the company or a profit-sharing agreement. In 
general, for a project to raise more money greater amount of equity must be offered, although 
this can depend upon the project (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Backers can then sell or trade 
the equity in the future and may receive a proportion of the profits while holding the equity. 
This is visualised in the Figure 2-4 below:  
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Figure 2-4 Visualisation of Equity crowdfunding 
 
In the first-period creator's exchange funds for equity in the business, in the second-
period backers have two choices, either they hold the equity and retain some form of 
shareholder profits or they sell the equity hoping that it is worth more than what they paid. 
Thus, the key question for this type of crowdfunding stems from the value of the equity held 
by the backers and the regulatory frameworks necessary for its development. These can be 
separated into adverse selection problems and moral hazard problems, in order to examine 
adverse selection, one needs to discern how many equity crowdfunding companies have 
become insolvent after running a campaign. Hornuf and Schmitt (2016), examined data from 
Germany and England on insolvency of equity crowdfunding start-ups, finding higher 
survival rates in England, 42 weeks after the campaigns ended 80% of English companies 
still survived compared to the 70% of German companies. Hornuf and Schmitt (2016) 
suggested these results demonstrated that equity crowdfunding is not only a market for 
lemons, utilising the famous concept from (Akerlof, 1978). Furthermore, Hornuf and Schmitt 
(2016) suggested that the moral hazard issue of creators not fulfilling their promises can be 
overcome by utilising multiple crowdfunding rounds and considering the approach utilised by 
companies where a portion of the money is held back for a certain period until the backers’ 
vote on the performance of the creators and the funds are released. This links to the emerging 
concept of conditional crowdfunding (please see section 2.2.5).  
2.2.3.2 Unique Regulatory challenges in Equity Crowdfunding 
Equity crowdfunding creates some unique regulatory challenges; this was highlighted 
in the United States of America by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) 
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which had to be enacted for equity crowdfunding to occur (Dorff, 2013). Regulatory 
differences across countries mean that equity crowdfunding platforms cannot be truly global 
as in the case of other types of crowdfunding, in general countries can only participate if they 
share a similar regulatory framework. For example, the UK can support other projects in 
Europe, for the time being at least. However a backer in the UK would not be able to support 
projects in China or America (Vismara, 2018).  
2.2.3.3 Examples of Equity crowdfunding platforms 
Even with these legal restrictions, there is a growing segment of equity crowdfunding 
platforms. The UK has the most developed equity crowdfunding markets with platforms 
competing such as Crowdcube and Seedrs. Crowdcube has raised over 466 million pounds in 
investment since being founded in 2011 and Seedrs has raised over 380 million pounds since 
being launched on 6 July 2012. The average amount of money raised per successful 
campaign is 0.66 million pounds for Crowdcube and 0.59 million pounds for Seedrs (Seedrs, 
2019; Crowdcube, 2019). Compare this to the most established reward-based crowdfunding 
platform Kickstarter, which on average raises only 20,000 dollars per successful project 
(Kickstarter, 2019a). America has a less developed equity crowdfunding platforms, as title III 
of the JOBS Act only came into force in May 2016, which was required to enable American 
equity crowdfunding platforms to emerge. Since then multiple platforms have emerged, 
Wefunder has raised 61.5 million dollars for 195 start-ups (Wefunder, 2019), StartEngine is 
also noteworthy, not just as an equity platform, but also an emerging crypto-funding platform 
which utilises cryptocurrency as part of its fund-raising activities, StartEngine has raised 
money for over 133 campaigns (StartEngine, 2019).  
2.2.3.4 Moral hazard in Equity Crowdfunding 
Even with regulatory allowances, there is still a suggestion within the literature that 
equity crowdfunding is far too lightly regulated and will lead to a “fleecing of the American 
Masses” by encouraging people to invest who do not have enough knowledge in the area to 
invest securely (Griffin, 2012). This is further considered in Ibrahim (2015) paper which 
considered that there are two types of Equity crowdfunding based on Title II and Title III of 
the JOBS Act. Title II of the JOBS Act enabled existing credited investors to seek additional 
money online and is more of an extension online of existing venture capital and angel 
investor networks. However, Title III requires no such existing credited investors and it is 
equity crowdfunding platforms which are linked to this type of crowdfunding which is more 
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likely to fund unsuccessful projects. Although he further suggested that this can be overcome 
by the wisdom of the crowds and intermediation.  
According to Felin (2012), the wisdom of the crowd is a concept the origins of which 
can be drawn back as far as Galton (1907), who considered that aggregated information, 
drawn from individual sources, which may be biased, can still provide key insights into the 
nature of reality and the aggregated preferences of individuals. This approach was further 
expanded by Hayek (1945) who argued that the aggregated subjective evaluations of 
individuals is reflected in the prices emerging from the market mechanisms. No one 
individual has access to all the information, rather prices act to enable co-ordination between 
users based upon their own private information. Organisations can aggregate information, to 
try and simulate the underlying wisdom of the crowds (Felin and Zenger, 2011).  Thus, the 
crowd has access to information and skills which may enable it to make decisions more 
beneficial than if the action was carried out via a single individual (Polzin et al, 2018). 
Hence, within crowdfunding, the wisdom of the crowd can be seen when backers collectively 
follow aggregate signals sent by projects to judge the quality of the projects (Ahlers et al, 
2015). Furthermore, due to the online nature of the crowdfunding platforms, the wisdom of 
the crowd can also be seen to be directed by the social actions specifically allowed within the 
platforms. The comments shared via the platform can be seen as a way of directing the 
wisdom of the crowd, due to the limited ability of the backers to interact on the platforms 
(Clauss et al, 2018). Thus, it could be seen that the comments of other backers can be used to 
highlight weaknesses and strengths within a specific project, enabling others to benefit from 
the knowledge of those other backers and to more clearly identify high quality projects.   
Intermediation is demonstrated through how equity crowdfunding platform attempt to 
demonstrate high-quality projects. For example, Crowdcube and Seedrs intermediates by 
offering validation of the creators’ pitch and a valuation of the creators company 
(Crowdcube, 2019; Seedrs, 2019). However, there is no clear process in how these valuations 
are gathered, and there is the possibility that a platform could be incentivised to overvalue a 
project to secure the money it receives for funding. Especially as Vulkan et al (2016) 
demonstrated that a higher valuation increases success within the Seedrs and the 
crowdfunding platforms are incentivised to encourage success as they receive a portion of the 
raised funds.  
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Furthermore, Vulkan et al (2016) also considered the effect that tax relief had on 
success in equity crowdfunding. As within the UK, SEIS (Social Enterprise Investment 
Schemes) and EIS (Enterprise Investment Schemes) tax relief can be claimed, thus offering a 
potential incentive in investing in Equity Crowdfunding. However, within their model the 
effects of SEIS and EIS were uncertain, they were positively correlated, however they were 
both insignificant. Thus, leaving the effect of the tax relief to be uncertain.  
2.2.3.5 Signal and uncertainty in equity crowdfunding 
Ahlers et al (2015) considered that success in crowdfunding could be captured by a 
combination of a signal of venture quality and the level of uncertainty in the equity campaign. 
They derive their argument of the necessity of signals by comparing asymmetric information 
in equity crowdfunding to asymmetric information in entrepreneurial finance, noting that 
information asymmetries are far higher in crowdfunding due to the distance between the 
backers and the creators (Agrawal et al., 2011). In order to overcome this asymmetric 
information, backers utilise the observable information as a signal for the unobservable 
information, projects which cannot show a set of information are assumed by the backers to 
be unable to show the information and are thus more likely to be considered low quality.  
 
Ahlers et al (2015) examined three different set of signals, human capital, social 
capital and intellectual capital. However, only human capital was found to have a significant 
effect on the number of investors supporting the project. Human capital was captured via two 
proxies, firstly the number of members on the board and secondly the percentage of board 
members with an MBA. Thus, one of the possible limitations with this work is that these 
proxies may not accurately capture human capital and that human capital may be captured via 
alternative measurements. Furthermore, this paper examined the impact of uncertainty in 
equity crowdfunding. Defining the level of uncertainty as the amount of equity offered 
relative to the amount of information provided about the campaign. The less information 
provided, the higher the level of uncertainty within the decision making of potential backers. 
The results supported this argument by showing that projects which did not include a 
financial forecast were negatively correlated to the amount of funds raised in the project and 
were statistically significant. This paper suggests that success in equity crowdfunding can be 
captured via examination of financial commitments and human capital, however, a large 
number of variables were insignificant, highlighting the need for further consideration of the 
specific variables used to capture these phenomena.   
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2.2.4 Donation-based crowdfunding 
2.2.4.1 Definition and visualisation 
Donation-based crowdfunding in some ways is the simplest form of crowdfunding because 
backers receive no compensation for their backing, funds are given freely with no additional 
requirements on the creators (Belleflamme et al, 2013). This is visualised in Figure 2-5 
below: 
Figure 2-5 Visualisation of donation-based crowdfunding 
 
Due to how backers receive no direct financial benefit in this form of crowdfunding, it 
has often been utilised for social enterprises, charities and projects with social objectives 
(Bone and Baeck, 2016). One such example was how donation-based crowdfunding was 
utilised to crowdfund research into Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) via the use of the 
ice-bucket challenge, where individuals poured a bucket of ice over themselves in order to 
raise awareness and funds for ALS research. This was not carried out on a specific 
crowdfunding platform, but instead, it was carried out through social media platforms 
(Hildebrandt and Bushardt, 2015). Alongside this usage of social media, donation-based 
platforms have been established, for example, GlobalGiving has raised over 383 million 
dollars supporting over 894,000 individuals across 170 countries. Projects on the platform 
support non-profit organisations across the globe focusing on providing funds, training and 
support to these organisations (Globalgiving, 2019).  
2.2.4.2 Medical crowdfunding 
Medical crowdfunding is a key subtopic of donation-based crowdfunding and refers 
to the usage of crowdfunding in order to pay medical bills or to support medical research as 
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shown by the ALS campaign. Renwick and Mossialos (2017), identified that medical 
crowdfunding could be further divided into four different types of projects. Health expenses, 
which utilises crowdfunding to fund individual medical bills which they would be unable to 
pay. Health initiatives which aim to improve the health of a group or community via a non-
profit organisation. Health research where crowdfunding focuses on funding research into the 
treatment of diseases, specifically those which are normally underinvested in by for-profit 
research. These three can all utilise donation-based crowdfunding. However the fourth area of 
commercial health innovation which focuses on for-profit research would be more likely to 
be funded via equity or debt-based crowdfunding.  
Burtch and Chan (2014), considered that the effect of health expense crowdfunding 
could be demonstrated via its ability to alleviate the high number of bankruptcies caused by 
medical debt. They considered that medical debt is seen as responsible for an estimated 62 % 
of individual bankruptcies within the United States of America. They considered the effect 
that giving forward a medical donation-based crowdfunding platform had on the number of 
bankruptcies within Americans states. Finding that the amount of money given on the 
platform was significant and negatively correlated to the number of bankruptcies across the 
different states. Supporting the argument that medical crowdfunding can be used to reduce 
bankruptcy rates. Dragojlovic and Lynd (2014), considered whether research into Ontology 
can be funded via the utilisation of crowdfunding. They discovered that Crowdfunding was a 
viable way of supporting the early development of research, as it acted as a proof of concept 
which then enabled researchers to attract more substantial traditional sources of funding. 
Another key point of there work was how crowdfunding enabled research into rare diseases. 
Thus there work supports the argument that medical crowdfunding can be used to carry out 
medical research by acting as a early source of funds for research.  
For creators engaged in medical crowdfunding, they have to be able to demonstrate 
the credibility of their medical need. Kim et al (2016), examined the effect of credibility on 
medical crowdfunding by examining Reddit comments related to specific medical 
crowdfunding campaigns, across multiple medical platforms. Alongside interviewing 
members of the public in how their perceived credibility of a set of campaigns. From these 
sources, they identified 11 different factors which could impact the credibility of the 
campaigns. Most impactful within Reddit comments was the detail of external financial 
support, while interviewers were most persuaded of credibility by communication between 
creators and backers. Furthermore, Kim et al (2016) argued that credibility by individuals 
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occurs via collective endorsement, where the personal comments sent by friends of the 
creators are key to the success of the project. However, Kim et al (2016) did consider that 
their study is limited both by the number of participants and how Reddit comments may be 
biased due to the structure of Reddit as a combination of small communities interacting 
together.  
Snyder et al (2017), identified some unique ethical issues which have to be addressed 
in medical crowdfunding. Firstly, they consider how medical privacy has to be abandoned in 
order for the creator to seek funds, the exact cost of this depends on the value of privacy, 
which can be considered via a philosophical approach (Necley, 2017). The question becomes 
is it ethical for creators to be forced to lose their privacy in exchange for participation on the 
medical crowdfunding platform? 
The second ethical aspect Snyder et al (2017) considers possible moral hazard 
problems involving the incentives of medical crowdfunding platforms. As in general, they are 
for-profit companies who seek to maximise profits. However these actions of attempting to 
maximise profits may lead them to decisions against the individual creators. For example, 
they have absolute control of who is allowed to fund on the platform, and they could be 
incentivised to remove individuals whom they perceive will not draw sufficient funds. There 
has been attempts to overcome these moral hazard problems within medical crowdfunding, 
Jin (2019) notes how within China, medical crowdfunding platforms must work with 
charities, this could overcome this moral hazard problem due to the charities having different 
incentives than the platforms.    
A final ethical consideration identified by Snyder et al (2017) is how medical 
crowdfunding affects medical funding, specifically how it may alter funds going to those with 
the greatest medical need, to those who have the most emotional story. With only those who 
can sell themselves being able to receive funds on medical crowdfunding. Further arguing 
that this may result in the long run to obscure the systematic inequality which is occurring in 
the medical systems. Duynhoven et al (2019) empirically support this point by demonstrating 
that those who are relatively socio-economically privileged, in Canada, are disproportionally 
using medical crowdfunding.  
2.2.4.3 Signals in donation-based crowdfunding 
Donation-based crowdfunding utilise signals to demonstrate high-quality campaigns 
and overcome asymmetric information, however, there also appears a form of collective 
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endorsement formed by the external communities surrounding the campaigns (Kim et al, 
2016). This form of external endorsement could be seen as a representation of the impact of 
the social capital of the project creators and project backers. Linking to areas of reward-based 
crowdfunding study, which considered if social capital affected the success of projects 
outlined in (Kromidha and Robson, 2016) and (Colombo et al, 2015).  
2.2.5 Conditional crowdfunding 
2.2.5.1 Definition and visualisation 
Conditional crowdfunding is an emerging form of crowdfunding separate from the 
original four subdivisions. In this form of crowdfunding the backer does not immediately 
provide any form of funding, funding is only provided when a specific condition is achieved. 
This type of crowdfunding was first considered as part of the literature by Beltran et al (2015) 
and has been more recently expanded on by Elsden et al (2019) who considered how 
automated third-party conditional donations systems could be designed and implemented. 
Conditional crowdfunding can be stated to have been occurring since at least 2013, as 
demonstrated via the existence of Patreon since 2013 (Patreon, 2018a). As with previous 
subdivisions of crowdfunding, conditional crowdfunding is visualised in Figure 2-6 below. 
Figure 2-6 Visualisation of conditional crowdfunding 
 
This type of crowdfunding enables backers to demand a specific condition to occur 
before their backing is received. This condition can occur multiple times, and if the backer 
remains committed to the condition across these multiple occurrences, the creator will receive 
multiple rounds of funding. For example, consider the scenario when a backer chooses to 
provide five dollars on the condition that a musician releases a song. If one song is released 
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than the backer will provide five dollars if ten songs are released, then the backer will provide 
fifty dollars. The backer can withdraw from the conditional arrangement at any time and thus 
if they no longer wish to support the musician they cancel the condition. This exact form of 
conditional support is demonstrated on the Patreon page of Miracle of sound, where 2032 
patrons together offered 4,151 dollars per song (Patreon, 2018b). Another demonstrated form 
of conditional crowdfunding is temporal conditioning, in this version backers agree to give 
creators an amount of money each month. Therefore, if the backers remained committed each 
month, the creators are provided with a continuous stream of income. Again this is 
demonstrated on Patreon with the writers of comic Kill Six billion demons having 1805 
patrons who give them 6280 dollars per month (Patreon, 2018c). Patreon thus enables a new 
stream of continuous funding for ongoing projects which are continually developed. This 
funding enables content creators on Patreon to more actively focus on developing their 
content and increase the output of their chosen medium (Wilson, 2017).  
Conditional crowdfunding offers an intriguing way of overcoming the traditional 
asymmetric problem within crowdfunding (Agrawal, 2014). Rather than engaging in a single 
signalling exchange to demonstrate the quality of the campaigns, the backers can identify the 
quality of the campaigns based upon the actual output delivered by the creators. Of note other 
types of crowdfunding also utilise specific conditions in the delivery of funds, for example, 
the all-or-nothing condition requires funding to be returned if a funding goal is not met. The 
key difference between this and conditional crowdfunding, is these specific conditions occur 
after funding has been given, they are conditions which upon being met funding has to be 
returned, where conditional crowdfunding is the opposite, funds are given when the condition 
is met. Conditional platforms can also utilise the other four basic types of crowdfunding, as 
they can offer reward, donation, equity or debt based in exchange for the condition being 
fulfilled. This is demonstrated on Patreon as backers can receive different rewards based 
upon how much they agree to conditionally give (Patreon, 2018b; Patreon, 2018c). 
Conditional crowdfunding can be seen as an additional layer of subdivision of crowdfunding 
rather than a direct substitute to the other four major types of crowdfunding. For example, a 
platform could be a conditional reward-based crowdfunding or a conditional equity-based 
crowdfunding platform. This method of adding a new adjective based division to highlight 
differences between crowdfunding platforms is extended in the next section by considering 
additional subdivisions based on the creator participation rights of crowdfunding platforms. 
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2.2.6 Creator participation rights and requirements. 
Each crowdfunding platform gives creators specific rights and requirements for the 
projects that they create within the platform. These creator participation rights and 
requirements can be used as an additional method of subdividing crowdfunding on top of 
backer participation rights.  
2.2.6.1 All-or-nothing versus keep it all. 
One key creator participation right is what happens in the situation when the funding 
goal of a campaign is not reached. There are two distinctly different creator participation 
rights used across crowdfunding platforms, firstly there is all or nothing, in this case, the 
creator only has the right to receive the money if the funding goal is reached, if the funding 
goal is not reached then all of the money is returned to the backers. Secondly, there is keep-it-
all, in this case, the creator has the right to retain the money raised in the campaign even if 
the funding goal is not reached. These two distinctions have been visualised in the Figure 2-7 
below: 
Figure 2-7 Visualisation of Keep-it-all versus All-or-nothing platforms  
 
These different creator participation rights greatly alter the design of the 
crowdfunding platform to such an extent that different types of campaigns will be successful 
under different conditions. Cumming et al (2016) used a sample of 22850 campaigns from 
Indiegogo to examine these differences, Indiegogo enables creators to choose between keep-
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it-all and all-or-nothing, thus enabling these rights to be considered within the same 
crowdfunding platform. They concluded that all-or-nothing funding campaigns tended to 
have higher funding goals and to be more successful in reaching these funding goals. 
However, keep-it-all funding was more successful in raising funds for lower funding goals 
and those with scalable outcomes.  
If a crowdfunding platform is utilising keep-it-all funding it restricts how success can 
be defined in the platform, the funding goal becomes a rather arbitrary number as the funding 
goal can be reached or not reached and the creator still receives the funds. Thus, setting 
success as reaching the funding goal makes little sense when keep-it-all funding is 
considered. Instead, success would have to be calculated in other means, perhaps using the 
backer/pledge suggested by Kromidha and Robson (2016) or utilising the total amount of 
funds raised. The case demonstrates how success has to be defined based on the 
crowdfunding platform and generalising a definition of success across platforms may not 
always be feasible. 
2.2.6.2 Continuous versus limited 
Platforms can require creators to finish their campaigns within a specific duration, for 
example in Kickstarter, projects can only run for a maximum of 60 days (Kickstarter, 2019c). 
This requires the creators to limit the duration of the campaign. However this restriction is 
not universal across crowdfunding platforms, some crowdfunding platforms are continuous, 
this means the projects can run as long as they want. An example of this is the conditional 
crowdfunding on Patreon; there is no distinct end to campaigns, they can carry on for as long 
as they wish (Patreon, 2018a). Continuous campaigns are not ubiquitous only to conditional 
crowdfunding, they also occur in donation-based crowdfunding such as Just Giving, within 
this platform users can continuously support campaigns over an indefinite amount of time. 
Just Giving also highlights how continuous crowdfunding campaigns can have funding goals 
(JustGiving, 2019). There is limited work into how continuous projects affect success 
however Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2018) did propose that most crowdfunding projects 
without an explicit deadline would lose momentum after a short period due to backers seeing 
that other backers could always fund the project, thus needing not to take responsibility 
themselves, thus leading to a low amount of support from backers. However, this is looking 
through the lens of reward-based crowdfunding; it may be that other types of crowdfunding 
are far more suited to continuous funding arrangements.  
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Continuous funding platforms create an interesting conundrum on how to measure 
success. If they have funding goals, as is the case for Just Giving, then these could be used as 
a measure of success. However, they may not have funding goals, if a project is raising 
money every month, is success measured as a monthly measure, or as a total amount of funds 
raised across all fundraising periods. Of course, these features can be easily taken into 
account, but it demonstrates how this type of condition can alter what is meant by success in 
a crowdfunding platform.   
2.2.6.3 Specialist versus generalist 
The creator participation requirement determines what types of projects can be raised 
on the crowdfunding platform. The author suggests there are two clear distinct groups of 
crowdfunding platforms regarding what the creators can fund; there are generalist platforms 
which enable creators to crowdfund any feasible activity as long as it is legal and specialist 
platforms which restrict creators to only support a single type or subset of projects. Although 
this distinction may be somewhat subjective, there are clear examples of both types of 
crowdfunding platforms. For example, Kickstarter could be considered a generalist 
crowdfunding platform, as people can fund any legal project, this had led to some truly 
bizarre Kickstarter projects, such as the case of Zack Danger Brown, who raised 55,492 
dollars to create potato salad, for no discernible reason other than making potato salad 
(Kickstarter, 2014). Unbound is an example of a specialist crowdfunding platform, on 
Unbound creators can only publish books, no other types of crowdfunding are allowed. One 
intriguing fact about Unbound is that it does not display the funding goal of the project 
completely, it only displays the percentage of the funding goal which has been reached. 
Obfuscating the amount of money which the creator is aiming to raise (Unbound, 2019). A 
second example of a specialist crowdfunding platform is Experiment; this is a crowdfunding 
platform solely for raising money for academic research (Experiment, 2019). Past work 
already showed that different categories within crowdfunding platforms have different 
success rates (Mollick, 2014; Kromidha and Robson, 2016), thus does the act of removing a 
category and creating a crowdfunding platform solely for that category increase its likelihood 
of succeeding? At this point this question is left unanswered, it may be that having all 
projects in one platform benefits from economies of scale or are more successful due to the 
internal social capital generated within the network as mentioned by Colombo et al (2015). 
Further work needs to be done in this area to consider if creating a specialist crowdfunding 
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platform enables greater levels of funding or not. Fundamentally, differences should be 
highlighted between specialist and generalist crowdfunding platforms.  
2.2.6.4 Crypto-currency 
One of the major creator crowdfunding participation requirements is what currency 
the creator is allowed to raise in, for example on Kickstarter the creators can use one of 18 
different currencies (Kickstarter, 2019c). However, crowdfunding platforms have started to 
embrace the usage of cryptocurrencies enabling sub-division based between traditional 
currencies and cryptocurrencies. Kickico is an example of such a platform, which uses a 
combination of Ethereum and its crypto-tokens Kick coins, to fund and support new initial 
coin offerings (Kickico, 2018). Indiegogo has also announced its intention to launch 
cryptocurrency-based crowdfunding, by working alongside Microventures, however, there 
are currently no active cryptocurrency campaigns on Microventures (Microventures, 2019).  
Alternatively, new American equity crowdfunding platform StartEngine has just 
begun to launch its own ICO (StartEngine, 2019). Initial coin offerings (ICO’s) are a process 
where creators seek to fund and establish a new cryptocurrency by offering an exchange of 
this new cryptocurrency for existing cryptocurrency. This is usually tied to some business 
idea or purpose for the new cryptocurrency, with the aim to increase the value of the new 
cryptocurrency, thus benefiting the backers who are now holding this new cryptocurrency 
(Fenu et al, 2018). This can be seen as a form of equity crowdfunding, where the equity 
obtained is the new cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is known to be particularly volatile, as 
demonstrated by fluctuation in the price of Bitcoin and how after reaching from a high of 
almost 20,000 in 2017, Bitcoin lost 80 percent of its value in 2018 (Coindesk, 2019). ICO’s 
are also known to be particularly fraudulent, as demonstrated by an ongoing market 
investigation by the United States and Exchange Comission (SEC )which advises against the 
use of ICO’s and outlines the major risk factors proposed by investing in ICO’s (SEC, 2019). 
This uncertainty and possibility of fraud demonstrates how crowdfunding platform should be 
separated based on the differences between cryptocurrency and traditional currencies.   
2.2.7 Combining subdivision to clearly define crowdfunding platforms. 
Combining the five backer participation rights and the four creator participation 
rights/ requirements, enables a clear subdivision for each crowdfunding platform. Figure 2-8 
below demonstrates how these methods can be used to subdivide crowdfunding platforms.  
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Figure 2-8 Expanded subdivisions methodology applied to crowdfunding platforms   
 
The table is not an exhaustive list of all crowdfunding platforms but rather aims to 
demonstrate differences between crowdfunding platforms. For example, a study could 
consider the differences between Unbound and Kickstarter, as they share all the same 
subdivisions, except that Kickstarter is generic and Unbound is specific.  
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2.3 Success in crowdfunding 
The aim of this section is to create a broad definition of success in crowdfunding, to 
be utilised in the development of the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework was 
designed with the aim to be utilised across multiple crowdfunding platforms. Therefore, a 
broad definition of crowdfunding success is necessary which can be used across the 
platforms. 
Ahlers et al (2015), outlined four main success measure which can be utilised in 
crowdfunding, that of whether a project reaches its funding goal, the number of backers a 
project obtains and how much funding was raised and the rate at which the venture reached 
their funding goal. Arguing that faster raising of funds was especially important within high 
tech industries which require timely execution to gain early-mover advantages. Kromidha and 
Robson (2016), examined only successful projects and utilised the pledge per backer 
measurement as an alternate measurement of success. Each of these measures is considered in 
more detail below: 
2.3.1 Reaching their funding goal/ percentage of funding goal reached:  
This measure is very useful in all-or-nothing platforms. In these platforms projects 
which don’t reach their funding goal don’t receive any funds. Thus, creating a clear point of 
separation between success or failure. Conversely, it is less useful in keep-it-all platforms, 
where the funding goal doesn’t restrict the creator receiving funds. On these platforms the 
funding goal becomes more arbitrary and using this measure of success can be flawed, due to 
how projects can raise more money but have a lower percentage of the funding goal reached. 
Another point to take into account is just because two projects both reach their funding goal 
doesn’t mean they are equally successful. Firstly, one projects funding goal could be much 
lower than another projects funding goal. Secondly, projects may greatly exceed their funding 
goal and achieve a large amount of overfunding (Li et al, 2018). Therefore, this measure may 
be restrictive in capturing the full range of success within a platform.  
2.3.2 Number of backers supporting a project: 
 This measure of success utilised by itself can be problematic. As having more 
backers does not necessarily mean that more funds will be raised, or that the funding goal 
will be reached. The author would argue this variable doesn’t capture success itself, but rather 
can be used to explain how success was reached, as a high number of backers may not lead to 
a successful project. Kromidha and Robson (2016) measure of pledge per backer can also be 
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considered in the same way, a method of describing the path to success rather than capture 
success itself.   
2.3.3 The amount of funds which were raised: 
This measure of success is the simplest measure of success; however, projects are 
aiming to raise different amount of funds as each project has a different scope, therefore 
saying a project is more successful then another simply because it raised more funds may be 
incorrect.  
2.3.4 Utilising temporal measurements 
As mentioned above Ahlers et al. (2015) argue for the usage of temporal 
measurements of success, i.e. the rate at which projects achieve these goals. This 
measurement will be useful in continuous crowdfunding platforms, where a specific funding 
goal may not exist. However, in platforms where there are limited possible differences in 
duration of projects and money is only received at the end of the project, this measurement 
will be less useful.     
2.3.5 Broad definition for framework 
Considering these measures, the author argues that these different measures can be 
captured via the following definition; raising greater amounts of funds relative to a specific 
funding goal by the end of a specific timeframe. This will be utilised in the theoretical 
framework. The exact measure used for each platform will be considered in the conceptual 
framework, in the methodology section. 
2.3.6 Failure in crowdfunding 
The previous sections considered success in crowdfunding, conversely this section 
briefly considers the effects of failure in crowdfunding specifically failing to reach a funding 
goal within and all-or-nothing platform. Greenberg and Gerber (2014), work considered the 
impact of failure within the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter, discovering additional 
negative effects beyond not receiving the funding. Creators with failed funding projects 
reported that it negatively impacted their social capital, through utilising their social capital in 
requesting support for their campaigns on social media. Leading to only 2% of the sampled 
creator relaunching their campaigns. However, the 2% who did relaunch had a 43% chance of 
reaching their funding goal. Greenberg and Gerber (2014), suggested that the creators utilised 
their failure to realign their projects, utilising information obtained from the backers of their 
first campaign. Demonstrating that even in failure key information can be obtained, this 
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highlights the potential of utilising crowdfunding as a marketing tool (Brown et al, 2017). In 
specific platforms, it can be impossible for an individual campaign to fail, for example in 
Patreon (2018a) as campaigns are continuous and don’t have funding goals, failure becomes 
more difficult to define.  
2.4 Theoretical Framework development 
In the previous sections it is stated that the measures of success which can be utilised 
across all crowdfunding platforms, is successfully raising greater amounts of funds relative to 
specific funding goals by the end of a specific timeframe. The author argues that two key 
areas can be considered in order to capture this measurement of success. The first is the 
ability of the crowdfunding participants supporting the project (creators, backers and the 
platform) to draw potential backers to the specific crowdfunding project. While the second is 
the ability of the participants to convince those drawn to the specific project to support that 
project. The factors are considered individually before being combined into a single 
theoretical framework. 
For a project to be successful, the participants supporting the project must be able to 
draw potential backers to the project. If no one is drawn to a project no matter how high 
quality the project, it cannot succeed. The author proposes that each agent can draw backers 
from external sources and internal sources. With external sources referring to anything 
outside of the crowdfunding platform, and internal referring to actions within the platform. 
For the backers and creators, the author argues that the ability to draw in backers can be 
captured via the social capital of these two participants. Specifically utilising the concept of 
separate internal and external capital types which was utilised relative to crowdfunding in 
(Colombo et al, 2015). The platform effects on drawing potential backers to the project is 
also considered via internal and external forces. With internal competition capturing the 
impact on drawing project to the category based upon competition between projects within 
the crowdfunding platform. And external competition captures the effects of cross-platform 
competition between crowdfunding platforms.  
Once the potential backers have been drawn to the project, they still need to be 
convinced to support the project. This can be compared to how once a shopper has been 
drawn to a digital marketplace, they still need to be convinced to purchase a good and the 
number of goods purchased (Kuan et al, 2005). Furthermore, unlike the purchase of a good, 
backers are free to support projects at multiple different levels. Therefore the participants are 
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aiming to convince the backers to spend as much money as possible. This can be compared to 
how within free digital gaming, the majority of funds can be obtained from a limited number 
of higher paying users known as “whales” (Shi et al, 2015). 
The author argues that the factors which impact the drawing of customers will also 
impact the ability to convince backers to support the project. Due to how social capital can be 
utilised to adopt new technologies (Isham, 2000; Katungi, 2006). This demonstrates that 
social capital can encourage specific behaviour and thus in the case of crowdfunding utilised 
to convince backers to support the project Competition internally and externally, both 
affecting the ability of the campaign to convince backers to support it. Due to backers being 
able to compare the examined project with other existing projects, within and outside of the 
crowdfunding platform. This enables a framework focused only on convincing backers to 
also include all of the factors suggested for attracting backers.  
Additionaly on top of these factors, the author argues that the ability to convince 
backers to support will also be impacted by the signals sent by the creators and the backers. 
The signals sent directly link to the concepts of signalling discussed across the literature in 
the previous sections. Finally the potentinal motivation for the backers is considered to 
impact the ability of creators to convince backers to support their project. Simply due to how 
these are the direct benefits the backers receive for participating in the platform. Combining 
these concepts together leads to the following visualisation of the conceptual framework 
shown in Figure 2-9 below, which captures factors drawing backers to the project and factors 
convincing them to back the project.   
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Figure 2-9 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
This framework is thus built from 3 major theory areas, social capital, signalling and 
competition and also includes the motivations of the backers. The next sections expand upon 
these four areas, to provide clear theoretical foundations to be utilised in the development of 
the paper’s hypotheses. 
2.4.1 Key theories used in the theoretical frameworks 
2.4.1.1 Signalling theory and overcoming asymmetric information 
Due to the very structure of crowdfunding, there is extensive asymmetric information 
between the backers and creators of crowdfunding projects. The impact of this asymmetric 
information on crowdfunding was captured within Belleflamme et al, (2010) and (2013), who 
noted that the amount of asymmetric information which was occurring depended upon the 
creator’s knowledge of the quality of their crowdfunding project, the greater the creators 
knowledge of the quality of their crowdfunding project, the greater the amount of asymmetric 
information between creators and backers, this observation being further supported in (Miglo, 
2018). From an economic perspective Ahlers et al (2015) crowdfunding literature review 
identifies asymmetric information as a major factor impacting the success of crowdfunding. 
Oddly due to the wisdom of the crowd (Ibrahim, 2015), it may be possible in specific 
circumstances for the backers to have a greater knowledge of the quality of the campaign 
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then the creator. Whether this is through greater theoretical understanding of the 
technological limitations or through an understanding of the other products available on the 
market, which implicitly affect the quality of the new product. Creating a rather unusual 
situation where both sides, creators or backers may have informational advantages.       
To address how asymmetric information can be considered in crowdfunding, an 
examination of how traditional credit markets have overcome asymmetric information was 
considered. Information asymmetry has been a core feature of traditional credit markets 
interaction between lenders and backers as exhaustively argued in Gorton and Winston 
(2003) review. Credit markets have increasingly failed to provide much needed financial 
resources, most acutely to early stage finance innovation projects characterised by high 
uncertainty. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provide the seminal theoretical contribution in deriving 
the conditions for this type of market failure. Identifying that credit rationing is an 
equilibrium resulting from rational choice of lenders in the presence of asymmetric 
information. Adverse selection is one of the mechanisms via which asymmetric information 
disrupts credit markets, (Akerlof, 1978; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1978). Adverse selection 
occurs if lenders are unable to distinguish the quality and thus the associated risk with a 
specific borrower. Lenders are unable to discern between low quality and high-quality 
campaigns, thus in an attempt to ensure the return on investment lenders ask for a higher rate 
of return. However, the problem with this stance is the fundamental relationship between risk 
and reward in investment, generally the higher the level of risk the higher the level of reward. 
Thus, by asking for a higher rate of return the lenders drive away lower risk projects, as they 
are likely to have a lower rate of return, thus these become unable to seek credit through the 
system. Conversely high-risk projects adversely select themselves for credit application 
having the potential to make a higher rate of return than the rate offered by the lenders. 
Exacerbating this problem is how rational acting lenders will eventually increase the lending 
rate as a reaction to the now riskier pool of investment, restricting the possible investment to 
even riskier investments. Creating a self-replicating process where only the projects with the 
highest levels of risk are able to be funded, creating a shortage of funding for low risk 
projects. 
2.4.1.1.1 Signalling theory 
To overcome the negative impact of asymmetric information, the better-informed 
party can create an action to signal the quality of its product to the less informed party, this 
process of signalling was first identified in the seminal work in Ross (1977) and Spence 
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(1978) essays on job market signalling, which highlighted the asymmetric information within 
the job market and that without some forms of signals, employers are unable to identify high 
quality workers from low quality workers. Thus, high-quality workers need to send some 
form of signal to distinguish themselves from low quality workers. Signals are specifically 
attributes which can be changed by the worker, such as the level of education they have 
received, or the type of clothes that they wear. Spence considered characteristics of the 
worker that affected employability but were outside of the control of the worker to be indices 
rather than signals. For a signal to be effective in reducing the existing informational 
asymmetry, the signal has to have a higher cost for a low-quality sender than for a high-
quality sender. This enables the emergence of separating equilibria whereby signals reveal 
the underlying quality of the person, object or business. Thus, reducing or eliminating the 
informational asymmetry (Riley, 1979; Cho and Kreps, 1987). Thus, for crowdfunding to 
effectively utilise signals the creators of poor-quality campaigns must have a higher cost of 
signalling than those of high-quality campaigns. Additionally, Spence argued that the signals 
must also be observable and manipulatable by the sender of the signals. If a signal is not 
observable by the other party within the signalling game, then the other party cannot alter 
their actions based on this signal and thus it cannot be utilised to overcome asymmetric 
information. The signal must be manipulatable by the original party, due to how as mentioned 
above, if the characteristic is outside the control of the signalling party, Spence would 
classify this as an indices rather than a signal. If the signalling party cannot manipulatable the 
signal, then by definition it is out of control of the signalling party.    
2.4.1.1.2 Signalling within crowdfunding 
Kromidha and Robson (2016) identified that signalling can occur from multiple 
parties in reward-based-crowdfunding, with creators and backers able to send signals. 
Specifically, in the context of Kickstarter they suggested that backers’ signals can be 
identified via the comments on the projects. While creators’ signals could be identified via 
the number of updates on the project. Comments can be considered only to be of backers and 
not general users of the crowdfunding platform as to comment on a project you must back the 
project. The study examined the top 5000 successful projects within Kickstarter and utilised 
the pledge per backer ratio as the key measure of success. There results found empirical 
evidence showing that number of comments increases the pledge per backer ratio within 
Kickstarter, conversely there the number of updates had no significant impact on the pledge 
per backer ratio. However, the project was limited by the fact it only examined highly 
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successful projects, specifically the top 5000 projects on Kickstarter, adding in comparison to 
less successful project may increase the effects of comments and updates. This point is 
further supported by Block et al (2018) who found that increased number of updates within 
equity crowdfunding platforms in Germany did have a positive impact on the number of 
investment raised by the crowd. Furthermore, the author proposes that comments may not 
necessarily have a positive effect within failures, as although to comment you have to back 
the project, this doesn’t mean you have to back the project to completion as you are able to 
withdraw your backing at any point. Thus, comments can also be utilised by the community 
to highlight problems they have with the project, giving the ability for these signals to have a 
negative effect on success.  
Signals can also be examined via the other main subdivisions of crowdfunding. 
Ahlers et al (2015), examined signalling within the context of equity crowdfunding, 
demonstrating that venture quality characterised via human capital was key to success in 
equity crowdfunding. To capture the human capital of the project, they used the number of 
board members and the percentage of MBA within the board members as proxies. However, 
in their main model the number of board members had a significant effect on crowdfunding 
success while the percentage with an MBA did not have a significant effect. This looked 
solely at the signals sent by creators in equity crowdfunding and did not consider signal sent 
by the backers. Piva and Rossi-Lamastra (2017), work further supports the use of human 
capital as a signal in equity crowdfunding, demonstrating that the amount of business 
experience and entrepreneurship experience are key proxies in predicting success in equity 
crowdfunding.      
Moss et al (2015) considered how to capture signalling within the lending-based 
crowdfunding platform Kiva, utilising a text analysis approach, which examined the loan 
descriptions, identifying key aspects of virtuous orientation and entrepreneurial orientation of 
the project. Virtuous orientation considers the usage of positive rhetoric such as integrity, 
empathy, courage, zeal and can be utilised as a signal for a company quality in the presence 
of asymmetric information (Payne et al, 2013). While entrepreneurial orientation considers 
the specific entrepreneurial characteristics possessed by a firm, specifically the firms rate of 
innovation, willingness to take risk, proactiveness and aggressive competitive stance 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Moss et al (2015) utilised these concepts to consider, if these are 
functional signals within the Kiva market, however their results found that the projects which 
signalled virtuous orientation were actually less likely to be funded. While signalling 
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entrepreneurial orientation were somewhat supported, with three out of the five terms 
considered, producing positive and significant results. One plausible reason why the text-
based signalling did not support the virtual orientation hypothesis, is due to the consideration 
that there is no cost associated with adding virtuous textual terms to a loan description, 
leading to there being no difference in the cost of signalling between high quality and low 
quality campaigns, therefore a separating equilibrium cannot be observed and asymmetric 
information cannot be overcome utilising this signal (Riley, 1979; Cho and Kreps, 1987). 
Signalling theory has also been used as a general way of considering success within 
crowdfunding regardless of type (Boudreau et al, 2015; Vismara, 2018). 
The author also considers that the signalling actions of the crowdfunding platform 
itself are not considered, the platform may require specific information to be sent by the 
creators and backers of campaigns. The platform can therefore be considered a third party 
involved in signalling, which can force either other party to send signals or act as a signalling 
agent itself. As demonstrated in the visualisation in Figure 2-10 below: the signal demanded 
refers to information that the crowdfunding platform must have from both the backers and the 
creators for them to participate in the platform. The forced signals refer to the information 
sent by the backers and creators in order to satisfy the signals demanded by the platform. The 
voluntary signals are additional signals that the creators and backers voluntarily send through 
the crowdfunding platform to future potential backers. 
Figure 2-10 Visualisation enforced and voluntary signals 
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2.4.1.1.3 Utilising Signals as proxies for human capital 
A key aspect of the utilisation of signalling theory within crowdfunding is the 
identification that human capital can be captured via using proxy variables within the 
crowdfunding platform. Moss et al (2015) usages of virtuous orientation and entrepreneurial 
orientation clearly link to established concepts of human capital. While Piva and Rossi-
Lamastra (2017) work demonstrated the human capital signalling of experience via the past 
entrepreneurial activity. This identification that human capital can be identified as proxies via 
information from crowdfunding campaigns is one of the key points of the authors paper 
(Davies and Giovannetti, 2018), with the funding goal being used as a proxy for ambition and 
the number of previously created projects being used as a proxy for experience. This concept 
of capturing human capital via proxies is utilised within the creation of this thesis hypotheses.  
2.4.1.2 Social capital 
Social capital can be viewed as the ability to utilise goodwill generated within the 
fabric of social relations in order to facilitate actions from those social relations (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002). Social capital has been employed within the entrepreneurial finance literature, 
specifically in considering how entrepreneurs utilise their social capital in attracting funds for 
new ventures (Kim and Aldrich, 2005; Westlund and Bolton, 2003). In crowdfunding, social 
capital can be considered to impact how the backers and creators and the platform itself can 
encourage other potential backers to support their desired project. To capture the impact of 
social capital in crowdfunding, an examination of social networks is utilised. 
2.4.1.2.1 Social Networks sites 
Before considering social networks, it is necessary first to define what networks are 
and how these can be developed into social networks. A network is a set of nodes which 
represent a specific group of actors, these actors could be anything from individuals to firms 
or computers, each network specifies what each node represents (Borgatti and Halgrin, 2011). 
These nodes are then connected, or not connected, based on a specific condition and these 
connections can be either direction or non-directional, in a non-directional network two states 
are possible between nodes in the network. Either they are linked together, or they are not 
linked together. In a directional network links between nodes can be in one direction, thus 
four possible states are possible between two nodes in this network (Jackson, 2010). Consider 
two nodes, node A and node B the four possible state could be as follows. In the first state 
node A is connected to node B while node B is not connected to node A. The second state 
node A is connected to node B and node B is connected to node A. The third state node B is 
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connected to node A, but node A is not connected to node B. In the fourth state node A is not 
connected to node B and node B is not connected to node A. Networks can be categorised 
into two major types: sociocentric networks and egocentric networks. Sociocentric networks 
capture all nodes and links within a specific network, for example a complete trade network 
could be expressed as a sociocentric network. Egocentric networks focus on the connections 
from a single node and the links between the connections of that node, for example 
egocentric networks have been utilised to examine the difference of support network of 
patients with and without dementia, showing that those with dementia were likely to have 
less friends within their support network and be more closely tied to family members (Perry 
et al, 2017). For the purpose of this thesis, sociocentric networks are considered.   
Networks have been utilised across multiple disciplines from engineering to medicine 
due to their versatility and ability to represent complex systems (Boccaletti et al, 2006). 
Network can be considered via a macro or micro approach. The macro effect of the network 
considers the whole structure of the network, while the micro considers the individual 
characteristics of the nodes (Schweitzer et al, 2009; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
One of the key networks utilised in the examination of social capital in crowdfunding 
are online social networks, for example Facebook, in which two people are connected if they 
are friends with each other (Ellison et al, 2007). Social networks sites specifically refer to 
online platforms which enable users to construct a public or semi-private profile within a 
system, which can be connected to other users based on a shared connection, these 
connections can be viewed within the system (Boyd and Ellison, 2007). The following 
section considers how to capture the impact of these sites on crowdfunding success. 
2.4.1.2.2 Social networks site impact on crowdfunding: Capturing social capital in Facebook 
and Twitter 
Lu et al (2014), considered how Twitter promotions are positively correlated with the 
number of supporters for the crowdfunding project. Utilising the Twitter API, they captured 
all Twitter promotions of crowdfunding project between November 2012 and April 2013, 
defining a promotion as a tweet which clearly provides the URL of the Kickstarter projects, 
or utilised Kickstarter inbuilt campaign share feature. They removed projects which had a 
low amount of funding or if they had less than five tweets. Their results showed positive 
correlation between log normalised number of promoters and number of backers within 
Kickstarter. Furthermore, Lu et al (2014) utilised the promoters to create a social network, 
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with the nodes being a promoter, and links being drawn between promoters if two criteria 
were met: 1) that promoter A had promoted the project before promoter B and 2) promoter B 
followed or was mentioned by promoter A. Creating a directed social network based around 
the communication between promoters of specific crowdfunding projects on Twitter. This 
demonstrated a more sophisticated connection between promoters, with a higher number of 
edges being utilised as an indicator for interests among specific Twitter sub groups, leading 
to more support and thus an increase in the correlated ratio of funding goal achieved. Social 
media impact upon crowdfunding is thus clearly demonstrated, alongside utilising network 
analysis to capture this impact. 
The effect of the social network on crowdfunding has been further demonstrated 
across multiple works specifically by (Mollick 2014; Giudici et al, 2014; Moisseyeve, 2013; 
Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Jarvinen and Nguyen, 2018; Beier and Wagner, 2015).  
However, there has not been consistent support for social media effects, with work from 
(Beier and Wagner, 2015; Colombo et al, 2015), not finding any significant support based on 
the number of Facebook friends or Twitter followers, while others still find significant 
support for social media (Mollick 2014; Moisseyev, 2013; Kromidha and Robson, 2016). The 
author considers that there is enough evidence in favour of including the impact of social 
network when studying success in crowdfunding. However, one of the major limitations of 
these social networks is that often the information utilised is not from the full social network, 
due to restrictions in both collecting and analysing the data. For example, Facebook has over 
2 billion users and the relationships between these users is constantly changing every moment 
of the day (Statista, 2018), thus it is not currently plausible for an individual researcher to 
consider the full extent of the network effects, the exact limitations enforced will depend 
upon the study and the related social media. A more recent emerging problem is linked to the 
possible presence of fake social information within crowdfunding (Wessel et al, 2016).  
2.4.1.2.3 Internal Social Capital: Transforming a crowdfunding platform into a network.  
The previously discussed social networks can all be considered to be external social 
networks to the crowdfunding platform. Colombo et al (2015) considered that a 
crowdfunding project can generate their own internal social capital, based on establishing 
relationship with other backers and funders. They captured this via utilising the number of 
previously backed projects by the creator of the current project as a proxy. Butticè et al 
(2017), further built on this work by considering the impact of internal social capital could 
captured via examining the number of successfully backed projects by the creator within a 
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specific timeframe, there results demonstrated that internal social capital has a limited 
duration and within a year and a half, internal social capital no longer had a significant 
impact on success. The author proposes that internal social capital of a crowdfunding 
network could be captured in a similar way as to how external social capital was captured by 
Lu et al (2014), in considering Twitter, specifically generating a social network based on 
patterns of connections from backers and creators. Focusing on exchange patterns between 
the two groups, to enable the development of a network which represents the evolving online 
community structure (Faraj and Johnson, 2011).  
One method of identifying connections in crowdfunding can be extracted from past 
work into examining how networks forces affect the diffusion of innovations and adoption of 
new products. Coleman et al (1957), utilised network analysis in considering the innovation 
and adoption of new drugs for physicians within the American drug market. Specifically, 
they created a network which compared the rate at which doctors gave out a new drug based 
upon socioeconomic links between the doctors, suggesting that doctors who were 
socioeconomically linked were more likely to give out a drug at the same time. However, 
their results did not support this hypothesis and rather showed that linking within the socio-
economic network had little impact in drug delivery timing. This work into network effects of 
adoption of innovations was continued by Rogers (1976) who considered the potential of 
network analysis built upon communication between agents and how weak links would 
reduce the effectiveness of the analysis. This work solidified the concept of utilising network 
analysis to consider adoption of innovations, whether the innovation was among farmers 
(Monge et al, 2008), young adults and the adoption of telephones (Taylor et al, 2011) or 
social media adoption (Mergel 2013). Highlighting the possibility of utilising network 
analysis to consider innovation within crowdfunding. To create a crowdfunding network, the 
method of connecting the actors (the links which build this network) has to be defined.      
A method of defining these links could be utilising communication links between the 
actors, with the actors either being creators or backers. This builds from the concept that you 
can capture the effect of innovations by considering communication between the potential 
adopters (Monge et al, 2008; Rogers, 2010). If communication between backers and creators 
is observable, this can be utilised to create this network. For example, projects could be 
connected if they have joint backers, or if backers comment on both projects. Alternatively, 
projects could be connected based upon creators’ activity, such as past created campaigns, or 
projects they have backed. Thus, if this data is viewable, then these networks can be 
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developed. If communication between creators and backers within the crowdfunding platform 
is not directly observable, this communication could be inferred via the external social media 
activity of the creators and backers as utilised within the Twitter network created by Lu et al. 
(2014). 
2.4.1.3 Social Network Analysis 
Once the network has been established and defined, it can be examined via the 
utilisation of social network analysis techniques, this section introduces some of the core 
concepts of social network analysis.  
Social network analysis can be traced back to Kent (1978) who captured the original 
dataset on the rise of the Medici family in Florence which was utilised in developing social 
network analysis by Padgett and Ansell (1993). They demonstrated how via creating and 
analysing a network based of marriage connections within the Italian Renaissance city of 
Florence the rise to success of the Medici family could be explained via their central position 
within the network.  
One of the key tools within networks analysis is the concept of centrality. Centrality 
refers to how central the nodes are to the rest of the network. There are four main 
measurements of centrality, each capturing a different aspect of the concept and are utilised 
to represent different information flows and behaviour of the network (Jackson, 2010). 
Furthermore, centrality has been identified in past work as key to interpreting the effect of 
social networks (Freeman, 1978), thus four of the main centrality measures are considered 
below, the next sections 1.4.1.3 are based on definitions derived from the following sources; 
(Wasserman and Faust,1994; Jackson, 2010; Benedictis et al, 2014; Perry et al, 2018) 
2.4.1.3.1 Degree centrality  
This can be viewed as the simplest measure of centrality, in its unweighted form it 
considers the number of nodes that a node is connected to. It is often normalised by 
considering this amount relative to the total amount of nodes, within the network, the node 
could be connected to. The total number of nodes a node can be connected to is the total 
number of nodes in the network minus one, as the node cannot connected to itself. Thus, 
normalised degree centrality for a single node can be obtained by dividing the number of 
connections a node has by the number of nodes in the network minus 1. This can be 
represented in the following definition: 
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𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒(𝑑𝑖) =
∑ ℒ𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑁 − 1
 
Where N is the number of nodes in the network, 𝑖 considers the node being examined 
and ℒ𝑖𝑗  is an indicator function that considers whether node i is connected to another node in 
the network, returning 1 if it is connected and 0 if it is not connected. Thus, the summation of 
these over all other nodes of the network, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, provides the total number of connection that 
the node has. If a network is directed, the notion of degree centrality can be expanded to 
consider separately a node’s out-degree and in-degree. Out-degree considers the number of 
connections made from the node to other nodes, while in-degree considers the number of 
connections being received by the node, starting from other nodes.  
Otte and Rousseau (2002) use degree centrality to demonstrate that authors who 
wrote on social network analysis were not closely connected. They constructed a network, 
where the agents were authors of papers on social network analysis and connected authors if 
the co-published together. They found the overall degree centrality of the network to be 11 
percent and used this to argue that it showed that researchers were not closely working 
together in the area. Degree centrality has also been used to examine differences in trade 
outcomes in the global trade network (Benedictis et al, 2014). 
2.4.1.3.2 Closeness centrality  
This measure of centrality considers how close a node is relative to all other nodes in 
the network. It can be calculated by considering the geodesic distance between the single 
node and all other nodes in the network. In a network, a geodesic refers to the shortest path 
between two nodes, i.e. the lowest number of nodes that have to be travelled along to reach 
the other node. The smallest possible summed value of all geodesic for a node is the total 
number of nodes in the network minus 1. In this case the centrality measure for the node will 
be 1. The higher the geodesic of other nodes, the lower the closeness centrality. Which can be 
formally calculated using the following diagram. 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝑖) =
𝑁 − 1
∑ ℓ𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
 
Where i refers to the node being examined, N-1 captures the lowest possible closeness 
measure and ℓ𝑖𝑗 considers the path length between node i and another node in the network, 
𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 .  
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2.4.1.3.3 Eigenvector centrality 
Eigenvector centrality considers that the centrality of a node is proportional to the 
sum of its neighbours. That is to say that the centrality of one node is based upon the 
centrality of the surrounding nodes, this creates an immediate problem as this becomes self-
referential. Consider an increase in the centrality of the node will then increase the centrality 
of the surrounding nodes and thus increase the centrality of the node. In order to overcome 
this self-reference problem eigenvectors are utilised, a method originally suggested by 
(Bonacich, 1972). Eigenvectors are vectors of a linear transformation, which when the linear 
transformations are applied to themselves they only change by a scale factor. To consider 
how this can be applied to centrality measurements, let Ce(g) denote the eigenvector 
centrality from network g. Furthermore, the proportional factor can be represented as ℒ. Thus 
eigenvector centrality can be written as follows: 
ℒ𝐶𝑖e(g) = ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑗
𝐶𝑗𝑒(𝑔) 
Which can then be represented in matrix notation as: 
ℒ𝐶𝑒(𝑔) = 𝑔𝐶𝑒(𝑔) 
Thus 𝐶𝑒(𝑔), is an eigenvector of g, with ℒ being the eigenvalue. There can be 
multiple eigenvalues and normally the highest eigenvalue is used (Jackson, 2010). This 
overcomes the self-reference problems and enables the effect of surrounding nodes to be 
considered when developing a centrality measurement. Eigenvectors are especially useful in 
capturing the effects of social capital within a network (Borgatti, 1998).  
2.4.1.3.4 Betweenness centrality 
Betweenness centrality considers how many paths utilise the nodes as part of a 
geodesic within the network. In other terms, it considers how many times the node has to be 
passed across in order for two other nodes to be connected as efficiently as possible. The 
maximum number of times a node can be passed through is based on the size of the network, 
specifically it can be calculated by (n-1)(n-2)/2. Therefore the centrality is simply the number 
of shortest paths which utilise the node divided by (n-1)(n-2)/2. More formally this can be 
written as: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝑖) =
∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑗𝑘≠𝑗:𝑖∉[𝑘.𝑗]
(n − 1)(n − 2)/2
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Where 𝑝𝑘𝑗 represents the number of shortest paths which utilise node i within the network. 
Betweenness centrality can be used to examine scenarios where the position within the 
network enables or restricts access to other nodes. The examination of the rise of the Medici 
is a key example in which the betweenness centrality is key to identifying why they rose to 
power. As the Medici had the highest betweenness centrality of any family (Padgett and 
Ansell, 1993).  
The specific meaning of the centrality is dependent upon the network they are 
examining as their interpretation can depend upon who the nodes are and how they have been 
linked together. For example, D'Ignazio and Giovannetti (2006) utilised betweenness 
centrality to examine the economic concept of partial essential facilities within the context of 
upstream internet access. 
2.4.1.4 Competition within and outside the platform 
The internal and external social networks consider how effective the creators and 
backers are at drawing in users into crowdfunding. However, this doesn’t consider the effect 
that the platform itself has in gathering backers to the platform. This is considered via 
examining competition within and outside of the network.  
2.4.1.4.1 Increased Competition within a platform 
Janku and Kucerova (2018) considered this concept in relation to reward-based 
crowdfunding, identifying the effects of competition on the success of funding projects on 
Kickstarter. They did so, by dividing the competition terms into three separate variables, the 
first being number of launched projects in the same month, the second being the number of 
projects launched within a specific federal state and the third considered whether the projects 
where launched at the weekend or a weekday. The first term demonstrates a temporal 
competition element within a crowdfunding platform that projects launched within the same 
month are competing for funds. However, utilising the launch month to judge this temporal 
competition seems flawed, due to how projects which are launched in the same month may 
not be competing for backers. If a project was launched on the first day of the month and had 
a duration of twenty days and another project was launched at the end of the month, there 
would be no overlap between these two projects. Instead of utilising a monthly separation, 
projects could be separated based upon their actual project activity, utilising the project start 
and end dates. Thus, the temporal competition would consider any project which was actively 
seeking funds at the same time.  
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The second competition variable demonstrates geographic competition within the 
platform, considering if the geographic position affects the success of the campaign. Building 
upon Agrawal et al (2014) and Mollick (2014) work into the effect of geography in 
successful crowdfunding projects this variable could also be focused more specifically to 
consider the impact of competition in cities and more generally to consider the impact of 
competition within a country. The last variable of weekend competition suggests that 
launching a project at the weekend decreases its chance of success due to there being a 
general trend of increased number of launches at the weekend. One could build upon this 
concept to consider if the number of launches each day affects the success of the project, 
removing the restriction of high number of projects launches only occurring on weekends. 
The next section expands upon how competition can be used to examine geographic 
differences in the platform. 
2.4.1.4.2 Capturing geographic competition within a platform 
In the previous section on social capital, the author considered how the internal social 
impact of crowdfunding can be examined via transforming the platform into a network, built 
on observable links between creators and backers. This section considers how the platform 
can also be considered by viewing the platform as an international trade network. This builds 
from the concept that world trade can be examined via the utilisation of networks (Benedictis 
et al, 2014; Amador and Cabral, 2017; Bhattacharya et al, 2008). The author considers that if 
a crowdfunding platform is occurring globally then a network could be developed akin to 
these global trade networks, where the global trade is replaced by the trade in funding. 
For this network to be created two key pieces of information are required. Firstly, the 
geographical location of the project must be known and secondly the geographical locations 
of the backers who are supporting the project must be observable. If both of these pieces of 
information are available across multiple crowdfunding campaigns it is possible to create a 
trade network, which demonstrates how much funding from the crowdfunding platform each 
geographical area receive. Alongside how much funds each geographic area gives to other 
geographic areas.  
This geographic approach would build upon the work of Agrawal et al (2014) which 
considered that greater geographic distance between backers and creators had a negative 
impact on the ability of creators to raise money on the crowdfunding platform Sellaband. 
Conversely Kang et al (2018) found the opposite: that increased levels of distance between 
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creators and backers increased the likelihood of a project raising more funds. Geographic 
factors were further examined within Mollick (2014) and Kromidha and Robson (2016), both 
showing clear evidence that geography affects success in crowdfunding projects. This 
geographic network would thus enable geographic affect in crowdfunding to be captured and 
analysed via network analysis, utilising the centrality measurements discussed in the social 
capital section.  
2.4.1.4.3 External competitive position of the platform.  
Projects could be affected by the current popularity of the platform relative to other 
crowdfunding platforms. However, it is very difficult to observe this specific phenomenon. 
As in order to observe the competitive position of a platform, vis a vis all other platforms, 
one would have to capture, and compare, how successful each of the crowdfunding platforms 
was across the entire duration of any examined projects. If the data about the amount 
simultaneously raised on each platform could be captured then, the level of competition could 
be estimated through utilisation of the HHI index (Hirschman, 1980), a method suggested to 
be applicable in crowdfunding by Wessel et al (2017). However, it is very difficult for a 
researcher to estimate this effect as it would require capturing the amount raised across all 
crowdfunding platforms within a project’s duration. Even if this information could be 
captured, it may still inaccurately estimate competition, as it makes the assumption that users 
of one platform are potential users of another platform. Without observing user behaviour this 
assumption may be flawed. Thus, this author focuses on the effects of internal competition, 
which can be observed through examining a single crowdfunding platform.    
2.4.1.5 Backer motivations 
This section considers a set of plausible motivations for backers to become involved 
in crowdfunding. One of the earlier identified motivations was that of altruism (Bretschneider 
and Knab, 2014), this can be most notably connected to donation-based crowdfunding, where 
the backer receives no incentive to participate. In incentive based crowdfunding 
Bretschneider and Leimeister (2017), identified six reasons why backers may be incentivised 
to participate, these six will be used as the framework for this section. 
2.4.1.5.1 Recognition  
Bretschneider and Leimeister (2017), suggested that backers could receive recognition 
on a crowdfunding platform when they are able to comment on the projects which they have 
backed. Considering recognition to be an acknowledgement of a user status, actions or 
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achievements (Maslow, 1987). The author supports the notion that backers want to be 
recognised, however the author would disagree that it is through the comment mechanism 
which this would primarily occur. Instead, the author would suggest that recognition could be 
obtained by the sharing of their backing on social media. Sharing within social media would 
enable users to gain recognition and gratification from members of their own social network 
(Malik et al,2016). The comments section would not give lasting recognition as the comment 
could be pushed further back by future comments and it would thus give a very limited 
amount of recognition.  
2.4.1.5.2 Desire to see project created, lobbying motivation 
Bretschneider and Leimeister (2017), suggested that backers are motivated to support 
projects by the desire to see the project created. Arguing that backers developed their own 
personal need for a project existence based upon the content presented within a crowdfunding 
page, if this content was consistent with their value systems (Moysidou, 2017; Ordanini et al, 
2011; Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010).  
However, this author would suggest that the lobbying motivation doesn’t have to be 
restricted to products which don’t exist within the market, instead lobbying could be utilised 
to increase the market availability of the product, or to encourage the continued existence of 
the project, or to create a variation of the product based upon the specific backer needs. 
Backers could be incentivised to increase the supply of the good within the market, as low 
supply of a product with high demand would lead to higher costs which could reduce access 
to the product. By lobbying through supporting projects on crowdfunding, backers could be 
able to increase supply and thus reduce the products costs, enabling more people to obtain the 
project which links with their personal need. Secondly, backers could also lobby to continue 
the existence of a product rather than simply creating it in the first, this can be shown via 
continuous crowdfunding platforms such as Patreon which enables backers to continually 
lobby for the existence of a project (Patreon, 2018a).  
2.4.1.5.3 To build a specific online image 
Bretschneider and Leimeister (2017), argued that backers are attempting to create a 
specific image through their actions within a crowdfunding platform. These actions are 
viewable on the user web page of crowdfunding platforms, which can then be linked to their 
personal social media, enabling them to create a specific online image from their actions on a 
crowdfunding platform. Utilising the concept that individuals value image in the virtual 
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world as much as within the physical world (Jabr, 2013) and that this image can be generated 
by the purchase of digital goods (Kim et al, 2011). The author would argue, that is not a 
significantly different motivation compared to recognition, utilising a webpage seems to be a 
method for them to generate recognition utilising the creation of social imagery. 
Alternatively, recognition can be seen as part of the online social image, rather than a 
separate phenomenon. As public recognition is key to encouraging pro-social behaviour 
(Lacetera and Macis, 2010). These two motivations seem linked rather than separate, thus the 
author would consider them both together under the guise of generation of a specific online 
recognisable image.      
2.4.1.5.4 Because they like the venture 
Bretschneider and Leimeister (2017) suggested that backers may simply support a 
project because they like it, building from observations that in the field of start-ups, making 
an entrepreneur likeable is a key first step in receiving investment (Brettel, 2003; Feeney et 
al,1999; Mason and Stark, 2004). The author suggests that this likeability could be divided 
into two separate motivations. The likeability of the campaign and the likeability of the 
creator. As support for the individual may not necessarily be tied to support for the venture. 
This can be demonstrated by considering that early investors in start-ups are often made up of 
friends and family (Kotha and George,2012), who may be backing ventures due to liking the 
entrepreneur rather than the venture.  
2.4.1.5.5 As anticipation of a reward 
One clear motivation for backers is the reward/incentive they can receive; the type of 
reward will be dependent upon the crowdfunding platforms backer participation rights and 
the options chosen by the project creators. Rewards have been empirically demonstrated to be 
key motivators of success within crowdfunding platforms (Gerber and Hui, 2013; Hobbs et 
al, 2016; Bretschneider and Leimeister 2017).  
2.4.1.5.6 As a function of herding behaviour.  
Zhang and Liu (2012), considered the effect of herding within the micro-lending 
platform of Prosper, observing the phenomena that projects which are attracting a large 
number of backers will attract even more backers. Herzenstein et al (2011) considered that 
herding occurred due to backer’s uncertainty of a project quality, as backers assumed that the 
other backers were able to identify high quality project, thus they followed the other backers 
regardless of whether the project was high quality or not. Herding has been extended from 
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micro-lending to crowdfunding (Bretschneider and Leimeister, 2017; Kuppuswamy and 
Bayus, 2018) 
These six categories show some of the possible motivations for backers on 
crowdfunding platforms, however this is undoubtedly a non-exhaustive list, as only an 
individual backer can ever fully know their own motivation. These six motivations can be 
utilised in creating a framework to consider what possible motivations can occur within a 
single crowdfunding platform. Certain motives may not be possible due to the crowdfunding 
platform design, the simplest example of that being that getting a reward on a donation-based 
platform is fundamentally impossible.  
 In conclusion this chapter has provided a definition which can be utilised to 
distinguish between crowdfunding and traditional financing, developed a clear subdivision 
method for a crowdfunding platform, highlighted key literature across the different 
subdivisions and, finally, developed a theoretical framework to be utilised in the 
methodology chapter in order to develop the hypothesis of this thesis.  
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3 Methodology 
The structure of the methodology is as follows. 
1) Research philosophy and design: This section discusses the theoretical underpinning 
of the methodology. Outlining why pragmatism was chosen as the research philosophy 
and the effects this decision had on the design of the study. 
 
2) Data collection management and analysis: The aim of this section is to outline the 
specific software and techniques utilised in collecting, managing and analysing data 
across both crowdfunding platforms.  
 
3) Kickstarter dataset: This section shows the exact process utilised in examining the 
crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. Firstly, the hypotheses are developed by utilising the 
theoretical framework developed in the literature review and expanding upon these 
theoretical underpinnings. Secondly, the data collection procedure is outlined including 
any data restrictions and ethical considerations. Finally, the data analysis procedure and 
models utilised to examine the dataset are outlined.   
 
4) Kiva dataset: This section demonstrates the process utilised in examining the 
crowdfunding platform Kiva. Firstly, the hypotheses are developed through utilising the 
theoretical framework developed in the literature review and connecting and expanding to 
the theories introduced within the examination of the Kickstarter dataset. Secondly, the 
data collection procedure is outlined alongside any data restrictions and ethical 
considerations. Before the last subsection critically examines why truncated regression 
was utilised in the creation of the Kiva models. 
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3.1 Research philosophy and design 
3.1.1 Pragmatism as a Research Paradigm:   
The definition used for a research paradigm in this thesis is as follows: an organising 
structure or framework used throughout the research connecting the design to a philosophical 
position, thus directly affecting the design and contribution of the research. The choice of 
research paradigms is driven both by the research design and via the researchers own 
epistemological understanding of the world (Feilzer, 2010).  
The research paradigm which will be utilised in this research is that of Pragmatism. 
Pragmatism considers that multiple different realities overlap in the world, some which can 
be interpreted via objective reasoning, others only by subjective reasoning, it states there is 
no consistent, correct way of viewing the epistemological design of the universe (Creswell 
and Clark, 2007; Dewey 1958). Research which utilises pragmatism is focused on providing 
a utility output, in general, this is achieved through the research having some direct 
application which can be utilised in the “real world” (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Pragmatism 
dictates that the specific approach used within the research should be chosen based on what is 
most suitable for that specific research, whether that approach is quantitative, qualitative or a 
combination of the two (Feilzer, 2010). 
The author utilises pragmatism as a research paradigm to research crowdfunding for 
several reasons. Firstly, it aligns with the author's personal view of the state of the universe, 
that certain elements of reality have to be subjectively interpreted via considering an 
individual’s perception (Jhangiani and Stangor, 2015). The author is of the view that one 
cannot perceive completely what another individual experienced, due to how an individual’s 
perception and reaction to an event can be affected by the past actions and beliefs of the 
individual (Albarracin and Wyer, 2000). Thus, even with the same stimuli another person 
cannot experience the same understanding of the current experience as they have not had the 
same past experiences. Fundamentally meaning that elements of the universe are subjective 
and only possible to be understood by those who can subjectively view them. Conversely, the 
author takes the position that other aspects of the universe are objectively observable outside 
of the subjective reality. A key example of this is within the scientific method, although the 
objective elements depend upon the scientific process utilised (Dallaporta, 1993). 
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To best explain the author’s fundamental underlying logic in deciding upon 
pragmatism an analogy of the structure of the universe is proposed. Consider the universe as 
a river, an analogy first introduced by the ancient philosopher Heraclitus (Kirk,1951), who 
considers how the universe was continually adapting and changing. The author expands upon 
this analogy by utilising it to examine the individual components of the river rather than the 
river as a whole.  
Imagine a river flowing from the top of a mountain to a sea. Within this river, there 
are multiple flows of water running simultaneously to each other from the start to the end of 
the river. These flows may at times cross and become connected, while at other times they are 
completely independent. It is these flows which represent the subjective viewpoint of reality, 
whereby each flow represent how information can be divided across the universe which may 
not be perceivable from the position of the other flows. Making that version of reality only 
perceptible to those who are within those flows. However, all streams belong to the same 
river and are tied to forces affecting that river, for example, if the river starts to approach a 
waterfall then all flows will be affected. Objectivity is viewed as a factor which will affect all 
flows regardless of their position within the river. It could be considered the underlying rules 
which guide the river in this analogy are the underlying objective rules which guide the 
universe. For these objective rules to change, the entirety of the river must be altered, beyond 
the framework of the original. Due to this reasoning, the research aims to demonstrate, as 
accuratly as possible, what is occurring within the universe, while accepting that the universe 
is both objective and subjective in nature. Leading to the choice of pragmatism as a research 
philosophy as it aligns itself with accepting this structure of the universe. 
Secondly, this approach is useful in examining crowdfunding, due to the broad variety 
of approaches which can be utilised in discussing this emerging phenomenon, the range of 
these is demonstrated within the literature review.  
3.1.2 The reasoning behind using a quantitative approach: 
The reasoning behind using a quantitative approach is linked to the aims of the study, 
to enable success to be measured across the entirety of a crowdfunding platform. It was noted 
through pre-data collection examination of Kickstarter that there were on average over 150 
projects added each day, each project was hosted on its own webpage within Kickstarter, 
where the creator set the funding goal and provided key information about the venture, 
backers support the venture through the project page.  
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Thus to utilise qualitative methods, the timeframe examined would have to be greatly 
reduced or alternatively only a specific category on Kickstarter could be examined. While 
utilising a quantitative approach would require neither of these restrictions and maintain the 
generalisability of the result to similar forms of crowdfunding platforms. Similar forms of 
crowdfunding platforms refers to platforms which utilise the same backer participation rights 
and creator requirements. 
Furthermore, through the examination of Kickstarter and Kiva, it became clear that 
the systematic structure of the crowdfunding platforms enabled key information to be 
consistently provided about the campaigns. For example, within Kickstarter every single 
project had to set a funding goal, enabling the funding goal to be compared across all 
projects. Kickstarter and Kiva both had a set of variables which were reported consistently 
across all projects, enabling a set of independent variables to be developed which were 
consistent across all projects. both platforms also provided consistent key information which 
could capture success in the platforms, enabling the dependent variable to be defined. For 
example, within Kickstarter, the all-or-nothing condition enabled successfully reaching the 
funding goal to be utilised as the dependent variable, enabling a consistent set of dependent 
and independent variables to be obtained across all projects within the crowdfunding platform 
which can then be tested utilising quantitative analysis techniques, and encouraging the 
choice of a quantitative approach.  
For these reasons, a quantitative approach was utilised. The following sections outline 
the exact quantitative process utilised in developing the models to be tested for the thesis.    
3.1.3 Outline of the Quantitative process 
For each model, the following steps are used.  
Step 1) Key hypotheses and conceptual framework are developed by utilising the theoretical 
framework outlined in the literature review. 
Step 2) Data is collected from the crowdfunding platforms to obtain both the dependent and 
explanatory variables. 
Step 3) A model of the data is proposed to be examined based upon the collected data and 
developed conceptual frameworks. 
Step 4) The model is analysed using a quantitative approach, the exact approach is chosen 
based upon the nature of the dependent variable and underlying characteristics of the dataset.  
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Step 5) The hypotheses, derived from the research framework, are then tested based upon the 
model’s estimations.  
Step 6) Findings, recommendations and conclusions are developed and discussed based on 
the results and their impact within the framework and the existing literature.  
3.1.4 Reasoning behind examining two distinct crowdfunding platforms.  
Within this thesis, two separate platforms are examined Kickstarter and Kiva. Two separate 
datasets are collected from these platforms for the following reasons.  
1) To demonstrate that the theoretical framework developed within the literature review could 
be utilised to examine multiple types of crowdfunding platforms, regardless of whether the 
platforms had the same backer participation rights and creator requirements.  
2) Kiva was utilised specifically as it enabled the examination of the effects of the backer's 
past support within the platform, which was not observable in Kickstarter.  
3) To enable comparison between both platforms, to identify if there were some specific 
underlying qualities across the crowdfunding platforms, which could be utilised as the basis 
for future research and more generalisable results.   
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3.2 Data collection/management techniques 
The section considers the key data collection and management techniques used for 
both the Kickstarter and Kiva datasets. This section does not highlight the exact collection 
procedure used for each dataset but rather aims to demonstrate what techniques were used, 
why they were used, and the steps taken to address ethical issues and reliability issues.  
3.2.1 Primary data collection 
3.2.1.1 Utilising Import.io web crawler 
A web crawler is a system for extracting specific information autonomously from the 
web or a specific website (Pant and Menczer, 2002). Web crawlers have been used 
extensively for the collection of crowdfunding data (Huhtamaki et al, 2015; Moqri and 
Bandyopadhyay, 2016; Thies et al, 2014). The specific web crawling software used for this 
thesis was Import.io. Import.io is a web crawling software/service, which enables the website 
to be extracted based on a point and click interface, which can be utilised to continually 
extract key pieces of data from the web (Import.io, 2018). 
There are multiple elements to the crawler, for this thesis the most important aspect 
was the extraction tool. This tool works by first asking the user to input the website they wish 
to extract from. Once this is input, the page loads the webpage, with an extraction interface 
built over. The extractor has two key tabs the data tab and the edit tab. The edit tab shows the 
webpage you wish to extract from, and the data tab shows the data which would be extracted 
from that page. Data can be selected to be collected in the edit tab, and this is done by simply 
clicking the element in the webpage, this is demonstrated in Figure 3-1 below by the green 
square surrounding the number of backers. The data is arranged into multiple columns which 
can be viewed in the data tab. The process of selecting the elements one wishes to extract is 
known as training the extractor, and once the process has been done with one webpage, the 
crawler can then attempt to extract the same information from another webpage, if the data is 
not successfully extracted one can further train the extractor on the second webpage. There 
are multiple options built into the system such as disabling javascript and utilising manual x-
path in the identification of specific elements, which can be used to train the extractor further 
improving its ability to collect the required information. This template can then be used 
across a list of other URLs, enabling mass extraction of data. Furthermore, the software has 
inbuilt scheduling, enabling the extraction of information at a specific time each 
day/week/month. Another feature which is useful is the ability to link extractors together if 
one extractor collects a URL, that URL can then be used as the target of another extractor 
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(Import.io, 2018). The specific way in which this tool was used will be discussed in further 
detail in the Kickstarter and Kiva sections.  
Figure 3-1 Import.io extractor on a kickstarter page (Kickstarter 2019b) 
 
3.2.1.2 Ethical usage and reliability of data within the use of web crawling techniques  
Utilising web crawlers has specific ethical issues which must be taken into 
consideration. Thelwall and Stuart (2006), outlined four types of ethical issues surrounding 
web crawlers; cost, privacy, copyright and denial of services. Cost refers to how websites 
incur a cost for visitors visiting their website, and this will also be incurred by a web crawler. 
Thus the researcher by utilising a web crawler may increase costs to the business. These costs 
are not standard across time, and the temporal variance can be demonstrated by comparing 
the original costs outlined in Thelwall and Stuart (2006) paper. The websites hosting sites 
mentioned in the paper all had monthly bandwidth limits of between 0.25 gigabytes and 7 
gigabytes with charges if these limits were exceeded. Compare this to Weebly, who in 2018 
offer free websites with no limit on the bandwidth for UK users and no additional/hidden 
charges based on usage (Weebly 2018). Geographic differences can also occur with 
continents such as Australia having far more expensive bandwidth than Europe (Prince, 
2014). Thus, the cost to a website of web crawlers is decreasing. However, this still 
highlights how the number of web crawls should be minimised, only crawling what is 
necessary to collect the data.  
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In order to reduce the cost of the crawlers on the sites for the thesis, two main steps 
were taken, one was to pick two large and established platforms, who were less likely to be 
affected by any bandwidth costs. Secondly, the crawlers were designed so that the minimum 
number of runs was utilised while still collecting the data. The exact crawling process utilised 
for each dataset is outlined in more detail later in the chapter. 
Regarding privacy, although the internet is essentially in the public domain, 
researchers have to consider that by utilising web crawling there is the possibility of 
collecting personal data. The argument that the data is already in the public domain is not 
satisfactory when considering personal data. Zimmer (2010) paper examined the outcome of 
extracting data from a social media site; they identified how a 2008 study into Facebook 
accounts lead to the privacy of the users being at risk. What was notable was the study did 
take several steps in anonymising the information, it provided anonymous ids for both the 
students and the college they were attending and delayed the results of the research. 
However, based on the information of being a north eastern American university, the results 
were narrowed down to 13 universities, then to a single university and finally, the exact 
group of students were identified (Zimmer, 2008). This provides a perfect example of how 
simply relying on the data being accessible to the public is not enough to address privacy 
issues. And that releasing data that can be related to a single user can enable identification 
even when the name is anonymised. Web crawlers demonstrate why even anonymised 
information is so problematic, due to how they can be trained to look for these specific 
phrases and used to track down their source. This issue of extracting information specifically 
from social media sources is further discussed in Semenov (2013), considering both the legal 
and technical challenges, however as social media data is not extracted within the thesis 
further expansion on the topic is not carried out. 
Furthermore article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) sets 
out for individuals ‘a right to erasure’ so that they can request that personal data that is held 
should be deleted. This could represent a potential risk for researchers using web crawlers as 
individuals could request that copies of their personal data that has been obtained are 
removed. However, guidelines indicate that researchers can obtain exemptions under certain 
circumstances (GDPR, 2018). 
.  
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The issue of copyright and web crawling occurs due to how web crawling creates a 
copy of a website or specific information, which may be viewed as a breach of copyright in 
certain situations. O’Reilly (2006) gives a more detailed look at copyright and specific 
trademark challenges with the context of web crawlers and screen scrappers and the legal 
ramifications, which are outside the specific skill set of the researcher. In order to overcome 
any copyright issues, data is only reported at a platform level, with no specific information 
about each project released.   
The last problem identified by Thelwall and Stuart (2006) was the problem of denial 
of service. Only a certain number of people can utilise a website at the same time based on 
the infrastructure of the website, and a crawler can reduce the capacity of the website and 
thus could lead to a denial of service of other users. To reduce the effect of crawlers on the 
users of the website, the runs were carried out at specific times in the day; the times were 
chosen by considering the userbase of the platform, which was observed via utilising Alexa. 
Alexa is an online database that can be used to identify which countries most actively use the 
website and thus what times should be chosen to minimise the effect of the web crawlers 
(Alexa, 2018). 
3.2.1.3 Reliability and accuracy in web crawlers 
A separate issue alongside ethical issues is the reliability of the data collected on web 
crawlers. Two main issues which can occur when utilising web crawlers is the problem of 
selective data and personalisation. 
Selective data refers to how the website may retain only a selected sample of projects 
which best reflect the desired outcomes of the site. The crowdfunding platform Crowdcube is 
a perfect example of this in which data is available on the past campaigns which are 
successful but not the campaigns which are unsuccessful (Crowdcube, 2019). This makes 
perfect sense as the crowdfunding platforms themselves are incentivised to demonstrate they 
have delivered high-quality projects in the past, in order to attract high quality projects in the 
future (Agrawal et al 2014). However, this incentive means that if a crawler was run on 
Crowdcube and only captured the selective data, then the results are limited to examining 
factors in successful crowdfunding campaigns. If utilised to consider all campaigns, the result 
may be biased. This problem can be overcome by running crawlers’ multiple times over a 
specific period. Enabling the capture of ongoing campaigns which may succeed or fail. 
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The second problem is that of personalisation. This is the concept that websites can be 
personalised to the specific user. A common example of this sort of personalisation can be 
seen within e-commerce applications, where the individual’s view of the website can be 
altered so that certain products are more prominent (Goy et al, 2007). This creates a unique 
problem when utilising web crawling that the specific webpage faced by each user may be 
different. Thus the webpage which is captured by the crawler may not be the webpage viewed 
by the user. To address this problem crawlers can disable specific scripts and utilise virtual 
private networks to access the website from different locations and with different metadata. 
For this specific thesis, personalisation was not a major issue as both of the examined 
crowdfunding platforms do not utilise personalisation.  
3.2.1.4 Opportunity cost  
In considering the feasibility of utilising web crawlers, an examination of the next 
best possible technique should be considered. In the case of crowdfunding one of the main 
alternative data collection technique utilised in the literature is surveys, as demonstrated in 
the following non-exhaustive list; (Marom et al, 2016; Sancak, 2016; Berglin and Strandberg, 
2013). Therefore, the options of using surveys were considered as the next best alternative to 
web crawling. However, two main problems were identified with utilising surveys in this 
case. The first is that some campaigns creators had limited or no contact details, as 
demonstrated within the crowdfunding platform Kiva, where due to the structure of the 
platform the campaigns were run by partnership organisations representing each creator, 
instead of the creator themselves (Kiva, 2018a). This makes it problematic to contact the 
creator of the campaign in order to request the completion of a survey. The second is the 
scale of surveys which would have been necessary to capture the full ongoing campaigns at 
Kickstarter. The dataset collected for this thesis on Kickstarter, had over 50,000 campaigns 
within a single year, collecting this number of surveys as a single researcher was deemed to 
be unrealistic. As a result, utilising this method would have required a reduction in the scope 
of the research. For these reasons’ surveys were not seen as a viable alternative to utilising 
web crawlers in this research project.  
3.2.2 Secondary data collection 
Alongside collecting data directly from the crowdfunding platforms, secondary data 
sources were utilised to collect additional information about the crowdfunding platforms.  
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3.2.2.1 Shared Count 
Shared Count is an online website which can be used to track the number of times a 
specific URL has been shared upon social media. Shared Count captures how many times a 
URL has been shared, commented on, or reacted to on Facebook, as well as how many times 
it has been pinned on Pinterest. Shared Count was utilised within the Kickstarter model, to 
demonstrate how many times the crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter had been shared on 
Facebook (Shared Count, 2018). 
3.2.2.2 Google Trends website data 
Google Trends is an online tool which can be used to identify the popularity of search 
terms within the google search engine. The results can be tailored to specific search terms at a 
specific time and within a specific region. The result is in an index, where 100 represents the 
highest search frequency for the website in that specific time period. This data is presented as 
a graph on the website and can be downloaded in CSV format (Google Trends, 2018a). Preis 
et al (2013) noted that you can utilise Google trends in tracking shocks to financial markets. 
Multiple past authors have identified that google trends plays a role in identifying the impact 
of online media (Rech, 2007; Nghiem et al, 2016). Within crowdfunding specifically, Geva et 
al (2017) used Google trend data to highlight how a large supply side shock can be 
considered as responsible for helping crowdfunding low-quality actors. They considered the 
somewhat infamous example of Zack Danger Brown and his crowdfunding project funding 
potato salad (Kickstarter, 2014), noting that the interest in the search term Kickstarter had 
dramatically increased during his project. Their work highlighted how the success of a project 
can be impacted by the external media inputs and, thus, that this should be captured as a key 
covariate within models examining crowdfunding success. The temporal profile of the 
interest in Kickstarter, between 2017 and 2019, is displayed in figure 3-2 below.    
 
 
 
96   
 
Figure 3-2 Interest in Kickstarter over time (Google Trends, 2018b)  
 
3.2.3 Software utilised in data management and analysis 
This section considers how the data was managed and analysed, highlighting the 
specific software and techniques utilised by the author.   
3.2.3.1 Excel 
The main data management tool utilised in the thesis was Microsoft Excel. Data 
extracted utilising Import.io and from Google Trends was extracted in csv format which can 
be directly opened and manipulated in Excel. The main Excel commands which were utilised 
in organising the data are outlined in detail within the data appendix (section 7.1).  
3.2.3.2 QGIS: Mapping software 
QGIS is a data mapping software which can be utilised to compare geographic 
variables and to plot these variables on a map of the authors choosing. The software was 
utilised within the Kickstarter dataset to plot the location of crowdfunding campaigns. For 
further documentation on the general usage of the software, please refer to the software 
website (QGIS, 2018). 
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Figure 3-3 Geographic positions of all collected Kickstarter projects 
 
3.2.3.3 Gephi 
Gephi is a network analysis and visualisation tool, which can be used to visually 
display networks and obtain network statistics concerning said network. The software can 
build a network from multiple different data formats, the simplest requiring three columns of 
data, one column with the source of the link, one column with the target of the link and one 
column with the weight of the link. Gephi was utilised in the network development for the 
kiva dataset as shown in Figure 3-4, the specific network characteristics extracted is 
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considered within the Kiva model. For more information, please refer to the software website 
(Gephi, 2018). 
Figure 3-4 Example of Gephi usage, geographic network from Kiva dataset. 
 
3.2.3.4 Stata 
Stata was utilised in the econometric analysis of the data. It was used to carry out a 
logistic regression on the Kickstarter dataset, and truncated regression analysis on the Kiva 
dataset alongside further statistical robustness tests on both datasets. For in-detail records of 
the exact processes used, please refer to the syntax files recorded within Appendix sections 
Error! Reference source not found. and 7.6.  
3.2.3.5 Postman 
Postman was utilised when collecting data on the partnership organisation on Kiva. 
Postman defines itself as a complete API development environment, whereby an API 
(application programming interface) allows applications to communicate with each other in 
order to enable the applications to be used together. API have many usages, the specific 
usage within this thesis was to collect data on Kiva partnership organisation by utilising an 
API to access Kiva’s database on partnership organisations (Postman, 2019). 
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3.3 Kickstarter Model 
Kickstarter is a reward-based crowdfunding platform which was founded on the 28th 
April 2009. Since then it has raised over 4.2 billion dollars in funds and supported 159,000 
projects as of the 23rd of March 2019 (Kickstarter, 2019a). The process for obtaining funds on 
Kickstarter is as follows: 
Step 1) The creator sets up a project page, which contains key information about the 
campaign. The page must contain the projects funding goal, the project location, the project 
duration, the different reward levels, the project category and specialism, past number of 
projects created by the creator and past number of projects backed by the creator. 
Additionally, the creator is free to add images, videos and text to persuade users to back the 
projects. 
Step 2) After the project page is created, the creator then decides when they want to launch 
the project, this becomes the project start date.  
Step 3) The project start date is reached, and the project becomes live, potential backers can 
now visit the project and back the project. At this point, the project starts to display the 
number of backers supporting the project and the amount of money raised towards the goal as 
well as the time left before that goal must be reached. The maximum difference between the 
start and end date is sixty days. 
Step 4) The creators are free to adjust their project during the campaign, they can add 
additional reward levels, remove unused reward levels, add updates or more videos and texts. 
The backers are also free to comment but only after they have backed the project. This 
campaigning process continues until the end date. 
Step 5) By the end date of the project and if the funding goal has been reached or exceeded, 
the project gets to keep all of the funds. If the project has not reached its funding goal the 
money is returned to the backers.  
Step 6) The rewards are given to the backers, this step may occur at any point, some rewards 
can be given instantaneously and thus will occur during the campaign, however in other cases 
rewards will be sent at a future point in time.  
Examining this step by step process utilising the expanded subdivision method 
outlined in the literature review enables Kickstarter to be further defined as a reward-based 
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all-or-nothing limited generalised traditional crowdfunding platform (see section 2.2.7 for 
detail on the expanded subdivision method).  
It is reward-based as all projects must offer different rewards levels in return for the 
backing they receive. Reward levels differ slightly from the concept of a reward, as reward 
levels can combine multiple rewards into a single funding level. For example, a project could 
set two reward levels, one at 5 dollars where backers receive a hat and one at 20 dollars 
where backers receive a hat and a signed shirt. The platform is all-or-nothing as projects must 
reach their funding goals to receive any funds. It can be considered limited as this is referring 
to the project duration, and projects on Kickstart must finish between 1-60 days. It is 
generalised as although projects must be legal there are no other specific requirements for 
what can be raised. And finally, it is traditional as it does not utilise cryptocurrency.   
Success on Kickstarter is measured depending upon a crowdfunding project reaching 
its funding goal. If the project reaches the funding goal then it will be considered a success, if 
the project doesn’t reach the funding goal, it will be considered a failure, utilising the same 
measure of success as Mollick (2014) and Janku and Kucerova (2018). Additionally, if the 
project is cancelled by the creator it will also be considered a failure. However, if Kickstarter 
suspended a project, then this observation would not be considered a success or failure, but 
instead was removed from the dataset. This is due to how a suspended project could have 
already reached their funding goal but was suspended based upon breaking Kickstarter 
internal ruleset. Therefore, these projects cannot be viewed as successful or unsuccessful and 
thus were removed from the dataset.  
3.3.1 Hypotheses and conceptual framework development 
The next four sections create the main hypotheses for the Kickstarter model, 
separating these hypotheses into separate sections based upon the theoretical framework 
developed in section 2.  
3.3.2 Creators Signals 
This section considers the development of the hypotheses focussing on how signals 
sent by the creators might affect the outcome of the crowdfunding projects. As mentioned in 
the literature review three qualities are required for signals between two groups to be 
effective; they must be observable, manipulatable and their cost should be positive correlated 
with the quality of the sending group (Spence 1978), in this case, costlier for high-quality 
projects versus low-quality projects. Within Kickstarter, all of the signals are observable, due 
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firstly, to how the platform requires specific information to be delivered and, secondly, to the 
fact that this information is freely available on the crowdfunding page. However, assessing 
whether the signal is manipulatable and costlier will have to be considered on a signal by 
signal basis. Signals have been used as a proxy, to capture the human capital of a project’s 
creator, the reasoning behind the usage of each proxy for that specific aspect of human capital 
is justified within each section.  
3.3.2.1 Over-confidence 
The specific signal examined in this sub-section is the relative funding goal within the 
specialism of the creator, or the amount of money a project declares it wants to reach by the 
end of their campaign on Kickstarter relative (taking differences) to other projects active 
within the specialism over the duration of the Kickstarter project. The funding goal and thus 
the relative funding goal can be set at any level by the creator and this level of funding can 
also be exceeded.  
The relative funding goal can be considered as a signal for the level of confidence of 
the creator of the crowdfunding project. With the reasoning being that: the greater the 
confidence the creator has in the project, the more likely that the creator will consider their 
project to be better than other projects within the same specialism (smallest sub-division in 
Kickstarter) and thus that they are able to set a higher funding goal. If the creators lack this 
confidence then they would be more likely to consider their project to be worse than other 
projects within the platform, thus setting a lower relative funding goal.  
To examine the impact of confidence, the author considered if this level of confidence 
was justified or if it was likely to be overestimated by the creators of the crowdfunding 
projects. In examining the performance of start-ups it was considered that traditional 
entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident (Astebro et al, 2014), therefore it could be argued that 
creators in crowdfunding which includes entrepreneurs (Bruton et al, 2015) could also be 
viewed as overconfident. This argument is supported by work specifically on crowdfunding 
which finds creators to be overconfident (Miglo, 2018). Therefore, the author argues that the 
creators in crowdfunding on average might tend to exhibit overconfidence. 
In examining the impact of overconfidence Moore and Healy (2008) divided 
overconfidence into three distinct concepts; overestimation, over placement and over 
precision. Overestimation considers individuals assessing their ability or performance too 
greatly, over placement considers that the individual rates its ability above that of others. 
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Finally, over precision considers that individuals believe that they are more accurate in the 
predictions of their ability than they actually are. All of these three different features of 
overeconfidence can be captured by creators setting a higher relative funding goal in their 
crowdfunding campaigns.  
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) argued how over placement and overestimation can 
both be linked to the concept that individuals overestimate their ability when comparing their 
ability to other people, a key concept within the social psychology literature (Larwood and 
Whittaker, 1977; Svenson, 1981; Alicke, 1985; Camerer and Lovallo,1999). Kruger and 
Dunning (1999), further considered that it was those with the lowest level of competence that 
were the most likely to overestimate their relative abilities. Testing individuals with separate 
tests on humour, grammar and logic, they found that individuals who scored lowest were the 
most likely to overestimate their results. For example, the results showed those who 
performed poorest in the test, scoring within the lowest 12 percent of all participants 
estimated themselves to be above average, predicting they would score in the top 38 percent 
of the test. Relating these results to crowdfunding indicates that projects with the lowest 
quality may greatly overestimate their ability, by comparing themselves to high-quality 
projects which occurred in the past and believing they can also achieve this level of success. 
As a result, creators overestimate their projects ability to raise funds, which leads the creator 
to set an unrealistic high relative funding goal.  
Overpredicting can also be directly related to crowdfunding as the relative funding 
goal can be seen as a direct outcome of the prediction of how much money the campaign will 
be able to raise. Malmendier and Tate (2005b) demonstrated that CEOs overpredicted results 
by finding high levels of variance in stock trading, they utilised the calibration literature in 
explaining how individuals tend to overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge 
(Lichtenstein et al, 1977; Alpert et al, 1982; Koriat et al, 1980; Einhorn and Hogarth,1978). 
Furthermore, this literature even points out that experience, is not able to prevent inaccurate 
predicting. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978), considered three plausible reasons for this: the lack 
of evidence against their original viewpoint, the inability of the individual to identify 
environmental effects which impact the outcome of the event and finally that outcomes were 
not accurately recorded or coded so that outcomes cannot be referred to when assessing 
future events. Applying these ideas to crowdfunding, suggests that creators are unlikely to be 
able to successful gauge the potential of their project, even if they have past experience on 
the platform, which may lead to an unachievable relative funding goal being set.   
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As previously discussed, it is necessary to consider if the relative funding goal, 
intended as a signal, respects the three critical conditions of being manipulatable, costlier for 
low-quality projects and observable. Clearly, the relative funding goal is manipulatable and 
observable, as any funding goal can be set for a project and the backers are free to view the 
funding goal. This signal can also be considered costlier for low-quality projects as, usually, 
more backers will be needed to support a project with a higher funding goal. Thus, with an 
increased number of backers, there will be an increased amount of scrutiny placed upon the 
project, not only as a result of the direct knowledge of each backer but as a function of the 
combined knowledge of the backers in the form of crowd wisdom (Sadiku et al, 2017). Low-
quality projects would be less likely to withstand this increased level of scrutiny, therefore 
incurring a higher cost for setting a higher relative funding goal. Hence, the relative funding 
goal can be seen as an effective signal and can be used as a proxy for the level of confidence 
of the creators. Thus, the author proposes that in general creators signalling through their 
relative funding goals, might be overconfident in the quality of their projects, unintentionally 
leading this signal to have a negative impact on the success of the crowdfunding project. This 
is captured by stating the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Creators’ overconfidence has a negative impact on the probability of the 
project’s success.  
3.3.2.2 Experience 
The signal examined in this sub-section consists of the past number of projects that 
the creators have created on the crowdfunding platform. Past created campaigns are 
considered as a proxy for the creator’s experience, as if they have carried out previous 
projects on Kickstarter, by definition they are more experienced, than creators who have 
carried out less or no previous projects on Kickstarter. The concept of utilising experience as 
a key measure of success stems from key contributions in the entrepreneurship literature. 
Gompers et al (2010), examined how experience impacted entrepreneurs’ ability to go public 
with their start-ups. They found that entrepreneurs who have successfully gone public in the 
past had a 30 per cent chance of going public in contrast to the 18 per cent chance for first-
time ventures. The reasoning suggested for this evidence is that many aspects of being an 
entrepreneur can only be learnt through experience and by doing entrepreneurship. Thus 
entrepreneurs who have experienced past projects have learnt specific skills which make 
future start-ups more successful (Packalen 2007). One of the possible advantages these 
specific skills could give is to enable entrepreneurs to adapt to the changing business 
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environment surrounding the start-up. Alternatively it could provide them with knowledge of 
technology key to the success of the new venture (Shepherd et al, 2000). Thus, this concept 
can be transferred to examine crowdfunding, arguing that creators develop specific skills by 
carrying out past crowdfunding campaigns and that these specific skills will enable them to 
be more successful in the future.  
The same concept can be tackled from an economic perspective, utilising the 
consumer experience perspective. Shapiro (1983) considers that if observations of a product 
attributes are difficult for consumers, they can use the last produced product as an indicator of 
past quality. Furthermore, this past quality can then be used to moderate their future 
consumption of a good (Peña et al, 2013). Therefore, within the context of crowdfunding, the 
past campaigns carried out by the creator can be utilised by backers as indicators of past 
quality, enabling them to moderate there future backing based upon the past quality provided 
by the creator.  
Utilising the creators previously backed campaigns as past experience to predict 
success within crowdfunding has been common across the crowdfunding literature. However, 
the literature is divided other whether the past experience has any significant effect. Marelli 
and Ordanini (2016) alongside Koch and Siering (2015), both found that the past creators 
experience did not have a significant effect on the level of success, even when only past 
successful projects were considered. Conversely, Buttice et al (2017), Janku and Kucerova 
(2018), and Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2018), all found that the past creator's experience did 
have a positive effect on the likelihood of success. Janku and Kucerova (2018) suggested that 
it was the sample sizes of the projects which were affecting the results, with the work of 
Marelli and Ordanini (2016) and Koch and Siering (2015), who respectively had sample sizes 
of 500 and 1000 observations. Compared to Buttice et al (2017), Janku and Kucerova (2018) 
and Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2018), who respectively had samples of, 31,389, 202,272 and 
25,508 observations.    
Furthermore, higher levels of experience within the crowdfunding platform could also 
impact the other variables utilised to examine the success of projects. For example, Koch and 
Siering (2015), included the project description, graphical accompaniment and the provision 
of video materials, as additional independent variables, finding that all three of these did have 
a significant effect on success. These authors argue that these could be considered as an 
outcome of the experience of the creators, whereby more experienced creators utilise these 
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techniques more than less experienced ones. A further example of this is in Marelli and 
Ordanini (2016) study which included variables on text length and video inclusion. These two 
variables could also be demonstrating the creator's experience as utilising the optimum text 
length and the ability to include a video could be seen as skills derived from previous 
attempts.   
As previously discussed, it is necessary to consider if the experience, as a signal, is 
manipulatable and costlier for low-cost projects. The past number of campaigns are 
manipulatable, as creators can create more campaigns to increase this variable over time, the 
variable can also be manipulated downwards by not linking the past accounts to the new 
project, resetting the number to zero. The signal has higher costs for low quality campaigns, 
as the only way to increase this signal is to run additional campaigns, in contrast projects with 
past experience will not need to run any campaigns. Therefore, low-quality projects regarding 
experience have to endure a higher cost to appear as high-quality projects. 
Therefore, creator experience can be adopted as an effective signal and can be 
assessed in its potential to impact success on Kickstarter. Increased experience is seen as a 
positive signal of project quality, and thus the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H1b: Signalling increased experience has a positive impact on the probability of the 
project’s success. 
3.3.2.3 Trustworthiness  
The signal examined in this sub-section consists of the number of updates provided by 
the creators during their campaign, Log values for updates were utilised to normalise these 
values. The author argues that updates can be seen to represent trustworthiness, due to how 
updates provide new information to the backers, answering questions on possible flaws and 
providing greater details about the project. They provide an ability for creators to reassure the 
backers on the reliability of the project and that the desired outcomes can be achieved, while 
the funding of the project is ongoing. Thus, demonstrating how trustworthy the creator is.  
The impact of trustworthiness on success can be examined by considering the 
entrepreneurship literature, where trustworthiness is a key aspect of successful entrepreneurs 
(Rauch and Frese, 2007; Abdullah, 2013). Highly competent entrepreneurs are better at 
gaining trust and confidence from their investors or consumers (Baron and Markman, 2003). 
Furthermore, the ability of entrepreneurs to signal trustworthiness can be a crucial impactor 
in securing supply from other businesses (Venkataraman, 1997).  
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As discussed previously it is necessary to consider if the number of updates, seen as a 
signal, is manipulatable and costlier for low-cost projects. This signal can be manipulated as 
the creators have the ability to send as many or as few updates during the duration of the 
project. At first glance, it seems that there is little ability to distinguish between high quality 
and low-quality campaigns for this signal as there is no direct higher cost in posting an update 
to the project page for the low-quality projects. However, it could be proposed that lower 
quality projects will incur a higher cost when posting updates, as the more updates that are 
posted, the more information is available for the crowd to scrutinise the higher the likelihood 
that the low quality of the project will be revealed, leading to an increased signalling cost for 
the lower-quality campaigns. Therefore, trustworthiness, as a signal, can be considered to be 
effective, and the following hypothesis is developed. 
H1c: Increased levels of trustworthiness have a positive impact on the probability of a 
project’s success.  
3.3.2.4 Impatience 
The signal examined in this sub-section is the duration of the crowdfunding project. 
The duration of the crowdfunding project is considered as a proxy for the level of patience of 
the creator. The shorter the duration, the more impatient the creator is in acquiring their 
funds, the longer the duration, the more patient a creator is. The most impatient creators 
create campaigns which last a single day, conversly the most patient creators will create 60 
days campaign, as Kickstarter allows projects to last a minimum of 1 day and a maximum of 
60 days.   
Patience has been identified as a necessary element of success within 
entrepreneurship (Kirby, 2004). As often to succeed entrepreneur need to defer their 
consumption, enabling them to make further investments with the aim of providing benefit to 
them in the future (Doepke and Zilbotti, 2014). Furthermore, over 75 per cent of Start-ups fail 
to return their original investment (Gage, 2012) and therefore an entrepreneur may need to 
run several start-ups before receiving any return on their investment. Requiring a large 
amount of patience by the entrepreneurs, while they continuously aim to create their 
successful start-up.  
Conversely, alongside patience being desirable, impatience is undesirable. Cadena 
and Keys (2015), examine the impact of impatience and its effect on income across the 
lifetime of members of the public. They utilised surveys which identified impatient 
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individuals based on a specific set of questions, then compared these to specific outcomes. 
The paper demonstrated that impatient users had less money, were more likely to have 
smoked and drunk to the point of having a hangover, compared to there patient counterparts. 
Furthermore, they examined the relationship between how impatient someone was, and their 
level of education obtained, with impatient people 10.2 per cent more likely to drop out of 
high school. The cumulative effect of these decisions was that the impatient participants were 
earning 13 per cent less than their cohorts by the time they were 46 years old. Therefore, 
impatience seems to be an undesirable trait for entrepreneurs, while patience emerges as a 
desirable one.      
As previously discussed, it is necessary to consider if the duration of the project is a 
signal that is both manipulatable and costlier for low-cost projects. Duration is manipulatable, 
as the creator can set the duration between 1 and 60 days. However, there is no clear higher 
cost to low-quality campaigns compared to high-quality campaigns. The author would argue 
that if the duration was far longer than the 60-day limit imposed by Kickstarter than an 
increased cost of low-quality campaigns could be argued. Consider a duration limit of 365 
days; the far longer funding period would enable far greater scrutiny of their product, giving 
the potential for weakness in low-quality projects to be identified. Thus a higher duration 
would incur higher costs to low-quality projects. However, in such a restricted time limit as 
sixty days, the author would propose that there would be no way to distinguish between high-
quality campaigns versus low-quality campaigns. Therefore, even though patience is 
desirable this signal is not likely to be effective. Thus, as patience would be seen as having a 
positive impact the following hypotheses is proposed, however it is considered that it is likely 
that the hypotheses will be rejected due to the inability for high quality project to distinguish 
themselves from low-quality projects: 
H1d: Increased level of patience have a positive impact on the probability of a project’s 
success. 
3.3.2.5 Ambition 
The specific signal examined in this sub-section is the funding goal, or the amount of 
money a project declares it must reach by the end of their campaign on Kickstarter. From an 
operational point of view, a logarithmic transformation of the funding goals values was 
introduced to help comparison across projects and reduce the effect of outliers. The set 
funding goal is considered as a proxy of the ambition of the creator. As this author argues that 
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creators with more ambitious projects would require higher amounts of funding than projects 
with less ambition. This is especially likely due to how Kickstarter is organised as an all-or 
nothing platform and thus, projects must reach their funding goal to receive any funding and 
thus creators are not incentivised to set funding goals above their ambition level.  
In order to interpret whether signalling a higher level of ambition would have a positive or 
negative effect on the project’s success, the effect of ambition within entrepreneurship was 
initially considered. Within the entrepreneurship literature, higher levels of entrepreneurial 
ambition are seen as a positive element, driving start-ups ability to grow and expand 
(Davidsson, 2003 and Bosma, 2009). However, excessive amounts of entrepreneurial 
ambitious have been considered to have negative effects on the overall macro level of the 
economy, leading to economic inefficiency (Cieślik et al, 2018). Additionally, within the 
crowdfunding literature, ambition has been identified as having a negative effect. Wells 
(2013) identified that ambitious crowdfunding project success can be hampered, due to how it 
can enable bad actors to steal trademarks and patents. However, we somewhat disagree with 
this argument as it suggests that the company is unable to file patents or copyrights before 
they run the crowdfunding campaign. Furthermore, within crowdfunding campaigns key 
information for new products does not need to be revealed. For example, one could state that 
he is building a new type of 3-D printer, however one would not need to state the specific 
technology used in this printer. However, Mollick (2018) suggests a far simpler reason why 
ambitious projects are more likely to get less support: that they are in general more 
complicated, thus more likely to fail in development and thus less likely to receive funding. 
This effect will be reinforced by the all-or-nothing condition which requires all projects to 
reach their funding goal to receive funds. Moreover, since by their very nature more 
ambitious projects require higher goals, this decreases their likelihood of succeeding. Thus 
this author argues that if Ambition is an effective signal, it will exert a negative impact on the 
probability of a project’s success.   
As with other signals, one must consider whether the funding goal is manipulatable, 
observable and costlier for low quality projects. The funding goal is manipulatable and 
observable, as any funding goal can be set for a project and the backers are free to view the 
funding goal. This signal can also be considered costlier for low-quality projects as, usually, 
more backers will be needed to support a project with a higher funding goal. Thus, with an 
increased number of backers, there will be an increased amount of scrutiny placed upon the 
project, not only as a result of the direct knowledge of each backer but as a function of the 
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combined knowledge of the backers (Sadiku et al, 2017). Low-quality projects would be less 
likely to withstand this increased level of scrutiny, therefore incurring a higher cost for 
setting a higher funding goal. Hence, the funding goal can be seen as an effective signal and 
can be used as a proxy for the level of ambition of the creator.  
The author proposes that, in general, creators signalling greater level of ambition will have a 
negative impact on success and that it will be an effective signal. This is captured by the 
following hypothesis: 
H1E: Creators’ Ambition has a negative impact on the probability of a project’s success. 
3.3.3 Backers Signals  
 
The reason that backers have to engage in signalling behaviour within Kickstarter is 
due to the link between the utility gained by an individual backer and the support of other 
backers, a typical case of direct network externalities. One backer, in the majority of cases, 
will not be solely responsible for funding a project. Instead, they will be offering a portion of 
the required funds, based upon the level of backing they give to the project. However, if the 
project does not reach its funding goal, the creators will receive no money, and thus the 
backers are not going to receive their rewards and their expected utility gain. Therefore, a 
backer is incentivised to signal, to other backers, to increase the probability that the project 
will reach its funding goal. Moreover, even after the project has reached its funding goal, the 
backer may still be incentivised to encourage further support for the project, under the 
assumption that this will increase the likelihood of successfully delivering the project's 
rewards.  
The signals sent by the backers are fundamentally different to the signals sent by the 
creators, the reason for this is that each backer is communicating their desires and therefore 
the signals sent can be seen as a combination of all backer’s desires, but not a direct reflection 
of any single backer. Therefore, it is not possible to examine these signals as proxies for the 
human capital of the backers due to the collective nature of these signals. Instead, the signals 
are considered as specific strategies by the backers.   
The backers have three primary ways to signal support in crowdfunding campaigns, 
through making comments on the crowdfunding page, by the act of backing a project and by 
choosing the level of backing they provide. In backing the project, the backers signal both 
support for the project and how strong that support is via the amount of money that the 
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backer provided. Therefore, these can be considered as two separate signals, the first solely 
based on the desire to back the project and the second based on how much money they are 
willing to give. Furthermore, after supporting the project backers can directly leave 
comments on the crowdfunding page, both positive and negative comments. However, to be 
able to post comments, they must first back the project, suggesting an increased number of 
comments can be viewed as a signal of support for the project. Log values of the number of 
posted comments were utilised within the model to capture the positive but decreasing 
marginal impact of additional comments. As within a crowdfunding page there is a set limit 
of how many comments can be viewed on the front page of the community page of the 
Kickstarter project. When this limit is reached the comment is pushed further back, and for 
someone to view the comments, they have to click another link, thus for each additional 
comment renders older comments less likely to be read, and to a decrease in their impact.  
In order to capture the signalling effects of backing, the early funding period was 
examined, following Colombo et al (2015), the initial funding period examined was a 1/6th of 
the duration of the project1. Colombo et al (2015) utilised the early funding period to examine 
the effects of internal social capital within crowdfunding. Conversely, the author utilises this 
early funding period, to examine the impact of signalling behaviour of the backers. Arguing 
that the early signalling sent by the backers are key to success for the project, due to how they 
can be viewed as the early adopters of the crowdfunding project. The concept of early 
adopters is outlined within the theory of diffusion of innovation. Rogers (2010) argued that 
each innovation is initially supported by a set of early adopters before being supported by 
other users and without these early adopters other future groups of adopters will not support 
the innovation. The author argues this phenomenon would also occur within Crowdfunding 
and that these early adopters are key to success on the platform. Thus the signals sent by 
backing in the early funding period is expected to positively affect the success of the project. 
The early backing period is captured, in the model, by three separate variables, the number of 
backers, the amount of funds raised and the pledge per backer. The first two variables are 
simply those reported by Kickstarter. The third variable of pledge per backer was originally 
suggested as a measure by Kromidha and Robson (2016). The author argues that this measure 
can be utilised in the early funding period. It captures the average amount of money pledged 
 
1 This specific length of the time period was tested for goodness of fit in the model, please see 
appendix item Item 3: Models testing early funding period for the results of the goodness of 
fit. 
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per backer, which can be interpreted as a measure of how effective the campaign is at 
persuading each individual backer to provide more money. Log values were utilised as a 
measure of normalising effect for this variable, and this is necessary due to how within the 
dataset some campaigns have a very small number of backers with a very high amount of 
backing. 
As with the creator’s signals, to be effective also the set of backers’ signals must be 
observable, manipulatable and costlier for low-quality projects. They are observable as the 
information is freely available on the crowdfunding page, they are manipulatable as the 
backers can increase both the comments and the amount of early backing provided to the 
campaign. As backing has a cost, backing low-quality campaigns is costlier than backing 
high quality ones as they have lower probabilities of success. Therefore, the signal can be 
considered to be effective, leading to the creation of the following hypothesis:  
H2: Increased number of signals sent by the backers has a positive impact on the probability 
of a project’s success. 
3.3.4 Backer incentives: Rewards  
Rewards are the primary incentives of backer participation in reward-based 
crowdfunding (Bretschneider and Leimeister, 2017). The specific incentive mechanism 
provided by rewards can be considered as based on the characteristics of the reward. Thürridl 
and Kamleitner (2016) identified eight different dimensions in which rewards can be 
allocated; these are: purpose, tangibility, scarcity, geographical limitation, monetary value, 
recognition, level of collaboration and core features. Further arguing that, by leveraging these 
dimensions, rewards can be utilised as strategic assets in securing funding on a crowdfunding 
platform. Thus, these elements are particularly relevant in capturing the value of rewards. 
However, capturing these elements can be difficult, due to how each specific reward could 
display different values for each of these dimensions and how some of these dimensions are 
subjective, such as the level of collaboration. Thus, while these dimensions can be utilised to 
examine a specific project, it is far more difficult to use them across projects. Therefore, to 
assess how rewards can be used within Kickstarter, one must first consider how rewards are 
offered on Kickstarter.     
On Kickstarter every single crowdfunding campaign must offer at least one reward 
level, the creator can then choose to add additional reward levels. The rewards levels can 
contain multiple rewards and backers are free to support as many different reward levels as 
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they wish, they can also support the same reward level multiple times. Zhang and Chan 
(2019) suggested that the number of rewards should be examined rather than the reward 
level. However, the author disagrees with this suggestion for two reasons. Firstly this would 
require the researcher to be able to identify what counts as a reward within every reward 
level, for example, consider if one reward level contains a box of goods, does that reward 
level contain one reward, or is every item in the box a reward. Or, consider another reward 
level, which is spending a day visiting the creators, is this a singular reward or is every 
activity in that day a reward. Fundementally, this is thus a problem as it creates uncertainty in 
the estimation of the number of rewards. Secondly, backers can only back projects at a 
reward level, they cannot pick a single reward and make a customised reward level. 
Therefore it is assumed that it is the effects of reward levels which should be investigated, not 
the number of rewards. For these two reasons, the author examines reward levels, instead of 
the number of rewards.   
 
The number of reward levels is considered to demonstrate the variety of options given 
to the backers, with the assumption made that projects which give a higher number of reward 
levels are more varied and thus more likely to fulfil backer motivation (Frydrych et al, 2014). 
Past empirical research into Kickstarter supports that the number of reward levels impact 
success on Kickstarter (Frydrych et al, 2014; An et al, 2014). Xu et al (2014), further 
identified that adding reward levels to an ongoing campaign was a more successful way to 
increase the chance of success compared to changing the textual context of the campaign. 
Thus, the author proposes: 
 H3a: Increased number of reward levels within a campaign will have a positive impact on 
the probability of the project success.  
Further developing alongside this hypothesis, the author suggests two sub-hypotheses 
based upon additional information surrounding the reward levels, specifically, the average 
time a backer has to wait for the reward to be delivered and whether the reward is global or 
local.  
3.3.4.1 Average wait time to reward  
This variable captures the amount of time backers have to wait on average until the 
predicted reward delivery date. This is collected from the projects at the end of the campaign 
and weighted by the number of backers for each reward, and their respective delivery dates. 
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These are only predicted date values as the time needed to facilitate reward delivery is often 
underestimated by creators. As Mollick (2014) work demonstrated by showing that only 24.9 
percent of design and technology projects on Kickstarter delivered on time out of a sample of 
389 projects.  
Joenssen et al (2014) study on Kickstarter, found empirical evidence that higher 
waiting times negatively impacted the likelihood of crowdfunding success. They argued that 
this was due to how wait time could be seen as a proxy for examining how far along a 
product was within its development cycle and projects further along in their development 
cycle would be more likely to succeed. However, this explanation thus requires crowdfunding 
to be for something which has a clear-cut development cycle, as Joenssen et al (2014) were 
examining only the technology category within Kickstarter this could be justified, however as 
this thesis examines all categories on Kickstarter, this explanation is not satisfactory.  
The author argues that in understanding why longer wait times for rewards may 
impact the success of the crowdfunding project on Kickstarter, the concept of the personal 
discount rate can be utilised. In the economic literature, the personal discount rate reflects the 
rate at which consumers trade future consumption in favour of present consumption 
(Hausman, 1979). The higher the discount rate, the more the individual prefers to consume in 
the present rather than consume in the future, the specific rate will depend on the individual, 
but it has also been linked to socioeconomic factors, such as, their level of education and age 
(Warner and Pleeter, 2001). If a user on a crowdfunding platform chooses to back a project, 
she/he is setting aside a given amount of money at present to be rewarded at a future time. If 
the amount of time a backer has to wait until she/he received the rewards is short, then this 
backer will not be greatly affected by their personal discount rate and would be more likely to 
back the product. However, if the waiting time is long, backers will be affected by their 
discount rates and thus less likely to back the products, leading to the formulation of the 
following hypothesis: 
H3b: Increased expected delivery times of reward levels will have a negative impact on the 
probability of project success.  
3.3.4.2 Global or local rewards 
This variable considers whether the rewards are global or local. Rewards can either be 
shipped to anywhere in the world or restricted to specific regions, this variable considers the 
number of globally shipped rewards and can be used to explore whether consumers prefer 
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rewards to be local or global. Digital rewards were grouped alongside local rewards as their 
delivery time could be considered instantaneous making them more alike to local rewards. 
The author proposes that backers would prefer local rewards versus global rewards, 
for the following reasons. Firstly, global rewards have an increased delivery time, which will 
impact the backers discount rate as discussed above. Secondly, they inherently have an 
increased cost to the backers as shipping costs have to be paid alongside any taxes or duties 
which may be imposed as part of the import process. Thirdly, there could be a desire for 
backers to consume locally rather than globally. Their motivation for local consumption 
could be a perception of increased quality or considered as a socially responsible action in 
supporting the local economy (Jenkins, 2006; Onozaka, 2010; Sims, 2009).   
For these reasons, the number of global reward levels is considered to have a negative 
impact on the success of the crowdfunding project, leading to the formulation of the 
following hypothesis: 
H3c: An increased number of global rewards will have a negative impact on the probability 
of the project success.  
3.3.5 Social capital 
The definition of social capital utilised in this thesis is as follows: the ability to utilise 
goodwill generated within the fabric of social relations in order to facilitate actions from 
those social relations (Adler and Kwon, 2002). The impact of social capital on success within 
crowdfunding has been separated between its external and internal effects. The concept of 
internal social capital in relation to crowdfunding, stems from Colombo et al (2015), who 
argued that crowdfunding platforms could generate their own internal social capital through 
the social interactions between creators. The expected impact on the campaigns’ success of 
external and internal social capital are examined separately in the following two subsections.  
3.3.5.1 External Social capital  
The effect of external social capital is captured through considering the level of 
presence of a campaign on external social networks. Specifically, the author utilises the 
number of times the project was shared on Facebook. A share on Facebook refers to a user of 
Facebook sharing a link to the project to their Facebook network, with their Facebook 
network consisting of anyone who is friends with them or follows them. The higher number 
of shares is considered to represent a higher amount of social capital as each share displays 
another user on the social network being linked to their project 
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As discussed previously, in the development of the theoretical framework, within the 
literature on crowdfunding, there is a lack of consensus about the actual effect that increased 
social media presence has on success in crowdfunding. However, many of the studies which 
reached a differing conclusion, simply utilised the number of Facebook friends or Twitter 
followers as a measure of the social capital (Beier and Wagner, 2015; Colombo et al, 2015; 
Mollick 2014; Moisseyev, 2013; Kromidha and Robson, 2016). The author argues that 
measuring social capital effects in this way is flawed, because it does not fully capture the 
activity of the network and instead only captures the potential activity of the network. 
Utilising network analysis literature, one can consider that the number of Facebook Friends 
can be seen to represent the number of paths with length one to the original node. Therefore, 
if the impact of social capital is greater than the first jump within the social network, then 
only utilising the number of Facebook friends will underestimate its impact. As discussed 
within the eigenvector centrality section of the literature review, other surrounding nodes 
may also impact on the project, and this will not be captured when using Facebook friends. 
Secondly, it does not demonstrate whether the creator utilised those connections, it only 
demonstrates that they can utilise them. Compare this to the number of times a project is 
shared on Facebook; this measure captures the number of nodes within the Facebook network 
which have received a link to the crowdfunding project, regardless of the path lengths 
between the two nodes. Demonstrating that backers are actively utilising the Facebook 
network to support the crowdfunding project. However, this measure has one major flaw, it 
cannot distinguish between creator shares and backers shares and therefore can only be used 
to consider the impact of the combined social capital of creators and backers.  
The impact of social capital on crowdfunding success is considered to be positive as 
social capital has been shown to increase the amount of donations to charities (Brown and 
Ferris, 2007), widely important for the success of start-ups (Pirolo and Presutti, 2010) and 
demonstrated to be vital to knowledge sharing within virtual communities (Chiu and Wang 
2006). Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed.  
H4a: Increased levels of combined creator and backer external social capital has a 
positive impact on the probability of the project’s success. 
3.3.5.2 Internal social capital of creators 
The internal social capital of the creators is captured via the number of other creators’ 
projects backed by the creator, up to the current date. This metric shows how active the 
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creators have been within the crowdfunding platform and thus how much internal social 
capital they might have generated. The measure can be captured within Kickstarter as users 
can be “playing both sides”, a term coined within Zvilichovsky et al (2015). The term refers 
to the ability of backers to become creators and creators to become backers. Zvilichovsky et 
al (2015) identified that within Kickstarter this two-sided activity is recorded within the 
project page of the crowdfunding campaign, providing access to the past platform backing 
activities of the creator and thus enabling the consideration of whether this past backing 
activity can support the internal social capital of the creator and, eventually, positively 
affecting the likelihood of success of its own campaigns. 
Past work has empirically shown that this backing is repaid within the creators’ 
community (Koch and Siering, 2015; Kunz et al, 2017; Marelli and Ordanini, 2016). The 
positive effect of internal social capital can be captured as the occurrence of reciprocity 
within the platform. Therefore, examining the reasons of why reciprocity may occur within 
the platforms, is relevant in developing testable hypotheses about the impact of internal 
social capital on campaigns success.  
One way of explaining the effect of reciprocity within an online network is through 
network exchange theory. This considers configurations and distributions of social power 
within networks connections and the effects of the ability to utilise this power (Walker et al, 
2000). Faraj and Johnson (2011) utilised this approach in relation to reciprocity, suggesting 
that although individuals have differing intrinsic motivations, reciprocity within an online 
network occurs at an aggregate level. These authors also identified that reciprocity was 
present across each one of the different examined online networks, however, the magnitude 
of these effect varied across each community, leading to the suggestion of differing social 
norms and network structures (Faraj and Johnson, 2011). In the specific context of 
crowdfunding, if the creator of one project backs another project, that project is likely to get 
backed in return even if this reciprocal backing is not coming from the creator who benefited 
from the backing. Zvilichovsky et al (2015) expanded upon this approach, classifying 
reciprocity into: direct and indirect reciprocity, with direct reciprocity considering 
interactions between two individuals and indirect reciprocity considering the interaction 
between an individual and a group. They capture both direct and indirect reciprocity in regard 
to Kickstarter, with the results supporting the concept that reciprocity increases the likelihood 
of projects reaching their funding goals. Colombo et al (2015) support these results showing 
that project creators are more likely to support other project creators, when compared to 
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normal backers, providing further evidence of direct reciprocity. Johnson et al (2014) 
describe how indirect reciprocity can be seen as an individual interacting with an entire social 
group. With members of the social groups supporting an individual who they themselves 
don’t interact with but are encouraged to support via the individual participation within the 
group. In the case of crowdfunding, this could suggest that by backing other projects they 
will be rewarded by individuals in the community who supported the original campaign.  
Therefore, whether direct or indirect, reciprocity is considered to have a positive 
effect on crowdfunding success and thus that internal capital which creates reciprocity should 
have a positive impact on success in crowdfunding, leading to the creation of the following 
hypothesis: 
H4b: Increased amount of creator internal social capital have a positive impact on the 
probability of the project’s success. 
3.3.6 Competition effects 
In the same way that social capital can be examined internally and externally to the 
crowdfunding platform, competition can also be decomposed into the same two categories, as 
internal and external competition, with internal competition considering the impact that other 
projects within the platform have on the current project seeking funds, while external 
competition considers how successfully Kickstarter is at competing at attracting potential 
backers with other crowdfunding platforms. 
3.3.6.1 Competition within the platform  
Higher levels of competition within a platform can have either a positive or negative 
effect on the likelihood of a project reaching its funding goal due to the strength of the 
positive and negative externality effects (Economides, 1996). Positive externality effects can 
occur due to an additional project within the platform increases the attractiveness of the 
platform and thus increases the number of users of the platforms and thus benefits all project 
which utilises on the platform. Conversely, negative externality effects occur as an additional 
project will be competing over the same resources within the platform, with each additional 
project there will be fewer resources to go around and thus decreases the likelihood of other 
projects succeeding (Lee, 2014). Therefore, the entry of a new project can either have a net 
negative or positive effect on the chances of other projects succeeding based upon whether 
the positive or negative externality effects were stronger. In identifying whether positive or 
negative externalities effects would be stronger within crowdfunding, the author argues that 
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this would depend upon the position of the new project relative to the position of the 
examined project within the crowdfunding platform.  
The author argues that additional competition within the projects speciality and 
category will have a significant and negative externality effect, while, competition in the rest 
of the platform will lead to a significant and positive externality effect. This arises because 
projects within the same specialism and category can be considered to be substitutes with 
each other and thus compete over backers in Kickstarter. Porter (1989), showed that the threat 
of substitution played a key role in driving competition within an industry. Conversely, 
projects which don’t share the same category are unlikely to be substitutes for each other. 
Therefore both projects benefit from the increased number of users drawn by the additional 
project, while not directly competing over these backers. This assumes that each backer looks 
beyond the original project which they were attracted to, an assumption that is supported by 
considering that users on average will visit 2.76 pages on Kickstarter (Alexa, 2018). 
The next step in the analysis of these externality effects, requires defining the set of 
projects the current project is, internally, competing with. Janku and Kucerova (2018) 
showed that competition within Kickstarter could be divided into smaller subsections based 
on temporal and geographical information. The first measure of temporal competition utilised 
was the number of projects launched in the same month. This author proposes improving this 
measure by considering the number of projects active at the same time as the crowdfunding 
project, rather than utilising the number of projects within a month. Arguing that projects 
within the same month may not be competing with each other, if one project has a duration of 
10 days and starts at the beginning of the month then it will not compete with another project 
which starts at the end of the month.  
The second temporal measurement suggested by Janku and Kucerova (2018) 
considered whether projects were launched on a weekend or on a weekday. They argued that 
projects launched on a weekend would lead to it being more competitive as, on average, more 
projects were launched on the weekend. Within this thesis, this idea is captured by measuring 
the number of competing projects on launch day, regardless of whether the project was at the 
weekend or not. Geographic competition, instead, will be measured by examining the impact 
of the project’s city and country on the likelihood of success. This measurement will also be 
weighted by the number of backers obtained by projects within the city or country during the 
duration of the project. 
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Additionally, each measure of the degree of intra-platform competition will be 
weighted by the number of backers obtained by the project with either its full duration or on 
the launch day based upon the competition measure. The competition measures utilised to 
examine the entire funding period will be converted into an index form utilising the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (Hirschman, 1964). This index is given by the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of each individual firm within the market, to capture the overall 
level of competition within the relevant market. This index is often used both as a measure of 
the level of competition and of market structure (Rhoades, 1993; Caves 1974). The specific 
market will be defined as composed by all projects which were active at the same time as the 
examined project. Thus, based upon the arguments outlined in this section, the following two 
hypothesis are proposed: 
H5a: Increased competition within the category has a negative impact on the probability of 
the project’s success. 
H5b: Increased competition outside the project’s category but on the same platform has a 
positive impact on the probability of the project’s success.  
3.3.6.2 Geographic competition within Kickstarter 
Utilising competition measures enables the geographic impact on success to be 
captured via the creation of a competition index whereby competition is categorised based on 
country. This index thus captures all of the projects which are competing against each other 
within the same country. Mollick’s (2014) work showed that there was clustering between 
projects of the same category within Kickstarter. As mentioned in the previous subsection, 
products of the same category were considered to be more likely to be substitutes of each 
other leading to a negative impact on the success of the project of additional projects being 
added. Thus, an increased number of companies in a small geographical area such as a city 
can be expected to decrease the chances of success. Conversely, an increase in the number of 
projects within a large geographic region can be seen to demonstrate an increase in the 
general level of success and thus is expected to have a positive impact on success, utilising 
the logic that projects outside of the local area are less likely to be substitutes of each other.  
H5d: Increased geographical competition at a city level will decrease the likelihood of a 
project succeeding.  
H5e: Increased geographical competition at a country level will increase the likelihood of a 
project succeeding. 
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3.3.7 Kickstarter Conceptual framework 
Drawing together the predicted outcomes of the hypotheses from the previous 
sections leads to the creation of the following conceptual framework displayed in Figure 3-5, 
based upon the theoretical framework developed in section 2.4 of the literature review.  
Figure 3-5 Kickstarter conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework utilises the developed hypotheses to consider the expected 
impact of the different factors on the success of crowdfunding projects within Kickstarter. 
For example, increased amounts of competition outside of the category which the project is 
based in is considered to have a positive impact on the success of the examined project. 
3.3.8 Additional covariates collected for Kickstarter 
Alongside the variables identified in the conceptual framework, an additional 
covariate was captured, the google trend value for the search term Kickstarter, further 
restricted to the category of the project. As discussed previously in section 3.2.2.2, google 
trend information captures the popularity of a specific search term, in the form of an index 
value between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the search term being most popular and 0 
being least popular (Google Trends, 2018a). Thus, this covariate captures shifts in the overall 
popularity of the category of the examined projects on Kickstarter. As popularity may be 
shifted by factors outside of the examined variables, this thus stops the overestimation of the 
impact of other variables.    
3.3.9 Data collection procedure for Kickstarter  
Data was collected from Kickstarter between 11th November 2015 and 11th January 
2017 utilising the Import.io web crawling software previously outlined in section 3.2.1.1. The 
timeframe enabled the capture of an entire years’ worth of Kickstarter projects, the extraction 
lasted over a year due to the full completion of all projects only completing sixty days after 
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the 11th November 2016. The data collected is expressed as a cross-sectional dataset. Data 
was extracted from Kickstarter utilising crawlers which were run every day for this duration 
at 08.00 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). This specific time was chosen to take into account 
that the largest user base for Kickstarter is American, this was identified utilising Alexa 
(Alexa, 2018). Thus, a time was chosen when many of the users would be asleep, as 08.00 
GMT translates to 04.00 Eastern Standard Time (EST) and 01.00 Pacific Standard Time 
(PST). Therefore, limiting the effect that the crawler would have on the users and owners of 
Kickstarter. Four crawlers were necessary to extract all information from Kickstarter. 
3.3.9.1 Crawler 1: URL extractor: 
The first step was to capture the URLs of new projects launched on the Kickstarter 
platform. This was achieved utilising Kickstarter’s inbuilt explore feature, which can be used 
to sort projects by when they were added to the site. The URL for this explore feature is as 
follows; 
https://www.kickstarter.com/discover/advanced?woe_id=0&sort=newest&seed=2560961&pa
ge=1 
This page had 12 results per page. And could be easily altered to extract additional 
pages of results, utilising the concatenate function in excel, as the only necessary change to 
extract from the second group of 12 is to alter page=1 to page=2 in the URL. Therefore the 
URLs for the crawler were as follows. 
https://www.kickstarter.com/discover/advanced?woe_id=0&sort=newest&seed=2560961&pa
ge=1 
https://www.kickstarter.com/discover/advanced?woe_id=0&sort=newest&seed=2560961&pa
ge=2 
The number of pages that it was necessary to extract was based on the number of new 
projects which were added each day. Early days of data collection observed that between 
200-300 projects were added each day. Thus 30 URLs were collected, giving 360 of the most 
recently started campaigns. These were checked against already existing URLs within the 
dataset by utilising the VLOOKUP command. With each new URL being added to the 
dataset to be used with the main crawler. Before the first day of the full extraction, a list of 
the past day's project was collected, ensuring that the first day contained only projects which 
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started on the 11th November 2015. This crawler was run every morning at 8.00 a.m., in order 
to capture new projects before running the main extractor. 
3.3.9.2 Crawler 2: Main crawler      
After obtaining a list of URLs for ongoing campaigns, the main extractor was run, this 
extractor was scheduled to run at 8.30 a.m., 30 mins after the first extractor to ensure there 
was sufficient time to upload the updated list of URLs. This specific extractor collected all 
information from the main page of the crowdfunding project on Kickstarter. Capturing the 
following variables: funding goal, duration, past number of created campaigns, past number 
of backed campaigns, the location of the project, category of the project, specialism of the 
project, start date, end date, number of Facebook friends. Alongside these variables, the 
number of backers and the amount backed was also collected for that specific day. This 
crawler was run each day to capture the changes between backers and funds across the entire 
funding period. A separate crawler was needed to capture the last day of backing and funding 
as Kickstarter changes the format of the crowdfunding page when it reaches its conclusion.        
3.3.9.3 Crawler 3: End day crawler 
The final crawler was carried out on the last day of the campaign, this captured the 
results of the campaign. Specifically it captured the following variables, the outcome of the 
campaign, the number of updates and the number of comments, alongside the final day 
backers and the final day funds.  
Utilising all three crawlers across the span of a year enabled all projects on 
Kickstarter to be captured across an entire year.  
3.3.9.4 Dataset characteristics 
The following section provides a brief overview of the dataset. Table 3.1 below 
displays key statistics of projects from the Kickstarter dataset.   
Table 3.1 Key statistics from the Kickstarter dataset 
Categor
y 
Number 
of 
projects 
Perc
enta
ge of 
total 
Number of 
successful 
campaigns 
Percenta
ge 
successf
ul 
Rank 
(based 
on 
percenta
ge 
Average 
amount 
pledged   
Average 
Funding 
Goal  
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successf
ul) 
Art 3,517 6.48 1234 35.09% 7 2595.489 
 
15686.04 
 
Comics 1,884 3.47 1089 57.80% 2 4979.81 
 
7902.744 
 
Crafts 1,775 3.27 383 21.58% 12 1501.595 
 
9477.257 
 
Dance 376 0.69 235 62.50% 1 2396.61 
 
10214.35 
 
Design 5,529 10.1
9 
1942 35.12% 6 15291.68 
 
27585 
 
Fashion 4,041 7.45 901 22.30% 11 4807.722 
 
16119.79 
 
Film 
and 
Video 
6,281 11.5
8 
2114 33.66% 8 4940.633 
 
29861.34 
 
Food 3,940 7.26 795 20.18% 13 4426.321 
 
36840.85 
 
Games 6,369 11.7
4 
2313 36.32% 5 15041.96 
 
25090 
 
Journali
sm 
1,425 2.63 180 12.63% 15 2119.825 
 
32541.44 
 
Music 5,601 10.3
2 
2413 43.08% 4 2119.825 
 
12769.14 
 
Photogr
aphy 
1,341 2.47 449 33.48% 9 2829.119 
 
12024.2 
 
Publishi
ng 
5,418 9.99 1688 31.16% 10 3810.035 
 
11666.61 
 
Technol
ogy 
5,583 10.2
9 
1083 19.40% 14 3560.716 
 
55198.57 
 
Theatre 1,180 2.17 650 55.08% 3 18045.23 
 
13101.46 
 
Total 54,260 
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The following map, in Figure 3-6 below, shows how projects were located across 
every continent in the world and how they were most heavily concentrated in Europe and 
North America. The exact number of results from each region can be more clearly seen in  
Table 3.2 located below the map.  
Figure 3-6 Spread of Kickstarter projects across the world 
 
  
 
Table 3.2 Summary of projects by continent for Kickstarter model 
Contine
nt 
Number of 
projects 
Perc
enta
ge 
Numbe
r of 
success
ful 
project
s 
Percentag
e 
successful 
Rank 
(based on 
percentag
e 
successful
) 
Average amount 
pledged 
Average 
funding 
goal 
Africa 166 0.31 56 33.73% 3 6088.618 
 
23511.05 
 
Antarcti
ca 
3 0.01 2 66.67% 1 7564.44 
 
1798 
 
Asia 876 1.61 318 36.30% 2 10265.91 23177.65 
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Europe 9,433 17.3
8 
2589 27.45% 6 8636.492 
 
15686.04 
 
North 
America 
41,883 77.1
9 
13950 33.31% 4 7299.022 
 
24411.61 
 
Oceania 1,767 3.26 521 29.49% 5 7383.757 
 
23345.49 
 
South 
America 
130 0.24 33 25.38% 7 2004.551 
 
17468.3 
 
Seven 
seas 
(open 
ocean)  
2 0.00
004 
0 0.00% 8 1564 
 
6000 
 
3.3.9.5 Data restriction 
Only projects with a funding goal of less than 1 million dollars were utilised. Projects 
above this funding goal were considered to be unrealistic. This restriction aligned itself with 
restrictions utilised within the literature, specifically by (Mollick 2014) and (Janku and 
Kucerova 2018). 
3.3.10 Data analysis and econometric specification 
The following sections examine the specific econometric techniques utilised to 
examine this data set. This information was adapted from the following sources: (Asteriou 
and Hall, 2015; Greene, 1997; Gill, 2000; Hahn and Soyer, 2005; Hayashi 2000). 
3.3.10.1 Logit model 
In the following, since the dependent variables, success or failure, is dichotomous, 
either being 1 or zero, the logit model will be used as the more appropriate specification, due 
the limitations of adopting a linear probability model, for dichotomous dependent variables, 
in particular that the variance of the error term is a function of the regressors, demonstrating 
that heteroscedasticity is inherent within the model. Additional problems associated with the 
linear probability model include that predications can lie outside of the (0,1) intervals. This 
problem is highlighted in Figure 3-7 below: 
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Figure 3-7 Dichotomous regression errors, Adapted from (Asteriou and Hall, 2015, p.256 
 
The diagram demonstrates that by utilising a normal regression line where the 
predicted value is greater than 0, or less than 1, shown at points A and B, both of these points 
don’t have a defined meaning as they fall out of the 0 to 1 valid range for probabilities. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the error term is not normal and instead follows a binomial 
distribution (Asteriou and Hall, 2015).   
To overcome these problems a logit or probit model can be utilised. Hahn and Soyer 
(2005) argued that there was a persuasive view in the literature that there was a limited 
difference within the application of probit versus logit models. With authors such as Greene 
(1997) and Gill (2000) concluding that in most scenarios it made little difference in the 
choice between probit and logit.  
To choose between the two in this specific case, an abductive approach was used, 
with both logit and probit considered and compared within the dataset. Logit was then chosen 
by comparing the results between probit and logit version of the models. Probit was unable to 
calculate the main model, thus the restricted model was used as a comparision, with the 
consideration that if probit was a better fit than alteration to the main model would have been 
necessary. However utilising the fitstat command in stata, demonstratated that probit was a 
worse fit for the model in comparision to logit, as shown in appendix section 7.4. 
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The logit function, estimated via the maximum likelihood estimator, and is defined as: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑥) = log (
𝑓(𝑥)
1−𝑓(𝑥)
)      (2) 
(For full information on the derivation of the logit function please see appendix item 7.2) 
As discussed above, the dependent variable in the logistic function must be 
dichotomous in nature, i.e. either 1 or zero. One of the advantages of the model is that the 
coefficient derived from the logistic model can be directly interpreted to represent the odds 
ratio of the event occurring. The odds ratio represents the likelihood of an event to occur. So, 
for example if an event is likely to occur 1 in every 5 time then the odds ratio can be 
expressed as 1/5. This has to be taken into account when considering the impact of the 
coefficient as they are not demonstrating positive or negative impacts on the likelihood of the 
event occurring but rather demonstrating positive or negative impact on the odds ratio of the 
event occurring.  
3.3.11 Model definitions: 
In the following models the dependent variable of success is defined as follows: 
  𝑌𝑖 = {
    1 𝐼𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
0 𝐼𝑓  𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
 
The models are constructed in order to reflect each aspect of the conceptual framework 
outlined in the previous section. Each section was added as a separate part of an overall 
model to enable the consideration of the impact of that specific group of variables. To reduce 
observations which set unreasonable funding goal, projects within funding goals of over 
1,000,000 were removed from the models, reducing the number of observations within the 
dataset from 54,260 to 54,193.  
Across all models, dummy variables for category and geographical region were originally 
considered, however their usage was problematic, as it was either causing very high levels of 
multicollinearity, increasing standard errors leading to statistically insignificant parameters. 
In order to still capture some of these effects, dummies for geographical and sector were 
integrated into the competition measures, where the effect of a category was captured in the 
category index, which examined the effect of differing levels of competition within a 
Kickstarter category. While the effects of geographical location where captured though the 
city and country competition indexes.  
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3.3.11.1 Model 1 Creator Signals 
The first model only considers the signals sent out by the creator of the crowdfunding 
campaign. This is represented in the following model form:  
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
𝛽5𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖      
This equation will then be referred to as [Creators Signals]. 
3.3.11.2 Model 2 Creators and Backers Signals 
The second model includes all the previous variables while also introducing the variables 
based on the backers’ signalling behaviour, leading to the formation of the following model: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + [𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] … + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 +  𝜀𝑖  
The additional variables introduced in this equation will then be referred to as [Creators and 
Backers Signals].  
3.3.11.3 Model 3 Creators and Backers Signals and Backers incentives 
The third model utilised the variables from the previous models while introducing variables 
focused on exploring the impact of the backer's incentives, leading to the formation of the 
following model:  
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + [𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 +
𝛽11𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 +  𝜀𝑖      
The additional variables introduced in this equation will then be referred to as [ Creators and 
Backers Signals and Backers incentives] 
3.3.11.4 Model 4 Addition of external and internal social capital 
The fourth model considers the additional impact of social capital on success in Kickstarter. 
Both internal and external social capital effects are captured leading to the creation of the 
following model: 
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𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + [𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠] +
𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖      
The additional variables introduced in this equation will then be referred to as [Social 
Capital] 
3.3.11.5 Model 5 Main Model 
This model considers all variables excluding a specific set of competition variables. 
This is due to some competition variables only be accurately calculated in a restricted version 
of the dataset. The main model captures the competition variables which are unrestricted, 
specifically those which are based around considering the impact of competition on the 
launch of the project. leading to the creation of the following model: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + [𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠] +
[𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙] + 𝛽15𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 +
𝛽17𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀𝑖      
The additional variables introduced in this equation will then be referred to as [Launch 
Competition] 
3.3.11.6 Model 6 Restricted Model 
The last model identified for the Kickstarter platform considers the competitions 
variables which are restricted within the dataset. Due to the nature of the variables, they will 
be underestimated in the first 60 days and last 60 days of the dataset. Within this timeframe 
projects are competing against projects which were not captured within the dataset. Therefore 
the number of competing projects would be underestimated. Therefore, the following 
restricted model is considered. 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + [𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠] +
[𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙]+[Launch Competition]+ 𝛽18𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽19 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 +
 𝛽20𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽21𝐾𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜀𝑖    
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The additional variables introduced in this equation will then be referred to as [Platform 
Competition]. 
Therefore, this model can be expressed as  
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + [𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠] + [𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠] +
[𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙]+[Launch Competition]+ [Platform Competition] + 𝜀𝑖.  
However, due to the restriction of platform competition requiring the last 60 and first 60 days 
to be omitted, this model will only be used to examine the addition of platform competition.   
Interpreting scale of log results in a logit mode. 
3.3.12 List of all variables in Kickstarter 
All variables in the table were directly collected from Kickstarter using web crawling, with 
the exceptions of Facebook shares, collected on shared count and google trend of category, 
collected via google trend.  
Table 3.3 List of all variables utilised in Kickstarter,  
Variable  Variable Output Variable description 
Success or failure Success or failure The dependent variable, recorded as 1 
if the project reaches its funding goal 
and 0 in all other cases, including the 
project funding being cancelled 
Ambition Funding goal (log values) The log value of the funding goal of the 
project.  
Confidence Relative Funding goal The difference between the funding 
goal of the project and the average 
funding goal in Kickstarter while the 
project was running within that specific 
specialism.  
Trustworthiness Number of Creator 
Updates (Log values) 
The log value of the number of posted 
updates on the crowdfunding project 
page by the creator of the campaign.  
Experience The number of previously 
created campaigns 
The number of previously created 
projects on Kickstarter by the creator of 
the current project.  
Reciprocity The number of previously 
backed campaigns. 
The number of previously backed 
projects on Kickstarter by the creator of 
the current project. 
Impatience The duration of the 
project. 
The number of days which the project 
is raising funds on Kickstarter.  
131   
 
Reward levels The number of reward 
levels.  
The number of different rewards levels 
that the backers can support for the 
project. 
Global rewards Global rewards The number of reward levels which can 
be shipped globally. 
Average wait time Average time backers have 
to wait for rewards. 
The average (mean) difference between 
the amount of time that backers ordered 
rewards and when they were received, 
this was weighted by the number of 
backers who chose each reward level.  
Campaign 
Comments 
Comments The log value of the number of 
comments made on the project by the 
backers of the project.  
Early Average 
Pledge 
Pledge per backer The log value of the average amount of 
money each backer provided to the 
project by the early funding period 
(1/6th of the duration).  
Early Backing Early backing The number of backers reached by the 
project by the early funding period 
(1/6th of the duration) 
Early Funding Early funds The number of funds reached by the 
project by the early funding period 
(1/6th of the duration) 
Facebook Shares Facebook Shares The log value of the number of 
Facebook shares of the project. 
Launch 
Competition 
Launch Competition from 
the rest of Kickstarter 
The number of projects which are 
launched on Kickstarter on the same 
day as the current project outside of the 
project’s category. Weighted by the 
number of backers those projects obtain 
on that first day.  
Launch 
competition 
category 
Launch competition within 
the specific category of the 
creator. 
The number of projects which are 
launched on Kickstarter on the same 
day as the current project and within 
the same category. Weighted by the 
number of backers those projects obtain 
on that first day. 
Google trend of 
category 
Google trend index value 
for the category of the 
project. 
An index value measuring search 
interest of Kickstarter category on 
google trends. Index values are 
between 0 and 100, with a 100 showing 
greatest interest in the category and 0 
showing the lowest interest.  
City index Competition index value 
based upon competition 
between projects within 
the same city and 
occurring at the same time. 
An index value measuring competition 
between projects on Kickstarter within 
the same city. Index values are between 
0 and 10000, with higher index values 
showing lower levels of competition.  
Country index Competition index value 
based upon competition 
An index value measuring competition 
between projects on Kickstarter within 
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between projects within 
the same country and 
occurring at the same time. 
the same country. Index values are 
between 0 and 10000, with higher 
index values showing lower levels of 
competition. 
Category index Competition index value 
based upon competition 
between projects within 
the same category, whose 
campaigns overlap.  
An index value measuring competition 
between projects on Kickstarter, 
restricted to projects within the same 
category. Index values are between 0 
and 10000, with higher index values 
showing lower levels of competition. 
Kick index Competition index value 
based upon competition 
between projects across 
the entirety of Kickstarter, 
whose campaigns overlap. 
An index value measuring competition 
between projects on Kickstarter, from 
any project whose was raising funds at 
the same time. Index values are 
between 0 and 10000, with higher 
index values showing lower levels of 
competition. 
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3.3.13 Kickstarter summary statistics 
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 report summary statistics for variables utilised in the 
examination of the hypotheses in the results section. Table 3.6 shows the marginal impact of 
each of the variables for both models at the mean maximum and minimum.  
Table 3.4 Summary statistics from main model 
variable mean sd min max 
Average wait time 130.1454 137.0995 0 2129 
Average google trend 48.77506 19.86891 0 100 
Campaign comments 0.912814 1.380342 0 11.27634 
Ambition 8.751633 1.717377 0 13.81551 
Early Average Pledge 2.281858 2.812328 -2.30259 9.21035 
Early Backing 49.37754 440.197 0 50311 
Early Funding 4245.817 50461.37 0 9570510 
Experience 0.571292 2.247201 0 74 
Facebook Shares 3.078752 2.332112 0 12.71055 
Impatience 33.33816 11.40492 1 60 
Launch competition 4904.628 5528.548 27 50761 
Launch competition 
in category 
647.4876 2060.199 0 42605 
Reciprocity 3.759563 18.03081 0 890 
Reward levels 7.388242 5.819252 1 179 
Trustworthiness 0.990633 1.269777 0 11.37094 
Global Rewards 3.687063 5.129691 0 179 
 
Table 3.5 Summary statistics from restricted model 
variable mean sd min max 
Category index 326.8946 405.8768 19.77083 6644.796 
City index 3986.172 3599.66 0 10000 
kick index 671.8295 649.2174 39.99643 6320.38 
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Table 3.6 Marginal impact of Kickstarter models 
 
margin at mean margin at 
min 
margin at max 
Ambition 0.2850013 0.9780455 0.0206466 
Confidence 3.18E-01 0.3751364 0.0220859 
Experience 0.3220047 0.3204058 0.5190883 
Trustworthiness 0.2926114 0.2156681 0.8817697 
Impatience 0.3250969 0.3250961 0.3197559 
Campaign Comments 0.302652 0.2481619 0.7905069 
Early Funding 3.22E-01 0.3223705 0.1074527 
Early Backing 0.3230296 0.3193789 1 
Early Average pledge 0.2578631 0.0895198 0.6029852 
Reward levels 0.3173777 0.2956814 0.8043709 
Global rewards 0.3241267 0.3352736 0.0130849 
Average wait time 0.3201795 0.3347502 0.1169387 
Facebook Shares 0.3225444 0.0942488 0.8414072 
Reciprocity 0.2475301 0.3243246 0.030497 
Launch Competition 0.3219999 0.3151286 0.3856989 
Launch competition 
category 
3.86E-01 0.326637 0.0737503 
Average Trend 
Category 
0.3220606 0.3085438 0.336231 
Kick index 671.8295 0.330186 0.3963209 
City index 3986.172 0.3508533 0.3163448 
Country index 447.8236 0.3370555 0.3478277 
Category index 326.8946 0.3435704 0.2003869 
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3.4 Kiva model 
Kiva is a lending-based crowdfunding platform, which focuses on funding loans to 
support projects across 83 different countries, it has raised 1.10 billion dollars supporting 2.7 
million borrowers since being founded in 2005 (Kiva, 2019a). Kiva provides backers with the 
option to obtain funds in two ways: firstly, by directly backing individuals and secondly by 
individuals working in tandem with partnership organisations who assist in the facilitation of 
the loans. In the second scenario the creators of the project can be viewed as both the 
partnership organisation and the individuals seeking the loan. Under the definition of 
crowdfunding proposed within the literature review (section 2.3), this can still be viewed as 
crowdfunding, as long as the partnership organisation does not choose how the funding from 
the crowd is allocated.  
Partner organisations assisting the original loan seeking individuals play a necessary 
role due to the nature of the loans markets within the emerging world (Kiva, 2019a), where 
there is less access to the internet and individuals may not have the required skills’ set to set 
up an online crowdfunding campaign, although, this being said, the gap in internet usage 
between the developed and emerging economies is declining in part due to the increasing 
usage of smart-phones (Poushter, 2016). Only projects which utilise partnership organisation 
will be considered within this analyis, due to an examination of the collected data, 
demonstrating that over 99 percent of the project utilised partnership organisations. Table 3.7 
below provides summary statistics from the partnership organisations within the dataset. The 
number of sectors refers to the number of categories within Kiva which are represented by 
the partnership organisation, with an example of a sector being argiculture.   
Table 3.7 Summary statistics of Partner organisations 
Number 
of 
partners 
in data 
set 
Average 
cost to 
borrower  
Average 
time on 
Kiva 
Number of countries 
represented  
Number of 
sectors 
represented 
73 35% 
APR 
78.5 
months 
43 13 
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Kiva can be further defined as a lending-based all-or-nothing limited generalist 
traditional crowdfunding platform utilising the subdivision methodology outlined in (section 
2.2.7). It is a lending-based platform as any money provided to the project must be returned 
to the backers at a future date. Kiva is an all-or-nothing as projects need to reach their 
funding goal in order to directly receive the money they raise from the backers. The project 
funding period lasts for exactly thirty days; thus, it is a limited platform. The projects are 
generalised as they are not restricted to raising funds for one specific product or purpose. 
Finally, Kiva can be considered as traditional as it does not utilise crypto-currency. The exact 
funding process for Kiva is described in Figure 3-8 below: 
Figure 3-8 Structure of Kiva adapted from (Kiva, 2019b)  
 
Figure 3-8 highlights a key issue with Kiva, that is the platform enables both 
crowdfunding and traditional financing to occur. If a project successfully reaches its funding 
goal, then crowdfunding is utilised to fund the project. However, if a project does not reach 
its funding goal the partnership organisation may choose to fund the project regardless of the 
outcome of the crowdfunding project. The partnership organisation uses their own funds to 
support projects, thus this is entirely separate from the crowdfunding process, thus it can be 
considered that Kiva enables two processes to occur, crowdfunding and traditional financing. 
For the purposes of this thesis we are only interested in the crowdfunding portion of Kiva.     
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This structure also encourages using the amount of money raised as the measure of 
success within Kiva for two reasons. Firstly, due to how failure to reach the funding goal may 
not equate failure in receiving funds, which reduces the effect of using this cut off point. 
Secondly due to how the outcome for backers in the event of failure is very similar to the 
outcome in success, in failure backers receive their funds immediately, in success backers 
receive their funds slowly over time, thus making the only effect of success on backers as 
receiving their funds more slowly.  
3.4.1  Hypothesis and conceptual framework development for the Kiva model: 
Utilising the theoretical framework developed within the literature review, the 
following hypotheses are developed, addressing, some of the previously highlighted key 
factors such as: creators signalling, backers social capital and competition within the 
platform.  
3.4.2 Creators Signals 
This section considers the different set of signals sent out by the partner organisation 
of the crowdfunding campaign. As previously stated, for the signal to be effective they must 
be observable, manipulatable and costlier for low-quality creators versus high-quality 
creators. The signals are all observable as they are freely visible on the Kiva website. 
However the other factors must be considered in a signal by signal case. Creators in Kiva 
refers to both the partnership organisations which facilitate the loan and the recipient of the 
loan, however for purposes of the development of the hypotheses the creator refers to the 
partnership organisation. As the creators signals identified within the dataset all relate to the 
signalling the quality of the partnership organisation, not the participant.   
3.4.2.1 Experience 
Two separate signals are examined in this sub-section both utilised as proxies for the 
level of experience of the creators (partnership organisation). The first signal considered is 
the amount of time the partnership organisation has been listed on Kiva. The second signal is 
the number of previously facilitated loans the partner organisation has carried out on Kiva. 
The first metric captures experience as expressed by the amount of time which has passed 
since the organization was listed on Kiva, this will be referred to as temporal experience. 
While the second expresses experience by the amount of past activity done on the platform, 
and this metric will be referred to as capacity experience. The impact of temporal experience 
is considered to have a positive impact on the success of creators on Kiva, utilising the 
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arguments outlined within the experience section of the Kickstarter conceptual framework 
development (section 3.3.1).  
The impact of the capacity experience is also considered to exert a positive impact on 
the success of creators on Kiva, expresed as the total amount of funds raised in each project. 
As the creators can utilise supporters from their past projects in subsequent campaigns 
(Skirnevskiy et al 2017), the initial connection on a crowdfunding platform between the 
creators and backer creates a linkage between both parties (Nahapiet and Sumantra, 1998). 
This connection can then be activated by the creator in support of their current campaign. 
Activation could occur through emails, direct messages or backer surveys (Skirnevskiy et al 
2017). These links can be activated before the campaigns have begun and thus be used as 
early supporters of the next campaign (Zheng et al, 2014).  
The two signals, discussed above, are both manipulatable. Temporal experience can 
be increased by spending additional time on the platform, capacity experience can be 
increased by running additional projects. These signals are also both costlier for low-quality 
projects, as more time and effort would be required to make them appear to be high quality 
projects. Therefore, these two experience signals can both be considered as effective and the 
following hypothesis on the proxy of experience is developed:  
A1: Creators signalling increased experience has a positive impact on the amount of money 
raised in kiva.  
3.4.2.2 Generosity 
The element of human capital considered in this section is that of generosity of the 
partnership organisation captured via a proxy calculated on the average cost that the 
partnership organisation charges the loan participant for acting as its intermediary in Kiva, 
averaged across all participants a partnership organisation has assisted in securing funds. A 
lower average cost is considered to display a higher level of generosity by the partnership 
organisation, as the loan recipients on average will be charged a lower rate of interest.  
The level of generosity is considered to have a positive impact on the success of a 
project. Rastogi (2000), considered how the value of generosity can be considered a 
component of a person’s orientation of pronoia. Orientation towards pronoia enables 
effective collaboration within the members of the organisation and increases social capital 
generation outside the organisation. Thus, the increased functionality within the organisation 
and increased amount of social capital generation can both be assumed to increase the 
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likelihood of a project succeeding in generating a larger amount of funding. Additionally, 
generosity can also be considered as exerting a positive impact by encouraging reciprocity 
from within a community (Gurven et al, 2000). 
Generosity, as a signal, is manipulatable as it can be modulated by increasing or 
decreasing the interest rate received from the recipient of the loan. However, the signal may 
not be costlier for low quality partnerships versus high quality partnerships, as low-quality 
partnership organisation are free to set lower interest rates. In fact, low quality partnership 
organisation may find it easier to set lower interest rates than high quality partnerships, as 
high-quality partnership organisations may have increased cost ensuring the validity of their 
participants, leading to a required higher interest rate. Upon saying this, the author considered 
that the signal may not be effective, however the following hypothesis is still proposed, to 
test the validity of requiring lower cost signals: 
A2: Signalling an increased level of generosity, by the partnership organisation, exerts a 
positive impact on the amount of funds raised, by the final project.  
3.4.2.3 Signals Sent by the platform about the creator 
One of the unique aspects of the crowdfunding platform Kiva, is that the platform 
itself sends a signal regarding the quality of the creator (partnership organisation). The signal 
is sent through the rating system, whereby the creator is rated between 0 and 5 stars by Kiva. 
With 5 stars demonstrating a highly trusted creator and zero stars demonstrating an 
untrustworthy creator. This signal is created by the platform and placed on the project page, 
thus the platform itself is engaging in signalling behaviour with the backers. In regard to the 
impact of the signal, the signal is expected to have a positive impact on success, due to how 
the stars can be seen as positive reviews left by the platform, positive reviews have been 
identified to increase online consumption (Cheng and Ho, 2015).  
Furthermore, the reviews can be seen as effective signals as firstly, they are 
manipulatable as the platform can change the number of stars whenever they wish. Secondly, 
there are higher cost for low quality projects as there is no direct way for them to pay to 
increase their star count and can thus only achieve this through increased performance. For 
this reason, the signal can be seen as effective and thus the following hypothesis is proposed: 
A3: The platform signalling increased level of support on the creator, exerts a positive impact 
on the final amount of funds raised, by the project.  
140   
 
3.4.3 Social capital hypotheses  
The following two hypotheses considers how social capital will be examined within 
the Kiva model. Looking at social capital within the platform itself and generated at a 
geographic level. 
3.4.3.1 Social capital captured via latent projects links from shared backers 
The impact of internal social capital of a project in Kiva is examined by considering 
the past behaviour of backers supporting the current project. Within Kiva, backers past 
behaviour can be identified within each project page. The past backing behaviour for each 
project was utilised to create a latent network of the crowdfunding platform. With the nodes 
of the network being the projects on Kiva, and the edges being formed when two nodes 
(projects) are being supported by the same backer. Therefore, if two projects were supported 
by the same backers, they would be linked within this latent network. If more than one backer 
supported both projects the weight of this link would be increased, so that the anlaysis will 
consider a weighted network of latent links between otherwise disconnected projects-nodes. 
The full network developed on the base of these above assumptions, linking any two projects 
if and only if they have joint backers, is displayed in Figure 3-9 below. 
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Figure 3-9 Network of Kiva project based on joint connections 
 
 
This network enables the examination of the role of latent social capital of the 
backers; social capital that can then be utilised as a predictor for collective action (Burt, 
2009). Increased capital within a network has been shown to increase the participation rate 
for the users of the network (Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Furthermore, the greater the number of 
times individuals interact within the network, the greater the likelihood that they begin to act 
in coordination with each other to achieve specific tasks (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). The 
latent social capital generated by the backers within the network, requires a specific way of 
capturing it, that goes beyond simple direct measures of, latent, connectivity. 
For this specific latent network three separate centrality measures are captured 
eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality, three of the measures 
discussed in section 2.4.1.3. In this dissertation the latent social capital associated with each 
node-project, will be examined through its eigenvector centrality, in line with past usage 
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outlined in (Borgatti et al, 1998). Eigenvector centrality was used as a measure of social 
capital at it captures the full impact of the co-operation among backers within the platform, as 
it includes not only the direct, one-hop, connections in the latent network that backers create 
among projects, but it also considers the indirect connections that each link carries, and the 
indirect connections of these indirections and so on. As each link in the network represents a 
backer who is shared between two projects, thus if two projects have multiple links, this can 
be seen to represent a group of backers who are jointly supporting those two projects and 
demonstrates that these group of backers must be interacting within the platform. The more 
interactions between these groups the more they are likely to coordinate together and thus 
have an increased impact on the success of the project (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). These 
backers will also be interacting in the surrounding projects, as both backers must be present 
in at least one of the surrounding projects. Thus, since the eigenvector centrality captures the 
impact of this interaction between the examined node and the surrounding nodes it can 
capture the impact of this co-operation and was utilised to measure the social capital of the 
project, as identified through the direct and indirect linkages created by the presence of 
shared backers. Therefore, increased levels of eigenvector centrality are considered to 
demonstrate increased levels of backer’s interaction and thus increased internal social capital 
for the examined project both from the creator and from backers. In turns, internal social 
capital is considered to have a positive impact as discussed in section 3.3.5. Leading to the 
formulation of the following hypothesis: 
 B1: Higher levels of internal social capital within Kiva have a positive impact on the amount 
of funds raised.  
Furthermore, Freeman (1978) identified that a different notion of centrality, closeness 
centrality can be seen as exerting two separate effects: that of the ability of the node to be 
independent of other nodes or that of the efficiency of the node to control access to other 
nodes. In line with other empirical work (Brandes et al, 2016; Powell et al, 1996; Rowley, 
1997), a project’s closeness centrality will be considered to represent the independence of the 
node within the Kiva latent network. A project with low closeness centrality has low levels of 
independence as the connection the the rest of the network will be restricted through a few 
other projects, while projects with high closeness centrality are far more independent as they 
have many nodes to access the network through. With nodes of closeness centrality of 1 
being able to directly access all other nodes in the network and thus be completely 
independent of other nodes. The third notion of network centrality discussed above in section 
143   
 
2.4.1.3, betweenness centrality can be used to represent whether a node’s ability to influence 
the spread of information through the network is important (Newman, 2005; Brandes et al, 
2016). Thus if one can empirically find a positive impact between a project’s betweenness 
centrality and the amount of money raised, it can be argued that a control of information 
within the network can affect the success of projects in raising loans on the Kiva platform.  
3.4.3.2 Creators joint internal social capital with a region 
This section considers if the past creation of internal social capital within a platform 
by other creators can positively impact on the success of the current project. It explores 
whether the creator of the current project utilises social capital generated by previous creators 
in supporting their project. This idea stems from how social capital can be tied to a specific 
organisation (Tillie, 2004), rather than a specific individual. Suggesting that this social capital 
can be utilised by different individuals by joining said organisation, so that, within the 
context of crowdfunding the creators may be able to benefit from the amount of social capital 
generated by past creators in support of their current project. In lieu of joining an 
organisation, instead it is considered as if creators in Kiva propose their loan within a specific 
geographic region and that they can benefit from the past social capital generated, within 
Kiva, for this specific region in support of their own current project. This is possible due to 
how a current loan records the number of previously created loans within the region, a metric 
this dissertation uses as a proxy for the total sum amount of social capital generated by all 
creators within a project’s region. As increased localised social capital is considered to have a 
positive impact on success, this measure will also be considered to have a positive impact on 
success leading to the creation of the following hypothesis: 
B2: Higher levels of social capital generated by previous creators within a geographic region 
have a positive impact on the amount of funds raised by projects located in the region.  
3.4.4 Competition hypotheses: Competition within the platform 
As previously discussed, increased competition is considered to have a positive or 
negative impact based upon the relative size of the positive and negative network 
externalities. In the case of Kiva, however, the author argues that the negative externalies are 
likely to be far larger than the positive ones. This is due to how on Kiva the partnership 
organisations (identified in this model as the creators) are rarely new participants to the 
platform and are, instead, participants regularly returning to the platform. Thus partnership 
organisations have already drawn additional participants to the platform and any extra 
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positive network externality effect they have will be limited. This is further strengthened as 
Kiva has limited external social capital links, as projects don’t have any direct links to social 
media, compared to Kickstarter which lets projects actively link in their Facebook 
connections. For these reasons, increased levels of competition are predicted to negatively 
impact the amount of funds in Kiva and the following hypothesis is proposed  
C1: Increased amount of internal competition within the platform has a negative impact on 
the amount of money raised by a project.  
In order to test this hypothesis, different variables are developed to capture the effects 
of increased competition. Firstly, competition can be measured utilising the number of 
competing firms on launch day, a measure suggested to be used in crowdfunding by Janku 
and Kucerova (2018). Alternatively, competition can be captured by utilising the HHI index 
values (Hirschman, 1980), a method suggested to be applicable in crowdfunding by Wessel et 
al (2017). Two separate competition indexes are developed: one based on competition in the 
sector, whereby the sector is selected by the partnership organisations when creating the 
project, and the second, based on competition from other projects launched by the partnership 
organisation. Finally, success can also have a spatial element in crowdfunding as argued in 
Gallemore et al (2019), as such competition can also be expressed in a geographic form, 
captured in the model by the number of competing loans within the same country of the 
project. All four of these measures are expected to exert a negative impact on the amount of 
money raised by a project on Kiva, in line with proposed hypothesis C1. 
3.4.5 Kiva Conceptual framework 
A unified consideration of the above hypotheses leads to the development of the Kiva 
conceptual framework, represented in the Figure 3-10 below.  
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Figure 3-10 Kiva conceptual framework 
 
This framework represents the expected effects of the different factors used to 
examine Kiva. For example, an increased level of generosity within the platform by the 
partnerships organizations is expected to have a positive impact on the amount of money 
raised by the project this organization is presenting. While increased level of competition is 
considered to exert a negative impact on the amount of money raised.  
3.4.6 Data collection procedure 
The data collection for the Kiva platform was carried out on the 16/05/2017, unlike 
Kickstarter, the entire data was collected in a single day, as the temporal funding pattern was 
not considered for this model. At the point of collection, projects had already concluded. The 
first step was in identifying a project which was recently completed on Kiva, and then in 
designing a selection process to capture projects which were completed within the month 
before the first examined project. This restriction was utilised to capture the impact of 
backers’ interaction within a small timeframe. The first project was selected manually by 
utilising the previously completed projects and then moving to the most recent project which 
was also completed. Then, additional projects which had finished before the project were also 
identified and selected. This is possible as Kiva has an Identifier (ID) for each project 
contained within its URL, to find the project which occurred before the last project the ID 
simply had to be changed by 1 digit for example if the ID was 1400, the project before that 
would have the ID 1399. Therefore, utilising Excel and the Concatenate command enabled 
the URL of the past 1000 project to be created, over 1000 specific projects URLs were 
created. Due to restrictions in Import.io crawler projects with over 50 backers could not be 
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accurately captured, and some projects had already been removed from Kiva. Hence, from 
the 1173 project originally captured only 1000 observation were retained and examined. 
Once the final list of URLs had been obtained, Import.io was utilised to obtain additional 
project’s specific information from the actual project page. Additional secondary data was 
also collected on the partnership organisations through the utilisation of Postman and the 
Kiva API (Postman, 2019; Kiva, 2019c).   
3.4.6.1 Adjacency matrix creation 
The creation of the backers’ latent network discussed in section 2.4.1.2.3, requires the 
creation of an adjacency matrix. In order to create an adjacency matrix of backers funding 
patterns, a specific crawler was designed to extract the group of backers who supported each 
campaign. These backers had the choice to keep their identity anonymous or to openly back 
the campaign. The crawler did not extract backers who had chosen to keep their identity 
anonymous. It extracted up to 50 non-anonymous backers from each campaign, the key to 
achieving this was the use of manual x-path, this a system for identifying key elements of a 
web within the Import.io framework. After they were extracted an adjacency matrix was 
constructed of all 1000 projects. Projects were then connected or not connected based upon if 
they shared a joint backer.  
A multi-step process utilising Countifs functions within Excel was used to create an 
adjacency matrix which showed which projects shared joint backers. Then the links in the 
adjacency matrix were weighted by the number of joint backers between any two projects. 
The data was transformed into three columns of source target and weight and transferred to 
Gephi for the generation of the network and to calculate the eigenvector centrality. Figure 
3-11 below shows an example of how projects could be connected in an adjacency matrix, 
where columns and rows are identified by a project page’s snapshot and their links by the 
avatar of one or multiple shared backers.    
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Figure 3-11 Adjacency matrices of kiva projects 
 
3.4.6.2 Data restriction 
Only projects with funding goals of over 50 dollars were utilised in the examination 
of the results, which lead to 15 projects being deleted from the model. This restriction aligned 
itself with restrictions utilised within the literature, specifically by Mollick (2014) and Janku 
and Kucerova (2018). 
3.4.7 Kiva econometric analysis  
The logistic regression previously utilised to analyse the Kickstarter data would not 
have been appropriate for analysis in the Kiva model. In the Kickstarter’s model the 
dependent variable, success or failure, was dicotomic, while in the Kiva case there is no such 
restriction as the amount raised by a project can take any positive value, being the amount of 
funding raised necessarily above or equal to 0. Therefore, an alternative approach has to be 
considered which is more suitable for this specific set of dependent and explanatory 
variables. OLS was initially considered through examination of the dataset and discovering 
that the models which would be generated would satisfy the Gauss-Markov assumptions and 
thus provide the best linear unbiased estimators. Furthermore, a truncated regression was 
considered to avoid misspecification due to the actual observations of the dependent variable, 
amount of money raised within Kiva, being necessarily truncated at zero. 
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Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator can be utilised to obtain estimates, ?̂?, of the 
true parameters of a linear regression. For example, if the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 is a liner 
function of the explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖, with some unobserved error terms, the unknown true 
relation can possibly be expressed in the following equation. 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 … . + 𝜀𝑖  
Ordinary least squares can then be utilised to calculate estimators ?̂? of the population 
parameters capturing the scalar impact of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable. 
The Gauss-Markov assumptions are a set of assumptions for the linear regression model, such 
that under the condition that they are satisfied, OLS will provide the best linear unbiased 
estimators. These assumptions are as follows: 
1) 𝐸[𝜀𝑖] = 0. 
2) [ 𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑛] and [ 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛] are independent  
3) Var(𝜀𝑖) =  𝜎
2 
4) cov(𝜀𝑖 , 𝜀𝑗) = 0: 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
5) No perfect Multicollinearity 
Therefore, if one can show that these 5 Gauss Markov assumptions are satisfied, then 
ordinary least squares would produce BLUE estimators of the true unknown population 
parameters. The following sections considers the specific procedures which were utilised to 
test whether the Gauss-Markov assumptions were satisfied relative to the specific conditions 
which could be problematic for this model.  
3.4.7.1 Testing for multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is a problem which occurs whereby the correlation between two 
explanatory variables is too high, thus making it impossible to distinguish the influence of 
either variable upon the dependent variable. Non-perfect multicollinearity itself does not 
violate the Gauss-Markov but should be reduced as it may increase the variance of the 
estimators. Multicollinearity was tested for using the Vector Inflation Factor (VIF) Stata 
command and is reported for the models utilised.  
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3.4.7.2 Dealing with possible Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity considers the problem that can occur if the variation of the error 
terms varies across the observations. With heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimator will be 
inefficient. As with heteroscedasticity, only the standard errors are biased, not the 
coefficients, if alternate standard errors can be found, heteroscedasticity no longer impact the 
efficiency of the estimator. Therefore, to address this potential problem, robust standard 
errors are utilised, a method suggested by White (1980). This is carried out in Stata by using 
the robust option while carrying out the regression options. For its implementation in Stata, 
please refer to the syntax document for Kiva appendix item 7.6.   
3.4.7.3 Omitted Variable Bias 
An omitted variable bias can occur if a relevant explanatory variable correlated both 
with the dependent variable and one or more included independent variables, is not included 
in the model which leads to the estimators of the included correlated dependent variables 
becoming biased. In order to test for this within the Kiva Regression, the Ramsey RESET test 
was utilised, which runs an F-test under the null hypothesis that there is omitted variable bias. 
This test is run in Stata using the ovtest command after the regression has been carried out. 
For its implementation in Stata, please refer to the syntax document in section (7.6).    
3.4.7.4 Truncated regression  
Allison et al (2014) have previously used OLS to examine Kiva. They utilised OLS to 
examine how factors impacted upon the amount of time it took for projects on Kiva to reach 
their funding goal. Moreover, OLS has also been utilised within the wider crowdfunding 
literature (Calic and Mosakowski, 2016; Mollick and Nanda, 2015). 
However, the problem with utilising OLS in our analysis of the determinants of the 
amount raised by the projects, is that Kiva projects cannot raise negative amounts of money. 
Thus, the dependent variable of the models is truncated at 0 and if this is not adapted for, this 
could cause a critical model misspecification error (Heckman, 1979). To overcome this 
problem a truncated regression approach can be carried out which overcomes this 
misspecification error, by restricting the sample and the residuals to values which are 
positive. As log values are utilised this restricts all values of amount raised to being above 1 
dollar.   
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3.4.8 Kiva model definition: 
The Kiva dataset is examined in four different models, all of the models utilised 
logarithms (natural logarithms) as weights in order to overcome omitted variable bias. The 
details of the models are as follows: 
3.4.8.1 Model 1: Signals only model 
This model considers all of the variables which can be identified as signals sent between the 
backers, the creators and the platform itself. 
The dependent variable is: 
Yi= Amount of money raised for project i  
Log Yi =  α + β1logGenerosity + β2logTemporal Experience + β3Capacity Experience +
β4LogRating +  εi     
3.4.8.2 Model 2: Signals and social capital: 
The second model adds the network centrality measurements which capture the impact of 
social capital in the model.  
Log Yi =  α + β1logGenerosity + β2logTemporal Experience
+ β3logCapacity Experience + β4logRating + β5logEigen Centrality
+ β6logBetweeness Centrality + β7Closeness Centrality + εi 
3.4.8.3 Model 3: Complete OLS Model 
The third model introduces the competition variables and thus the model contains all 
examined variables.  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜀𝑖 
3.4.8.4 Model 4: Kiva Truncated regression  
The fourth model uses all of the variables from the complete model, this truncates the model 
when the dependant value is 0. Thus, as the dependant variable is the natural log of the 
amount raised this thus captures all positive values of above 1. And thus the model is defined 
as follows: 
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𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜀𝑖 
With the restriction 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 > 1 and 𝐿𝑜𝑔 Ӯ𝑖 > 1  
3.4.9 List of all variables in Kiva 
The following table, provides a full list of all variables utilised in the Kiva models. 
Table 3.8 List of all Kiva Variables 
Variable  Variable Output Variable description 
Amount raised Natural logarithm of the 
amount raised by the end 
of the project 
The natural logarithm of the total 
amount of money raised by 
crowdfunding for the examined 
projects. This is the dependent variable 
for all of the Kiva models.    
Generosity Natural logarithm of the 
average interest rate 
charged to the individual 
seeking the loan by the 
partnership organisation.   
The natural logarithm of the average 
interest rate charged by the partnership 
organisation to the individual seeking 
loans. This variable is based of all past 
loans from the organisation and not just 
the loans within the dataset.    
Temporal Experience Natural logarithm of the 
time that the partnership 
organisation has spent on 
Kiva. 
The natural logarithm of the amount of 
time in months which a partnership 
organisation has spent on Kiva.  
Capacity Experience Natural logarithm of the 
number of projects that the 
partnership organisation 
has previously funded on 
Kiva.  
The natural logarithm of the number of 
successfully provided loans which a 
partnership organisation has facilitated 
within Kiva, since the creation of the 
partnership organisation.  
Country Funds Natural logarithm of the 
amount of funds lent 
within the country on 
Kiva. 
The natural logarithm of the amount of 
funds that have been lent by Kiva 
within the country of the individual 
seeking funds.   
Active Loans Natural logarithm of the 
number of active loans 
within the country. 
The natural logarithm of the amount of 
active loans, loans which have been 
funded and are currently being repaid 
within the specific country of the 
individual seeking funds. 
Rating Natural logarithm of the 
rating provided by Kiva to 
the partnership 
organisation. 
The rating is between 0-5 stars and is 
provided by Kiva to all partnership 
organisation.  
152   
 
Eigen vector 
Centrality 
The Eigen vector centrality 
of the project node within 
the latent network of Kiva. 
Captured via considering the Eigen 
vector centrality of the project in the 
latent network formed by joint backers. 
Eigen vector centrality is used to 
examine the effects of internal social 
capital within the model. 
Betweenness 
centrality 
The natural logarithm of 
the Betweenness centrality 
of the project node within 
the latent network of Kiva. 
Captured via considering the 
Betweenness centrality of the project in 
the latent network formed by joint 
backers. Betweenness centrality is 
utilised as a covariate within the mode. 
Closeness centrality The natural logarithm of 
the Closeness centrality of 
the project node within the 
latent network of Kiva. 
Captured via considering the Closeness 
centrality of the project in the latent 
network formed by joint backers. 
Closeness centrality is utilised as a 
covariate within the mode. 
launch comp The natural logarithm of 
the level of competition on 
launch day. 
Launch competition was captured via 
the number of other projects which 
were launched within the same day as 
the examined project.  
sector index The natural logarithm of 
the level of competition 
within the sector.  
An index value measuring competition 
between projects on Kiva within the 
same sector as chosen by the individual 
seeking the loan. Index values are 
between 0 and 10000, with higher 
index values showing lower levels of 
competition. 
partner index The natural logarithm of 
the level of competition 
for each partnership 
organisation.  
An index value measuring competition 
between projects on Kiva within the 
same partnership organisation. As each 
partnership organisation is funding 
multiple projects, these can be seen to 
compete with each other. Index values 
are between 0 and 10000, with higher 
index values showing lower levels of 
competition. 
 
3.4.10 Kiva summary statistics 
The table below provides summary statistics for the variables utilised within the Kiva models. 
Table 3.9 Summary statistics for Kiva variables 
 
Mean Std. Min Max 
Amount raised 5.998845 0.758075 4.317488 8.517193 
Generosity -1.09146 0.362618 -2.99573 -0.41552 
Temporal Experience 4.212621 0.455956 2.302585 4.875197 
Capacity Experience 9.922996 1.292193 3.828641 12.05235 
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Country Funds 17.04178 1.206516 12.79504 18.30839 
Active Loans 4.559813 1.508066 0 6.586172 
Rating 1.033783 0.379592 0 1.504077 
Eigen vector Centrality -3.28645 2.171032 -9.26463 -.0498581 
Betweenness centrality 1.808549 6.735709 -9.21034 9.287293 
Closeness centrality -0.91877 0.266306 -1.5976 -.6319214 
launch comp 4.886813 1.048697 0 5.666427 
sector index 4.862394 0.757686 4.208949 8.19849 
partner index 6.225386 0.999128 4.698356 9.21034 
 
3.5 Methodology conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the data collection and analysis procedure for both platforms 
examined within this thesis. This is summarised in Table 3.10 below:   
Table 3.10 Summary of the two models 
 Kickstarter Kiva 
Subdivide type Reward-based Lending-based 
Data-type Cross sectional Cross Sectional 
Observations 54193 1000 
Measure of Success Reaching the funding goal Amount of funds raised 
Analysis method Logistic regression model  Truncated Regression 
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4 Empirical Results 
This chapter explores the results of the models and their impact on the proposed 
hypotheses developed in this thesis, enabling the main findings to be discussed in the 
following chapter, the structure of the chapter as follows: 
1) Kickstarter model’s results: Explores the results of the key different Kickstarter logistic 
models, focussing on the full model results for both the main and restricted models, while 
providing a summary of all other examined models. The goodness of fit for both the main and 
restricted model are also considered in this section. 
2) Kickstarter’s results by hypothesis: Examines the impact of the results of the 
econometric model upon the hypotheses proposed for the Kickstarter model. Illustrating 
whether the hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence. Moreover, this section 
begins to highlight the potential findings of the thesis for further discussion in the findings 
and recommendations section.  
3) Kiva model’s results: Provides the results of the two key ordinary least squares 
regressions utilised to examine the Kiva crowdfunding platform. Examining the goodness of 
fit of the models and considering if multicollinearity or omitted variable bias was problematic 
within the models.   
4) Kiva results by hypothesis: Examines the impact of the results of the models based upon 
each of the hypotheses developed in the methodology chapter 3. Beginning to highlight the 
potential implications of these results and comparing them with the results from the 
Kickstarter model, leading into further discussion within the findings and recommendations 
section of the thesis.  
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4.1 Kickstarter model results 
This section considers all the results from the logistic model examining Kickstarter. 
Before considering the specific impact on the relevant hypotheses, a general analysis is 
carried out on the main and restricted models. The main model is used for examining the 
majority of the hypotheses. While the restricted model is utilised in examining the impact of 
multiple competition measures which required a reduction in the dataset to create unbiased 
results. 
4.1.1 Main Model results 
The main model considers all variables except the competition variables which require a 
restricted version of the dataset. It is thus defined as follows:  
  𝑌𝑖 = { 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
𝛽5𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 +
𝛽11𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖    
With the model results presented on the following page: 
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Table 4.1 Kickstarter Main Model Logistic regression 
Success or failure Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Sig 
Ambition -1.382 0.018 -75.10 0.000 -1.418 -1.346 *** 
Confidence -0.00000649 0.000 -8.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Experience 0.0393 0.007 5.44 0.000 0.025 0.054 *** 
Trustworthiness 0.893 0.018 49.49 0.000 0.857 0.928 *** 
Impatience -0.00128 0.002 -0.80 0.425 -0.004 0.002  
Campaign Comments 0.707 0.017 41.80 0.000 0.674 0.741 *** 
Early funding -3.5E-07 0.000 -0.17 0.867 0.000 0.000  
Early backing 0.00103 0.000 3.91 0.000 0.001 0.002 *** 
Early average pledge 0.615 0.015 40.59 0.000 0.586 0.645 *** 
Reward levels 0.0469 0.004 11.94 0.000 0.039 0.055 *** 
Global rewards -0.0433 0.004 -10.32 0.000 -0.052 -0.035 *** 
Average wait time -0.00158 0.000 -8.47 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 *** 
Facebook shares 0.784 0.013 61.27 0.000 0.759 0.809 *** 
Reciprocity -0.00673 0.001 -8.21 0.000 -0.008 -0.005 *** 
Launch competition 2E-05 0.000 6.88 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Launch competition in 
Category 
-1e-04 0.000 -11.59 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Google trend in category 0.00391 0.001 4.82 0.000 0.002 0.005 *** 
Constant 3.449 0.121 28.58 0.000 3.212 3.685 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 0.322 SD dependent var 0.467 
Pseudo r-squared 0.638 Number of obs 54193.000 
Chi-square 43500.800 Prob > chi2 0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 24665.063 Bayesian crit. (BIC) -565895.07 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
From Table 4.1 it can be seen that the majority of the variables are significant with 
only Impatience and Early funding not having a significant effect on the probability of 
successful funding a campaign. Secondly, the Pseudo R-Squared value of 0.6385 can be 
deemed as a good fit for the model, as Domencich and McFadden (1975) argued that any 
value larger than or between 0.2-0.4 could be deemed as excellent fit for a logit model.  
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Thirdly the chi-squared probability of zero demonstrates that the variables are jointly 
significant in impacting the success and failure of a Kickstarter project. The possibility of 
multicollinearity was then considered, of note you cannot directly carry out a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) analysis of a logit model in Stata, therefore, to utilise this test a standard 
Ordinary least squares regression was carried out on the variables, before the VIF command 
was utilised, which will provide accurate testing of multicollinearity between the variables.  
Table 4.2 Kickstarter main model variance inflation factor 
    VIF   1/VIF 
 Early Backing 2.589 .386 
 Early Funding 2.506 .399 
 Reward levels 2.3 .435 
 Facebook Shares 2.181 .458 
 Trustworthiness 2.132 .469 
 Global rewards 2.11 .474 
 Campaign comments 2.068 .484 
 Early Average Pledge 1.632 .613 
 Ambition 1.476 .677 
 Confidence 1.322 .757 
 Experience 1.19 .841 
 Reciprocity 1.177 .849 
 Average wait time 1.12 .893 
 Launch competition category  1.084 .923 
 Impatience 1.081 .925 
 Google trend in category 1.035 .966 
 Launch competition 1.023 .978 
 Mean VIF 1.649 . 
 
Table 4.2 above shows the VIF of the main model. VIF is the ratio of the variance of 
an explanatory variable i.e. 𝛽?̂? fitted against the full model to the variance of the same 
explanatory variables 𝛽?̂? fitted only by itself. Therefore, the smallest value that VIF can take 
is one, demonstrating no collinearity between any of the explanatory variables. However, in 
practice there tends to always exist some levels of collinearity between the variables, only 
values of 5 or greater are considered to be problematic (James et al, 2013). Therefore, as none 
of the values exceed 2.59 multicollinearity is not a problem within this model.  
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The presence of significant outliers in the data was addressed through the removal of 
any project which had a funding goal of over 1 million dollars, as these were seen as 
unrealistic. However, it is possible that other variables may contain outliers affecting the 
results, thus in order to consider if this was true a winsorization approach of limiting the top 
99 and 95 percent of all variables was utilised. This process enables outliers to be addressed 
by setting those specific values down to a specific outlier, without having to reduce the 
number of observations within the dataset (Ghosh and Vogt, 2012). Two tables, using these 
procedures, can be seen in appendix section 7.7. Although altering some coefficients, using 
these procedures do not alter the significance or signs of the relevant coefficients. Thus, 
reducing/ removing the outliers by this process would not greatly affect the analysis of the 
hypotheses.   
Table 4.3: Predicting the accuracy of the main model 
  TRUE   
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 15147 2565 17712 
- 2319 34162 36481 
Total 17466 36727 54193 
Sensitivity                   Pr( +| D)   86.72% 
Specificity                      Pr( -|~D)   93.02% 
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +)   85.52% 
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -)   93.64% 
False + rate for true ~D       Pr( +|~D)    6.98% 
False - rate for true D          Pr( -| D)   13.28% 
False + rate for classified  Pr(~D| +)   14.48% 
False - rate for classified  Pr( D| -)    6.36% 
Correctly classified                         90.99% 
 
Table 4.3 above shows the predicting accuracy of the main model, with the overall 
percentage of correctly predicted outcomes being 90.99 percent, as denoted by the “correctly 
159   
 
classified” row at the bottom of the table. This can be calculated by summing the number of 
correctly predicted successes and the number of correctly predicted failures over the total 
number of predictions. The model’s predictive ability is decomposed further into multiple 
prediction categories. 
Within the table “D” refers to projects which were observed to be successful, while 
“~D” refers to projects which were observed to be unsuccessful. The first section of the table 
demonstrates the amount of correctly classified results, with the second row, denoted by “+”, 
demonstrating that 15147 successes were correctly predicted as successes, while 2565 
failures were incorrectly predicted as success. Therefore 15147 projects out of the 17712 
predicted to be successful by the model were in fact successful. Thus, there is a positive 
predictive value of 85.52 percent as donated further down the table. Conversely, the third 
row, denoted by “-“, provides the ability of the model at predicting failure, it correctly 
predicts 34162 failures as failures, while incorrectly predicting 2319 successes as failures. 
Thus, leading to a negative predictive value of 93.64 percent as donated further down the 
table. Additionally, the sensitivity and specificity can also be calculated. With sensitivity 
referring to the percentage of successful projects which are successfully predicted to be 
successful, in this case 86.72 percent, as 15147 successes were predicted as successes and 
2319 were successes predicted as failures. While specificity refers to the percentage of 
failures which were correctly predicted, in this case 93.02, as 34162 failed projects were 
successful predicted as failures and 2565 failure were predicted as successes. These results 
taken together, show that the model is better at predicting failures correctly than it is at 
predicting successes, as shown by the higher level of specificity. 
Additionally, Table 4.3 can also be utilised to examine the probability of predicting 
successes and failures based upon the result being failures or successes. For example, the 
probability of a product being predicted as a success when it is a failure is 6.98 percent. 
Conversely the probability of a product being predicted as a failure when it is successful is 
13.28 percent. Demonstrating that the model is more likely to incorrectly predict a failure as a 
success than a success as a failure. These values can be utilised both in examining an 
individual model and in comparison, across models.  
4.1.2 Comparison between the Main model and social capital model. 
In order to consider whether the main model should be utilised in determining success 
and failure on Kickstarter, the model was compared to alternative model specifications. The 
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first specification compared to the main model was the social capital model which did not 
include the launch competition explanatory variables and was defined as:      
𝑌𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
0 𝑖𝑓  𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛽11𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 
+ 𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖  
Table 4.4 below demonstrates the differences between the main model and the social capital 
model, providing different measures of pseudo R squared measures which can be utilised to 
consider the goodness of fit of the logit models. Additionally, the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) is provided, this measure developed by Gideon E. Schwarz can be utilised in 
model selection, with the lower BIC value being preferred between the two models (Schwarz, 
1978). The formula for BIC is as follows: 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 ≡ −2𝑙𝑛ℒmax + 𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑁  
Whereby ℒmax is the maximum likelihood possible to be achieved in the model, k is the 
number of parameters and N is the number of datapoints used in the fit (Liddle 2007). 
Furthermore, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), is also included, this is a similar 
measure to BIC, with a lower AIC value demonstrating a preferred model (Akaike, 1974). 
The Formula for AIC is as follows: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 ≡ −2𝑙𝑛ℒmax + 2𝑘  
Similar to BIC ℒmax is the maximum likelihood possible to be achieved in the model and k is 
the number of parameters (Liddle 2007). 
Table 4.4 Comparing the main model to social capital model 
 
Main model Social capital model Difference 
N 54193 54193 0 
Log-Lik Intercept Only -34064.931 -34064.931 0 
Log-Lik Full Model -12314.531 -12412.446 97.914 
D 24629.063(54175) 24824.891(54178) -195.829(-3) 
LR 43500.800(17) 43304.972(14) 195.829(3) 
Prob > LR 0 0 0 
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McFadden's R2 0.638 0.636 0.003 
McFadden's Adj R2 0.638 0.635 0.003 
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.552 0.55 0.002 
Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.771 0.769 0.002 
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2 0.891 0.891 0 
Efron's R2 0.693 0.69 0.003 
Variance of y* 30.261 30.171 0.09 
Variance of error 3.29 3.29 0 
Count R2 0.91 0.908 0.001 
Adj Count R2 0.72 0.716 0.005 
AIC 0.455 0.459 -0.004 
AIC*n 24665.063 24854.891 -189.829 
BIC -565895.071 -565731.943 -163.128 
BIC' -43315.495 -43152.368 -163.128 
Difference of 163.128 in BIC' provides very strong support for the main model. 
Table 4.4 above demonstrates that across all pseudo R Squared measures the pseudo 
R squared of the main model is higher than the pseudo R squared of the Social capital model. 
Additionally, both the AIC and the BIC measures are lower indicating support for utilising 
the main model over the usage of the social capital model.  
Furthermore, the utilisation of the main model is supported through an examination of the 
predictive ability of the social capital model as shown in Table 4.5 below.  
Table 4.5 Predictive ability of social capital model 
 
TRUE 
 
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 15111 2608 17719 
- 2355 34119 36474 
Total 17466 36727 54193 
Sensitivity Pr( +| D) 86.52% 
Specificity Pr( -|~D) 92.90% 
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +) 85.28% 
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -) 93.54% 
False + rate for true ~D Pr( +|~D) 7.10% 
False - rate for true D Pr( -| D) 13.48% 
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False + rate for classified + Pr(~D| +) 14.72% 
False - rate for classified - Pr( D| -) 6.46% 
Correctly classified 90.84% 
 
Comparing Table 4.5 and Table 4.3 demonstrates that in every single aspect of predictive 
ability the main model is better at predicting than the social capital model. Further supporting 
that the main model should be utilised in the examination of the proposed hypotheses.  
4.1.3 Restricted model results 
The following section considers the restricted model, which had reduced observations 
due to how the competition indexes would be underestimated if the first or last sixty days of 
the dataset was included reducing the observations from 54193 to 42277. This is necessary 
due to how projects have a maximum duration of sixty days, thus a project which was 
launched on the first day could be competing with projects from before the start of the 
dataset, thus by dropping the first and last sixty days of observations competition effects are 
not underestimated. The restricted model was defined as the following: 
𝑌𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = 1 = 
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
𝛽5𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 +
𝛽11𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 +
 𝛽17𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽18𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽19 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 +
 𝛽20𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽21𝐾𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜀𝑖    
Table 4.6: Restricted model results 
Success or Failure Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Sig 
Ambition -1.431 0.022 -66.46 0.000 -1.473 -1.388 *** 
Confidence -0.00000658 0.000 -7.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Experience 0.0469 0.008 5.55 0.000 0.030 0.063 *** 
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Trustworthiness 0.945 0.021 45.26 0.000 0.904 0.986 *** 
Impatience -0.00624 0.002 -3.28 0.001 -0.010 -0.003 *** 
Campaign 
Comments 
0.748 0.019 38.74 0.000 0.711 0.786 *** 
Early Funding 2.07E-06 0.000 0.95 0.343 0.000 0.000  
Early Backing 0.00044 0.000 1.72 0.086 0.000 0.001 * 
Early Average 
Pledge 
0.594 0.017 34.37 0.000 0.560 0.628 *** 
Reward levels 0.0445 0.004 10.09 0.000 0.036 0.053 *** 
Global rewards -0.0406 0.005 -8.43 0.000 -0.050 -0.031 *** 
Average wait time -0.00201 0.000 -9.35 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 *** 
Facebook Shares 0.804 0.015 54.38 0.000 0.775 0.833 *** 
Reciprocity -0.00773 0.001 -8.20 0.000 -0.010 -0.006 *** 
Launch 
Competition 
1E-05 0.000 4.25 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Launch 
Competition 
Category 
-0.000106 0.000 -11.42 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Google trend of 
category 
0.00739 0.001 7.49 0.000 0.005 0.009 *** 
City index -5E-05 0.000 -9.24 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Country index 1.87E-05 0.000 0.88 0.380 0.000 0.000  
Category index -0.000249 0.000 -5.71 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Kick index 0.000178 0.000 5.92 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
Constant 4.438 0.137 32.43 0.000 4.170 4.706 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 0.338 SD dependent var  0.473 
Pseudo r-squared  0.652 Number of observations   42277.000 
Chi-square   35222.516 Prob > chi2  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 18882.900 Bayesian crit. (BIC) -431261.296 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
From Table 4.6 multiple factors can be considered. Firstly, the majority of the 
variables are significant with only Early backing, Early funding and country index not having 
a significant effect on the probability of successful funding a campaign. Secondly, the Pseudo 
Squared value of 0.652 can be deemed as a good fit for the model and is larger than the 
0.6385 value of the main model. Thirdly the chi-squared probability of zero demonstrates that 
the variables are jointly significant in impacting the success and failure of a crowdfunding 
project. The possibility of multicollinearity in the additional variables was then considered. 
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Table 4.7 Restricted model VIF test 
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Early Backing 2.679 .373 
 Early Funding 2.6 .385 
 Reward levels 2.318 .431 
 Facebook Shares 2.222 .45 
 Global rewards 2.155 .464 
 Trustworthiness 2.146 .466 
 Campaign Comments 2.079 .481 
 Early Average Pledge 1.678 .596 
 Ambition 1.488 .672 
 Confidence 1.322 .756 
 Experience 1.195 .837 
 Reciprocity 1.185 .844 
 Average wait time 1.127 .888 
 Category index 1.111 .9 
 Impatience 1.107 .903 
 Kick index 1.103 .907 
 Launch Comp Category 1.085 .922 
 Google trend of category 1.069 .936 
 City index 1.05 .952 
 Country index 1.046 .956 
 Launch competition 1.015 .985 
 Mean VIF 1.561 . 
 
As the VIF value of the explanatory variables does not exceed the boundary level of 5 
multicollinearity is not observed within the restricted model (James et al, 2013), furthermore, 
the predictive ability of the model is also considered in Table 4.8 below. 
Table 4.8 Restricted model predictive ability 
  TRUE   
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 12508 2022 14516 
- 1761 26006 27761 
Total 14269 28008 42277 
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Sensitivity Pr( + D) 87.66% 
Specificity Pr( -~D) 92.85% 
Positive predictive value Pr( D +) 86.20% 
Negative predictive value Pr(~D -) 93.66% 
False + rate for true ~D Pr( +~D) 7.15% 
False - rate for true D Pr( - D) 12.34% 
False + rate for classified + Pr(~D +) 13.80% 
False - rate for classified - Pr( D -) 6.34% 
Correctly classified 91.02 % 
In comparison to the main model the restricted model is better at overall prediction with a 
rate of correctly classified of 91.02 to 90.99. However, it has a higher rate of falsely 
predicting success when actual failure occurred at 7.22 compared to 6.98 of the main model. 
Overall the predictive ability is very similar to the main model. The following table shows a 
summary of all models Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Summary of all Kickstarter models 
 
Creator 
signals 
Backers 
signals 
Backer 
incentives 
Social 
capital 
main model Restricted 
model 
Ambition -0.538*** -0.946*** -0.992*** -1.393*** -1.382*** -1.431*** 
(-56.93) (-71.11) (-70.21) (-75.89) (-75.10) (-66.46) 
 Confidence -0.00000181 
*** 
-0.00000323 
*** 
-0.00000304 
*** 
-0.00000617 
*** 
-0.00000649 
*** 
-0.00000658 
*** 
(-3.94) (-5.18) (-4.73) (-7.72) (-8.01) (-7.10) 
Experience 0.0136* -0.0438*** -0.0375*** 0.0379*** 0.0393*** 0.0469*** 
(2.38) (-6.96) (-5.89) (5.27) (5.44) (5.55) 
Trustworthine
ss 
1.579*** 1.017*** 0.994*** 0.869*** 0.893*** 0.945*** 
(114.71) (63.03) (60.12) (48.74) (49.49) (45.26) 
Impatience -0.00909*** -0.00757*** -0.00457** -0.00166 -0.00128 -0.00624** 
(-7.60) (-5.45) (-3.20) (-1.04) (-0.80) (-3.28) 
Campaign 
Comments 
 
0.734*** 0.732*** 0.685*** 0.707*** 0.748*** 
 
(47.82) (46.84) (-41.03) (41.79) (38.74) 
Early Funding 
 
-0.00000418*** -0.00000405** -4.8E-07 -3.5E-07 2.07E-06 
 
(-3.49) (-3.18) (-0.23) (-0.17) (0.95) 
Early Backing 
 
0.00157*** 0.00164*** 0.000873*** 0.00103*** 0.00044 
 
(6.7) (6.87) (3.35) (3.91) (1.72) 
Early Average 
Pledge 
 
0.694*** 0.690*** 0.617*** 0.615*** 0.594*** 
 
(52.5) (51.13) (40.68) (40.59) (34.37) 
Reward levels 
 
  0.0911*** 0.0495*** 0.0469*** 0.0445*** 
  
(24.57) (12.68) (11.94) (10.09) 
 
  -0.0630*** -0.0441*** -0.0433*** -0.0406*** 
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Global 
rewards 
  
(-16.28) (-10.61) (-10.32) (-8.43) 
Average wait 
time 
  
 
-0.00138*** -0.00153*** -0.00158*** -0.00201*** 
  
(-8.52) (-8.31) (-8.47) (-9.35) 
Facebook 
Shares 
  
  
0.800*** 0.784*** 0.804*** 
  
  
(62.8) (61.28) (54.38) 
Reciprocity   
  
-0.00696*** -0.00673*** -0.00773*** 
  
  
(-8.57) (-8.21) (-8.20) 
Launch 
Competition 
  
  
  2E-05*** 1E-05*** 
  
   
(6.88) (4.25) 
Launch 
Competition 
Category 
    
  
-1e-04*** -0.000106*** 
  
   
(-11.59) (-11.42) 
Google trend 
in category 
    
  
0.00391*** 0.00739*** 
  
   
(4.82) (7.49) 
City index     
   
-5E-05 *** 
    
   
(-9.42) 
Country index     
   
1.87E-05 
    
   
(-1.05) 
Category 
index 
    
   
-0.000249*** 
    
   
(-4.51) 
Kick Index     
   
0.000178*** 
    
   
(6.79) 
Constant 2.311*** 3.145*** 3.108*** 3.753*** 3.449*** 4.032*** 
(-28.48) (-32.22) (-31.34) (-33.53) (-28.58) (-27.50) 
Observations 54193 54193 54193 54193 54193 42277 
Pseudo r-
squared 
0.4071 0.5452 0.5559 0.6356 0.638 0.652 
Chi-square 27738.18 37145.23 37871.61 43304.97 43500.800 35222.516 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
AIC*n 40403.687 31004.630 30284.252 24854.891 24665.063 18882.900 
BIC -550263.250   -559626.706 -560320.383 -565731.943 -565895.07 -431261.296 
 t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
4.2 Kickstarter results by hypothesis: 
This section considers the implications of the results on the research hypotheses both 
for the main and the restricted models. Across this section, numeric values are reported in 3 
significant figures or 2 decimal places whichever is more appropriate in recording accuracy. 
The section is split into sub-sections based upon the specific areas which each hypothesis is 
considering.  
4.2.1 Creators signals  
This sub-section considers signals sent by the creators of the crowdfunding campaigns. 
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4.2.1.1 Confidence  
Hypothesis 1a addressed the role that overconfidence played in crowdfunding project success 
on Kickstarter, stating H1a: Creators’ overconfidence has a negative impact on the 
probability of the project’s success.  
The hypothesis was developed based upon the concept that, on average, creators are 
overconfident in their projects’ ability to obtain funds, a concept developed in section 3.3.2.1. 
The platform forces the creators to set their funding goal at the beginning of the campaign, 
and this is utilised as the predictor of the confidence level of the project, natural log values of 
the relative funding goal were utilised to normalise the result and reduce the impact of 
abnormally high or low relative funding goals. The results shown in Table 4.1, indicate that 
the confidence had a negative and significant impact on the success of the project to above a 
99.99 percent confidence level, supporting H1a.  
This hypothesis can also be examined by considering the relative level of confidence 
of the project compared to other projects within the same specialism on Kickstarter, captured 
through the relative funding goal variable. The results shown in Table 4.1, show that the 
relative funding goal had a negative and significant impact on the success of the project. 
Furthermore, Figure 4-1, below, shows how the probability of success changes with the 
relative level of confidence in the creator within their specialism. An increase from 0 to 1000 
dollars relative to the average in the specialism leads to a decrease from 31.76 to 31.71. Thus, 
the scale of the impact on success is relatively small compared to the absolute level of 
confidence.  
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Figure 4-1 Marginal impact of Confidence 
 
The results support the argument that higher levels of confidence relative to other 
creators, have a negative impact on the probability of a project succeeding within Kickstarter, 
showing strong support for the hypothesis H1a, both in terms of its significance and with 
regard to the scale of the impact. This evidence provides additional support to the statement 
that creators can be overconfident in their project. Thus, creators set a higher relative funding 
goal, leading to a decrease in the probability of observing a successful project. This evidence  
also shows how the enforced signals that Kickstarter demands to be sent out by the creators 
can have negative impacts on the success of the crowdfunding campaigns, a point discussed 
further in section 5.1.1.  
4.2.1.2 Experience 
Hypothesis 1b addresses the role that signalling increased levels of experience by the 
creator has a positive impact on project success: H1b: Signalling increased experience has a 
positive impact on the probability of the project’s success.  
This hypothesis stemmed from the concept that increased levels of experience can be seen as 
key indicators for successfully raising funds within start-ups, and this principle can be applied 
to crowdfunding, as discussed in section 3.3.2.2. The level of experience of the creator is 
captured via the number of projects the creator has previously launched on Kickstarter. The 
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results shown in Table 4.1, show that experience has a positive and significant impact on the 
probability of a project succeeding, showing clear support for H1c.  
Figure 4-2 Marginal impact of experience variable  
 
What is notable from Figure 4-2 is that while the scale of the impact is consistent with 
the marginal impact of one additional previously created project increasing the probability of 
observing a project succeeding by around 0.27 at all experience values. The confidence 
interval surrounding this value increases with the level of experience, demonstrating that the 
precision of the model in capturing the effect of experience decreases as the amount of 
experience increases. The mean number of previously created project that creators had was 
0.571, as shown in Table 3.4, this was impacted by a large number of creators producing 
projects for the first time with 43162 creating projects for the first time out of the 54193 
projects examined by the main model. Applying this mean value to underlying data of Figure 
4-2, as shown in Table 3.6, displays that, on average, the model attributes a probability of a 
project succeeding of 32.2 percent. However, there was a large range of results with the most 
experienced creators having previously created 74 projects. At this maximum level, utilising 
the data from Figure 4-2, the expected probability of observing success increases to 51.9 
percent, indicating that high levels of experience exert a significant impact on the probability 
of a project reaching its funding goal.  
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4.2.1.3 Trustworthiness 
Hypothesis 1d addresses the role that signalling increased level of trustworthiness by 
the creator has a positive impact on project success: H1c: Increased levels of trustworthiness 
has a positive impact on the probability of the project’s success.  
This hypothesis stemmed from an examination of how trustworthiness is a key characteristic 
of entrepreneurs, demonstrated through the survival and growth of their ventures and how 
trustworthiness could be signalled by creators on Kickstarter through utilising the updates 
feature inbuilt into every Kickstarter campaign, concepts discussed in 4.2.1.3 . The results 
shown Table 4.1, demonstrate that trustworthiness has both a positive and significant impact 
on the probability of a project succeeding, showing clear support for H1c.  
Figure 4-3 Marginal impact of Trustworthiness  
 
The impact of the level of trustworthiness is shown in Figure 4-3 above. Natural 
Logarithms were utilised in this variable, thus the mean value of 0.99, as shown in Table 3.4, 
represents that, on average, each campaign had e0.99 (2.69 3.sf) updates. Thus, utilising the 
underlying data for Figure 4-3 (also viewable in Table 3.6), shows that, at the mean level, 
29.2 percent of campaigns are predicted to succeed. Furthermore, an increase from the mean 
of 2.69 to that of 5 updates would have shifted this probability of observing a success from 
29.2 to 34.2 percent demonstrating that a relatively small extra number of updates can 
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dramatically increase the probability of observing a success. The slight downward curve of 
the trend line within Figure 4-3 indicates that the marginal impact of extra updates decreases 
with increased number of updates. Furthermore, this is a relevant effect as log values were 
utilised and thus even a straight trend line would demonstrate a marginal decrease in the 
impact of extra updates. 
4.2.1.4 Impatience 
Hypothesis 1d addresses the role that signalling impatience will play on the project 
due to the inability of backers to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality 
campaigns, as discussed in section 3.3.2.4. The level of patience of the creator, as discussed 
earlier, is captured via the proxy of the duration of the campaigns. Stating H1d: Increased 
level of patience have a positive impact on the probability of a project’s success. 
The results in Table 4.1, shows that impatience does not have a significant impact on 
the probability of a project succeeding and thus does not support the hypothesis. This 
insignificance of the result was discussed as a possibility within the generation of the 
hypothesis due to how the signal did not enable backers to distinguish between low quality 
and high-quality campaigns, due to the duration being limited to sixty days, the author argued 
that this timeframe was too limited to enable distinction between high- and low-quality 
projects. Thus, although signal patience becomes ineffective, providing a possible 
explanation as to why the hypotheses was not supported. 
Suggesting that the human capital can be used to interpret the effect of signals but 
only when the signals are effective in overcoming asymmetric information. This point is 
discussed further in section 5.1.1.2.  
4.2.1.5 Ambition  
Hypothesis 14 addressed the role that Ambition played in crowdfunding project success on 
Kickstarter, stating H1E: Creators’ Ambition has a negative impact on the probability of the 
project’s success.  
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Figure 4-4 Marginal impact of Ambition  
 
The scale of the impact of ambition is carried out considering the marginal impact of 
higher measures of confidence, as shown in Figure 4-4, displaying the probability of success 
for a project as a function of the observed ambition of the creator. The values on the x-axis 
are log values, thus the graph shows that an increase of the funding goal from 𝑒2 (2.72 
reported to 3.s.f) to 𝑒4 (54.6 reported to 3.s.f) will lead to a decrease in the estimated 
probability of projects succeeding from 87.2 percent to 72.2 percent. The mean of the 
confidence level of all projects is 8.75, as reported in Table 3.4, expressed in funding goal 
terms this is 6321 US dollars and utilising the Figure 4-4, at this level the model predicts a 
28.5 percent probability of the project reaching its funding goal, as shown in Table 3.6.   
 
 
4.2.2 Backers signals 
This section considers the impact of signals sent out by the backers of the 
crowdfunding campaigns as discussed in 3.3.3. The signals are all examined in relation to the 
H2, which stated: Increased numbers of signals sent by the backers have a positive impact on 
the probability of a project’s success.  
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Four different signals were utilised in examining this hypothesis all demonstrating 
increased levels of signalling by the backers. The signals were as follows: the number of 
campaign comments, the amount of early funding provided, the amount of early backing 
provided, and the average pledge given by each backer in the early funding period. The early 
funding period consisted of the first 1/6th duration of the crowdfunding campaign. The results 
of these signals are displayed in Table 4.1.  
Therefore, three out of four of the above proxies for backers’ signals, support H2, as 
campaign comments, early backing and early average pledge all have both a positive and 
significant impact on the likelihood of a project succeeding. Early funding has a negative 
coefficient; however, this value is not significant at the relevant confidence levels. Hence, 
these results provide convincing support for H2. The scale of the impact of each of the 
significant signals is examined separately in Figure 4-5 to Figure 4-7 below. 
4.2.2.1 Impact of campaign comments 
Figure 4-5 Marginal impact of campaign comments 
 
Campaign comments are rescaled in natural log values, and thus in interpreting Figure 
4-5, the slight down turn in the slope of the curve demonstrates that the marginal impact of 
additional levels of comments decreased significantly at higher levels. On average, projects 
had e0.912 (2.49) comments, as shown in Table 3.4, applying this mean level to the underlying 
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data for Figure 4-5, displayed a probability of success at 30.26 percent, as shown in Table 
3.6. Furthemore, Table 3.4 shows that there was a large range in the number of comments, 
with the project with the most comments having e11.3 (78931.8) comments and the projects 
with the least having 1 comment. Thus, using the underlying data for Figure 4-5 shows that 
an increase from the mean to maximum level of comments increased the probability of 
success from 30.26 to 79.05 percent. Conversely, a decreasing number of comments from the 
mean level to the lowest level reduces the probability of observing success from 30.26 to 
24.81 percent. Examination of the 95 percent confidence interval at the mean level was 
between 29.97 and 30.56 percent suggesting that the model is efficient at predicting the 
impact of campaign comments. However, the confidence intervals increase as campaign 
comments increases, suggesting the model is better at predicting the impact of comments on 
success and failure of projects at lower number of comments.  
4.2.2.2 Impact of Early backing 
Figure 4-6 Marginal impact of early backing 
 
Figure 4-6 shows that increased early backing consistently increases success by 
around 1.48 percent per 200 additional early backers. This suggests that the marginal impact 
of each extra backers is a 0.0074 percent increase in the probability of observing a successful 
project, demonstrating a modest impact on the probability of observing a success. However, 
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the 95 percent confidence boundary increases significantly as the number of early backers 
increases, suggesting that the model is better at precisely predicting the impact of early 
backing when lower levels of early backing are reported. Table 3.4 displayed that, on 
average, each campaign has 49.37 early backers, utilising the underlying data for Figure 4-6, 
this would predict the probability of observing a success at 32.30 percent.  
4.2.2.3 Impact of Early pledge per backer 
Figure 4-7 Marginal impact of early average pledge 
 
The early average pledge variables display the amount of money on average each 
backer gave in the early funding period. Natural logarithms were utilised in constructing this 
variable, and thus in interpreting Figure 4-7, the straight line shows that the positive marginal 
impact of average pledge on the probability of observing a successful outcome decreases as 
average pledge increases. On average, backers gave e2.281858 (9.79) US dollars, extracted from 
Table 3.4, at this value utilising the underlying data for Figure 4-7, as shown partially in 
Table 3.6, would predict the probability of observing a success at 25.78 percent. Furthermore, 
increasing the average pledge by 5 dollars to 14.79 dollars would raise the probability of 
observing a success from 25.78 to 27.7 percent.  
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The combination of the three significant positive variables with their strong marginal impacts 
provides convincing support for the H2, showing the positive impact that increased backers 
signalling has on the probability of a project succeeding.   
4.2.3 Reward hypotheses 
The following section considers the results related to all hypotheses formulated to 
identify the impact of backers’ incentives on the success in Kickstarter as they were 
developed in section 3.3.4 .  
4.2.3.1 Reward levels 
Increasing the number of reward levels offered to backers of the campaigns was 
considered to exert a positive impact on the probability of projects succeeding, as it would 
provide increased choice to the backers regarding how they wish to support the project, an 
argument discussed when developing H3a: Increased number of reward levels within a 
campaign will have a positive impact on the probability of the project success.  
Figure 4-8 Marginal impact of reward levels 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the number of reward levels has a positive and significant impact 
on the probability of a project succeeding, thus supporting H3a, as also displayed in Figure 
4-8 below on the probability of observing a success for specific reward levels. The straight 
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line within the graph shows that increasing the number of reward levels has a consistent 
effect for the first 10 increases, with each increase leading to an increase of around 0.34 
percent in the probability of observing a success.   
An examination of the mean number of reward levels, from Table 3.4, shows that on 
average each campaign had 7.39 reward levels. Utilising the underlying data for Figure 4-8 
shows that at the mean level of 7.39, the probability of observing a successful project was 
31.7 percent. Table 3.4 additionally shows the range of the reward levels of projects, with the 
minimum number of reward levels being 1 and the maximum being 179. Thus, using the 
underlying data for Figure 4-8 as partially shown in Table 3.6, at the minimum level a project 
was predicted to have a 29.6 percent probability of succeeding, conversely at the maximum 
level the project was predicted to have an 80.4 percent probability of succeeding providing 
support for hypothesis 3a.  
4.2.3.2 Number of days for the rewards being delivered 
The second hypothesis related to backers’ incentives considered that backers would 
be less likely to support projects which delivered rewards at a later time period, or that they 
would discount future rewards, compared to closer ones, based on a typical positive discount 
rate assumption, as developed in section 3.3.4.1. Stating this hypothesis, H3b: Increased 
expected delivery times of reward levels will have a negative impact on the probability of 
project success. 
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Figure 4-9 Marginal impact of average wait time 
 
The results on the average waiting time, from Table 4.1 above, provide support for the 
hypothesis, stating that the average wait time of the backer had a negative and significant 
impact on the probability of a project succeeding. The scale of the impact is shown in Figure 
4-9 below, the straight line in the Figure 4-9 shows a consistent decrease in the probability of 
success with increased waiting times, with an increase of 10 days consistently leading to a 
decrease of 0.11 percent chance of observing a successful outcome, to a 95 percent 
confidence level. This can be considered a relatively small decrease in the probability of 
observing success, suggesting a relatively small impact on the level of success by increased 
wait times.  
Furthermore, on average, backers had to wait 130.1 days to receive their rewards, as 
shown in Table 3.4, utilising the underlying data for Figure 4-9 as shown partially in Table 
3.6, at this level the probability of observing a success was 32.0 percent. Thus, a project 
delivering rewards instantaneously would only increase the probability of observing success 
from 32 percent to 33.4 percent. Providing evidence that people are mostly willing to wait for 
their reward, however, there is a still a negative impact on success by increased delivery 
times, thus supporting the proposed hypotheses.   
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4.2.3.3 Global reward levels 
The final hypothesis considering the impact of backers’ incentives examines the 
impact of global rewards on the probability of a project succeeding. With a global reward 
consisting of any reward which could be physically shipped to anywhere in the world. The 
hypothesis stemmed from the concept that backers would prefer local and digital rewards, 
compared to global rewards, as discussed in section 3.3.4.2,stating H3c: A larger number of 
global reward levels will have a negative impact on the probability of the project success.  
Figure 4-10 Marginal impact of global reward levels 
 
H3c is supported by the model as seen in the results from Table 4.1, which show that 
the number of global rewards has a negative and significant impact on the probability of a 
project succeeding. Furthermore, Figure 4-10 provides evidence that this impact is consistent 
as the number of global rewards increases. With a decrease of around 0.03 percent for each 
increase in the number of global rewards.  
Table 3.4 shows that the average campaign had 3.69 global reward levels. Utilising 
the underlying data for Figure 4-10 at this level, the chance of observing a successful 
campaign was 32.4 percent. Having no global rewards would increase this chance to 33.5 
percent, indicating the strength of the positive increase. This increase could be considered 
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relatively small, showing a small impact on success by the number of global rewards, while 
still supporting the proposed hypothesis.   
The support for these three hypotheses demonstrates that changes to the number of 
rewards does impact the probability of a project succeeding in Kickstarter. However, this 
impact may be relatively limited, suggesting that other factors outside of the actual rewards 
may also be relevant to capture success within Kickstarter.  
4.2.4 Social capital hypotheses  
The following section considers the impact that internal and external social capital 
have on the probability of a project to succeed. 
4.2.4.1 External social capital 
The following hypothesis considers how the combination of the backers and creators’ 
external social capital could positively increase the probability of a project succeeding, 
capturing the external social capital from the number of Facebook shares of the 
crowdfunding project, as discussed previously in section 3.3.5.1. Stating H4a: Increased 
levels of combined creator and backer external social capital have a positive impact on the 
probability of the project’s success. 
Figure 4-11 Marginal impact of Facebook shares 
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The results displayed in Table 4.1, show clear support for the hypothesis, with the 
number of Facebook shares being both positive and significant in their impact on the 
probability of a project succeeding. Natural logarithms were utilised as marginal impacts 
were expected to be smaller at larger number of Facebook shares due to the network distance 
between the original sender of the share and the recipient to be larger and thus less likely to 
impact their decision to support the project. Figure 4-11 demonstrates a relatively straight 
line, with a slightly gentler slope at early values and a slightly steeper slope at higher values, 
showing support for the decreasing marginal impact at higher levels of Facebook shares.  
In examining the scale of the impact of Facebook shares on probability for the project 
to succeed, the log of the mean number of Facebook shares was 3.07, as shown in Table 3.4 
below, thus on average each project had 21.7 shares, and utilising the underlying data for 
Figure 4-11 as partially shown in Table 3.6, the probability of observing a success at this 
level was 24.75 percent, compared to having zero Facebook shares, which gave the 
probability of observing a success at 9.42 percent. Furthermore, the highest observed number 
of Facebook shares at 331224 increased the probability of observing a success at 84.14 
percent. These two points show that the number of Facebook shares had a positive impact on 
the likelihood of a project succeeding.   
4.2.4.2 Creators Internal social capital 
This hypothesis considers the impact of increased internal social capital captured via 
the number of previously backed projects by the creator. Arguing that the internal social 
capital of the creator can be captured by examining the amount of previously backed projects 
by the creator, which is used as a proxy for reciprocity, as discussed in section 3.3.5.2. 
Stating H4b: Increased amount of creator internal social capital has a positive impact on the 
probability of the project’s success. 
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Figure 4-12 Marginal impact of Reciprocity 
 
Contrary to our expectations, the results in Table 4.1, do not support H4b: with 
increased Reciprocity having a negative and significant effect on the probability of 
successfully funding a project. This is further seen when examining the impact of increasing 
levels of reciprocity demonstrated in Figure 4-12 above. The negative coefficient could 
suggest that utilising the number of backed projects by the creator is not a good indicator of 
the creator’s internal social capital. Instead, creators backing other projects could be seen as 
wasteful to the potential backers of the creator’s project. Why are they asking for money if 
they are already able to give money to other creators? Thus, leading to the negative 
coefficient observed in the model.  
However, it should also be noted that the negative coefficient of the impact is quite 
small, the average campaign creator had previously backed 3.76 projects, as shown in Table 
3.4. Utilising the underlying data for Figure 4-12 as partially shown in Table 3.6, would have 
the probability of observing a success at 32.2 percent. In comparison projects with zero 
previously backed projects had a probability of observing success of 32.4 percent, only 0.2 
percent less than the average project. Therefore, the scale of the negative impact on the 
average project was very small.   
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Hence, the results regarding the different hypothesis on the impact of social capital on 
the probability of a project’s success are mixed, showing strong support for the impact of 
external social capital, but a negative, if relatively small, impact for the internal social 
capital, these results are discussed in more details in the discussion of the results section. 
The following section considers results for hypotheses which consider the impact of 
increased levels of competition internally and externally to the crowdfunding platform. The 
results utilise both models as some of the competition results can only be examined through 
the restricted model. 
4.2.5 Competition within categories on Kickstarter 
This hypothesis considered the impact of competition within categories on 
Kickstarter; the hypothesis stemmed from the concept that projects within the same category 
were likely to be potential substitutes of each other, making the demand for crowdfunding 
very competitive, and thus increasing the amount of projects running within a category at the 
same time would decrease the probability of projects reaching their funding goal, as 
discussed in section 3.3.6.1. Stating H5a: Increased competition within the category has a 
negative impact on the probability of the project’s success. 
This hypothesis was tested through the examination of two key variables, the amount 
of competition on launch day and a specific category index of competition. The competition 
on launch day was obtained through the main model and considered the number of backers 
which were attracted by other projects on the launch day of the creator’s project. While the 
category index utilised the restricted model and calculated a competition index for a project 
across its entire duration. The results on launch competition, in Table 4.1, support the 
hypothesis reporting a negative and significant impact on the probability of a project 
succeeding. Conversely, the results on the competition index, in Table 4.6 do not support this 
hypothesis. They report a negative and significant impact, as higher values of the index 
indicate lower levels of competition, this result suggests that lower levels of competition 
within the category increase the probability of a project succeeding. This suggests that 
increased competition within the launch period of campaigns on the category does impact 
negatively on the project, however, increased competition outside of the launch period has a 
positive effect on competition. This is further examined by considering the impact of 
different levels of the variables on the probability of observing success. 
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4.2.5.1 Impact of Launch Competition within the category 
Figure 4-13 Marginal impact of the number of projects launching with the same category  
 
In examining the precision of the predictive ability of increased launch competition, 
Figure 4-13 shows that the confidence interval is far smaller at lower level of competing 
firms, or that the model is more efficient at predicting the effect of increased launch 
competition within the category at low number of projects, as the number of projects 
increases the precision decreases. Furthermore, the mean number of backers obtained by 
other projects within the category on launch day was 647.48 as shown in Table 3.4. Utilising 
this mean value in combination with the underlying data from Figure 4-13 as shown partially 
in Table 3.6, at the mean value of launch competition projects have a 32.2 percent chance of 
observing a successful project. In comparison, projects with no competition had a 32.6 
percent chance of observing a successful project. In contrast, the project with the highest 
amount of launch competition, as shown in Table 3.4, that of 42605 backers supporting other 
projects, had a 7.38 percent probability of succeeding, providing additional support for the 
proposed hypothesis.  
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4.2.5.2 Impact of increased category competition across a campaign’s duration expressed as 
an index 
Figure 4-14 Marginal impact of the amount of competition within the category 
 
The mean value of the category index was 326.89, as shown in Table 3.5, showing 
that, on average, there were high levels of competition within each category. Moving to the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Hirshman, 1945), by construction, its minimum was 10,000 
and the lower the value is the more competition, within the category, there is. Therefore, a 
value of 326.89 suggests that there was, on average, high levels of competition occurring 
within Kickstarter categories. Furthermore, the maximum value of 6644.80, as reported in 
Table 3.5, shows that every single project competed with at least one other project within its 
category. Furthermore, utilising the underlying data of Figure 4-14 as shown partially in 
Table 3.6, at the mean index value of 326.89, the likelihood of observing a success is 33.69 
percent. In comparison, a project with the minimum observed level of competition, at an 
index value of 6644.80, only had a 20 percent chance of succeeding. In examining the 
precision of the predictive ability of the model, Figure 4-14 demonstrates that the predictive 
ability becomes less precise on the higher levels of the category index. Thus, the model is 
better at predicting the impact of highly competitive projects, over projects with low levels of 
competition.  
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This result suggests that competition within a Kickstarter category does not have a consistent 
effect across the entirety of the campaigns lifecycle and that competition early on in the 
lifecycle may have the opposite effect than competition throughout its lifecycle. This concept 
is further elaborated in section 5.3.1. 
4.2.6 Competition outside of the category within Kickstarter.  
This hypothesis stems from suggesting that increased levels of competition outside of 
the Kickstarter category will increase the likelihood of a project to succeed. As projects not in 
the same category are less likely to be substitutes of each other, and thus the ability of extra 
projects to draw in more backers will have a positive impact on the likelihood of a project to 
succeed, as discussed in section 3.3.6.1. Stating H5b: Increased competition on the rest of the 
platform has a positive impact on the probability of the project’s success.  
This hypothesis was tested through the examination of two variables, the launch day 
competition generated by projects outside of the examined projects category and the amount 
of competition on the entire platform throughout the duration of the examined project, 
expressed in index form. The impact of competition on launch day from the rest of 
Kickstarter was obtained through the main model. Conversely the impact of increased 
competition through the rest of Kickstarter was captured on the restricted model.  
The launch competition results support the hypothesis reporting a positive and 
significant impact on the probability of a project succeeding as shown Table 4.1. Conversely 
results regarding the competition index do not support this hypothesis, as shown in Table 4.6, 
although they also report a positive and significant impact, as higher values for the 
competition index indicate lower levels of competition, a positive coefficient thus suggests 
decreased levels of competition will increase the likelihood of a project succeeding. 
Suggesting that although H5b is supported at the launch of the project, the effect of increased 
competition within the rest of Kickstarter changes over a project’s full duration. This is 
further examined by considering the impact of different levels of the variables on the 
probability of observing success. 
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4.2.6.1 Impact of launch competition from the rest of Kickstarter  
Figure 4-15 Marginal impact of launch competition 
 
This straight line in Figure 4-15 demonstrated that there is a consistent positive effect 
of the increased amount of competition on launch day outside of the category of the creator. 
However, the precision of the model decreases as the amount of launch competition 
increases, as easily seen through the increase in the confidence intervals at higher levels of 
competition. On average, launch competition was equal to 4904.63, as displayed in Table 3.4. 
This states that on each project launch day, on average, other projects outside of the category 
of the examined project attracted 4904.63 backers to their projects. Utilising the underlying 
data from Figure 4-15, partially shown in Table 3.6, suggests that, at this average level of 
competition, there was a 33.70 percent chance of a project succeeding. In comparison, 
projects with the minimum level of competition of 27, as displayed in Table 3.4, lead to a 
33.28 percent chance of observing a successful project. Conversely, the maximum level of 
competition observed of 50761, lead to a 37.68 percent chance of observing a successful 
project. Demonstrating a small impact on the probability of success based upon the level of 
competition at launch outside of the category of the project.   
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4.2.6.2 Impact of competition index from rest of Kickstarter 
Figure 4-16 Marginal impact of Kickstarter Index 
 
The straight line in Figure 4-16, displayed above, suggests that: as the level of 
competition decreases within the rest of Kickstarter, its impact on success is consistent. 
However, the precision of this impact declines as the index increases, as indicated by the 
widening of the 95 percent confidence intervals at higher levels of the Kick index. Kick index 
is an indexed value measuring competition between projects on Kickstarter within the same 
category. Index values are between 0 and 10000, with higher index values showing lower 
levels of competition. The mean level of the Kick index observed in the model was 671.83, as 
shown in Table 3.5. Utilising the underlying data presented in Figure 4-16 partially shown in 
Table 3.6, at the mean level of 671.83, there was a 33.69 percent chance of observing a 
successful campaign. In comparison, projects with the highest levels of competition, at an 
index value of 40, as shown in Table 3.5, had a 33.01 percent chance of observing a success. 
Conversely, projects with the least level of competition at an index value of 6320.38 had a 
39.63 percent chance of observing a success. Thus, the largest possible decrease in the level 
of competition within Kickstarter outside of the category would only increase the likelihood 
of observing a success by 6.62 percent. 
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Therefore, in alignment with the hypotheses considering the impact of competition 
within the category, competition outside the category alters its effect depending on the 
duration of the campaign, with the initial increased competition having a positive effect on 
success and conversely increased competition across the entirety of its duration having a 
decreased impact on success. These points are further elaborated on and critically considered 
within section 5.3.1.  
Figure 4-17 Marginal impact of average google trend 
 
The straight line in Figure 4-17 above shows that the impact of how well the platform 
is competing, has a consistent and positive effect on the likelihood of a project succeeding. 
However, the model is most precise in the 40 to 60 range, as, at these values, the 95 percent 
confidence intervals are narrower than at more extreme values. The average campaign had a 
trend value of 48.78, as demonstrated in Table 3.4 above. Utilising the underlying data of 
Figure 4-17, as partially shown in Table 3.6, at this average value there is 32.20 percent 
chances of observing a successful project. At the lowest value recorded of 0, this chance 
decreased to 30.85 percent, and at the highest level of 100, it increased to 33.62 percent, 
showing that the impact was small with only a 2.77% difference between the highest and 
lowest values.   
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4.2.7 Geographic competition 
4.2.7.1 Competition at a city level 
The hypotheses focussing on the impact of geography on success in crowdfunding, 
were divided between city and national level. At city level, the key hypothesis considered 
how an increased amount of geographical competition at a city level is expected to decrease 
the probability of a campaign succeeding, arguing that projects within the same city are more 
likely to be substitutes of each other, thus increasing the level of competition, decreases the 
probability of a project reaching their funding goal. Stating H5d: Increased geographical 
competition at a city level will decrease the probability of a project succeeding.  
However, the results displayed in Table 4.6, do not support this hypothesis, as they 
show a negative and significant impact on the probability to succeed based on an increase in 
the city competition index. An increase in this index shows a decreased level of competition 
within Kickstarter for that specific city, therefore leading to the opposite outcome compared 
to the one stated in hypothesis H5d.   
Figure 4-18 Marginal impact of city index 
 
An examination of the scale of the impact, shown in Figure 4-18 above, indicates that 
the impact of decreased competition constantly decreases as city index increases, with the 
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model becoming slightly less precise as the city index value gets closer to 10000. The 
average index value for each project is 3986.17, as shown in Table 3.5. By applying this 
value to the underlying data for Figure 4-18, as partially displayed in Table 3.6, one sees that 
33.71 percent of projects are predicted to be successful. The minimum value observed at 0 
would lead to a 35.09 percent chances to succeed to, while the maximum value of 10000 
reported at 31.6 percent chance to succeed, showing that the largest possible shift of 10000 
would only decrease the probability of observing a success by 3.39 percent, indicating a 
relatively small impact of decreased competition on the probability of success.  
This result suggests that the benefits of being close to other projects geographically 
outweighs the negatives of competing over similar resources. This point is further considered 
within discussion in section 5.3.  
4.2.7.2 Competition at a country level 
The final hypothesis developed within for Kickstarter conceptual framework, 
considers the geographical impact at a country level, stating that increased competition within 
a country would lead to an increased likelihood of a project success: stating H5e: Increased 
geographical competition at a country level will increase the probability of a project 
succeeding. 
However, the empirical evidence did not support this hypothesis, as the estimates for the 
relevant logit coefficient was not statically significant at the usual levels, as shown in Table 
4.6. This suggests that an examination of the geographical impact should not be considered at 
a country by country level, while still probably relevant when done at a finer state or city 
levels.  
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4.3 Kiva model Results 
This section considers the models introduced to study the key features and role of the 
crowdfunding platform Kiva. The different models are ordered based upon the number of 
variables considered, with later models having additional variables, but also reduced 
observations based upon the restrictions concerning specific variables discussed in section 
3.3.13. These models do not include dummy variables for specific categories or region. 
Models with dummy variables were originally attempted; however, these variables were 
found to be mostly insignificant or displaying high levels of multicollinearity. Instead a 
different category was modelled via the inclusion of competition indexes, based on such 
categories. Thus, enabling category effects to be captured. The effects of the specific country 
were instead captured through the variables: country funds and number of active loans.  
4.3.1 Kiva 1: Signals model 
The first model, below, only considers signals sent by the creators and by the platform 
Kiva itself, it was introduced, in section 3.4.8.1 as the following: 
Yi= Amount of money raised for project i 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖 
This results of the estimation for this model are reported here below: 
Table 4.10 Kiva signals only model 
 Amount raised  Coef.  St.Err.  t-
value 
 p-value [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
 Sig 
Generosity 0.017 0.076 0.22 0.826 -0.132 0.165  
Temporal 
Experience 
0.424 0.067 6.33 0.000 0.292 0.555 *** 
Capacity 
Experience 
-0.248 0.018 -13.61 0.000 -0.284 -0.213 *** 
Rating 0.219 0.082 2.66 0.008 0.057 0.380 *** 
Constant 6.484 0.317 20.48 0.000 5.863 7.105 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 6.000 SD dependent var  0.755 
R-squared  0.118 Number of obs   953.000 
F-test   53.379 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 2056.969 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2081.267 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 4.10 shows that all the variables, excluding generosity, are individually significant to a 
99 percent confidence level. Furthermore, the variables are jointly significant to above 99.99 
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percent confidence level as reported by the F test having a p value of 0. However, an 
examination of the omitted variable test, as reported in Table 4.11 below, shows that omitted 
variable bias poses a problem within this model specification.  
Table 4.11 Reset test for Model 1 
 
4.3.2 Kiva 2: Signals and social capital 
The second model used to study the determinants of amount raised by the Kiva 
platform, expands upon the first by including the measures of social capital and was defined 
as follows: 
Yi= Amount of money raised for project i 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 
The estimates for this second model specification, are reported in Table 4.12, here below: 
Table 4.12 Kiva signal and social capital regression model 
 Amount raised  Coef.  St.Err.  t-
value 
 p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
Generosity 0.036 0.063 0.57 0.570 -0.088 0.159  
Temporal Experience 0.313 0.055 5.72 0.000 0.206 0.420 *** 
Capacity Experience -0.194 0.020 -9.52 0.000 -0.234 -0.154 *** 
Country Funds -0.028 0.025 -1.14 0.257 -0.077 0.021  
Rating 0.119 0.071 1.68 0.093 -0.020 0.257 * 
Eigen Centrality 0.098 0.013 7.23 0.000 0.071 0.124 *** 
Betweenness centrality 0.020 0.005 4.43 0.000 0.011 0.029 *** 
Closeness centrality 0.546 0.084 6.48 0.000 0.381 0.712 *** 
Constant 7.834 0.406 19.30 0.000 7.037 8.631 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 6.059 SD dependent var  0.722 
R-squared  0.352 Number of obs   897.000 
F-test   68.210 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 1588.593 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 1631.785 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
This second model, as shown in Table 4.12, is jointly significant to above a 99.99 percent 
significance level however, three of the variables are now not statistically significant at a 95 
                  Prob > F =      0.0001
                 F(3, 945) =      7.33
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Amount_raised
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percent confidence level and the model still suffers from omitted variable bias as 
demonstrated in Table 4.13 below.  
Table 4.13 Reset test for Kiva signal and social capital regression model 
 
4.3.3 Kiva 3: Complete OLS model 
The third model derived from the Kiva conceptual framework, also considers 
measures of the level of competition measures thus defined as:   
Yi= Amount of money raised for project i 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜀𝑖 
The estimates for this third model specification, are reported in Table 4.14, here below 
Table 4.14 Kiva complete OLS model 
Amount raised  Coef.  St.Err.  t-
value 
 p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
Generosity -0.072 0.064 -1.13 0.259 -0.197 0.053  
Temporal Experience 0.240 0.050 4.78 0.000 0.142 0.339 *** 
Capacity Experience -0.104 0.032 -3.29 0.001 -0.166 -0.042 *** 
Country Funds 0.055 0.027 2.06 0.039 0.003 0.107 ** 
Active Loans -0.152 0.017 -9.03 0.000 -0.185 -0.119 *** 
Rating 0.160 0.066 2.43 0.015 0.031 0.290 ** 
Eigen Centrality 0.095 0.013 7.48 0.000 0.070 0.119 *** 
Betweenness centrality 0.020 0.004 4.56 0.000 0.011 0.028 *** 
Closeness centrality 0.477 0.078 6.11 0.000 0.324 0.630 *** 
Launch competition -0.046 0.020 -2.34 0.020 -0.085 -0.007 ** 
Sector index 0.056 0.024 2.32 0.021 0.009 0.103 ** 
Partner index 0.072 0.036 1.97 0.049 0.000 0.143 ** 
Constant 5.804 0.590 9.83 0.000 4.646 6.963 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 6.059 SD dependent var  0.722 
R-squared  0.440 Number of obs   897.000 
F-test   76.843 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 1465.840 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 1528.228 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
                  Prob > F =      0.0062
                 F(3, 885) =      4.15
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Amount_raised
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Table 4.15 omitted variable test for complete OLS model 
  
The results from Table 4.14 show that the majority of variables are significant with 
only the generosity one not having a significant impact on the amount of money raised. The 
variables are also jointly significant to above a 99.99 percent confidence level with the F-test 
reporting a p-value of 0. Utilisation of the BIC and AIC values in comparison with the second 
model is possible due to them having exactly the same number of observations, a necessity 
when comparing models using these tests. In both measures the complete model has lower 
values than the second model, suggesting the complete model is a better fit for the data 
(Liddle 2007). Furthermore, examination of the Omitted variable bias, reported in Table 4.15, 
showing that the RESET test output, indicates that the null hypothesis of no omitted 
variables, cannot be rejected. Additionally, the VIF test shows that multicollinearity was 
below the boundary level of 5 utilised to indicate problematic level of multicollinearity 
(James et al, 2013).  
Table 4.16 VIF test for Kiva OLS model 
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Capacity Experience 4.992 .2 
 Partner index 3.305 .303 
 Country Funds 2.939 .34 
 Temporal Experience 2.013 .497 
 Rating 1.915 .522 
 Eigen Centrality 1.837 .544 
 Active Loans 1.791 .558 
 Betweenness centrality 1.72 .581 
 Generosity 1.246 .803 
 Closeness centrality 1.151 .869 
 Launch competition 1.14 .878 
 Sector index 1.058 .945 
                  Prob > F =      0.1200
                 F(3, 881) =      1.95
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Amount_raised
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 Mean VIF 2.092 . 
 
Finally, the regression residuals appear to be normally distributed based upon the spread of 
the residuals as displayed in Figure 4-19 below: 
Figure 4-19 Residuals of complete OLS model 
 
4.3.4 Kiva Truncated Regression 
The fourth model developed in the Kiva conceptual framework, considered the necessity of 
restricting the dependant values to being positive and truncated at zero. Thus, the model was 
defined as: 
Yi= Amount of money raised for project i 
With the restriction 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 > 1 and 𝐿𝑜𝑔 Ӯ𝑖 > 1 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜀𝑖 
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 The estimates ‘results of this truncated model, are reported here below, in Table 4.17:  
Table 4.17 Kiva Truncated regression results at boundary 0 
 Amount raised  Coef.  St.Err.  t-
value 
 p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
 Generosity -0.072 0.063 -1.14 0.255 -0.196 0.052  
 Temporal Experience 0.240 0.050 4.81 0.000 0.143 0.338 *** 
 Capacity Experience -0.104 0.031 -3.31 0.001 -0.165 -0.042 *** 
 Country Funds 0.055 0.026 2.08 0.038 0.003 0.106 ** 
 Active Loans -0.152 0.017 -9.10 0.000 -0.185 -0.119 *** 
 Rating 0.160 0.065 2.45 0.014 0.032 0.288 ** 
 Eigen Centrality 0.095 0.013 7.54 0.000 0.070 0.119 *** 
 Betweenness centrality 0.020 0.004 4.59 0.000 0.011 0.028 *** 
 Closeness centrality 0.477 0.078 6.15 0.000 0.325 0.629 *** 
 Launch comp -0.046 0.020 -2.35 0.019 -0.085 -0.008 ** 
 sector index 0.056 0.024 2.34 0.019 0.009 0.102 ** 
 partner index 0.072 0.036 1.98 0.047 0.001 0.142 ** 
 Constant 5.804 0.586 9.90 0.000 4.655 6.953 *** 
 Sigma 0.540 0.014 37.91 0.000 0.512 0.568 *** 
Mean dependent var 6.059 SD dependent var   0.722 
Number of obs   897.000 Chi-square   934.628 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 1467.840 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This model’ estimates, in Table 4.17, yet again indicate that the majority of variables are 
statistically significant, with only the level of Generosity failing to have a significant effect 
on the amount of money raised. The Chi squared test also shows that the variables are jointly 
significant. However, it is worth noting that the AIC value for this model is slightly higher 
than the complete OLS model. The multicollinearity is identical to the complete OLS model 
as shown in Table 4.18 below: 
Table 4.18 Vif results for Truncated model  
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Capacity Experience 4.992 .2 
 Partner index 3.305 .303 
 Country Funds 2.939 .34 
 Temporal Experience 2.013 .497 
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 Rating 1.915 .522 
 Eigen Centrality 1.837 .544 
 Active Loans 1.791 .558 
 Betweenness centrality 1.72 .581 
 Generosity 1.246 .803 
 Closeness centrality 1.151 .869 
 Launch competition 1.14 .878 
 Sector index 1.058 .945 
 Mean VIF 2.092 . 
 
While the model still appears to be normally distributed as shown in the Figure 4-20 below. 
Figure 4-20 Residuals of truncated model 
 
Thus, even though the model has a slightly higher AIC value, as this model overcomes a 
possible misspecification error and still passes the Gauss Markov assumptions, this will be 
utilised in the examination of the Kiva hypotheses.  
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4.3.5 Kiva model summaries 
Table 4.19 Kiva results by model summary 
 
Signals only Social capital and signals Kiva main Tobit Model 
Generosity 0.0167 0.0356 -0.0718 -0.0718 
(0.22) (0.57) (-1.13) (-1.14) 
Temporal 
Experience 
0.424*** 0.313*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 
(6.33) (5.72) (4.78) (4.81) 
Capacity 
Experience 
-0.248*** -0.194*** -0.104** -0.104*** 
(-13.61) (-9.52) (-3.29) (-3.31) 
Rating 0.219** 0.119 0.160* 0.160* 
(2.66) (1.68) (2.43) (2.45) 
Country Funds 
 
-0.0283 0.0548* 0.0548* 
  
(-1.14) (2.06) (2.08) 
Eigen 
Centrality 
 
0.0975*** 0.0946*** 0.0946***  
(7.23) (7.48) (7.54) 
Betweenness 
centrality 
 
0.0201*** 0.0196*** 0.0196*** 
 
(4.43) (4.56) (4.59)  
Closeness 
centrality 
 
0.546*** 0.477*** 0.477*** 
 
(6.48) (6.11) (6.15) 
 
Active loans 
  
-0.152*** -0.152*** 
   
(-9.03) (-9.09) 
Launch 
competition 
  
-0.0465* -0.0465* 
   
(2.34) (-2.35) 
 
Sector index 
  
0.0557* 0.0557* 
   
(2.32) (2.34)  
Partner index 
  
0.0715* 0.0715* 
   
(1.97) (1.98) 
Constant 6.484*** 7.834*** 5.804*** 5.804*** 
 
(-20.48) (-19.3) (9.83) (9.90) 
Observations 953 897 897 897 
R-squared 0.1180 0.3523 0.4401 0.2654 
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F Statistic 53.38 68.21 76.84 77.90 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
4.4 Kiva results by hypothesis 
The following section considers whether the collected empirical evidence supports the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 within the Kiva conceptual models, aimed at better 
understanding the functioning of the Kiva platform. These results were grouped into separate 
subsections based upon the different components outlined within the Kiva conceptual 
framework (Figure 3-10)  
4.4.1 Signalling hypotheses 
The first set of hypotheses considered the impact that signalling increased levels of 
experience by the partnership organisation had on the amount of funds raised by the 
individual projects. Arguing that signalling higher levels of experience would increase the 
amount of funds raised by the projects the hypothesis states: A1: Creators signalling 
increased experience has a positive impact on the amount of money raised in Kiva.  
This hypothesis was tested by using two diferent variables: capacity experience, 
capturing the number of backers that had previously supported the partnership organisation, 
and temporal experience, calculated as the amount of time which the partnership organisation 
has been present on the Kiva platform. However, the results do not consistently support this 
hypothesis as shown in Table 4.17. 
The temporal experience variable shows a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the amount of money raised, supporting the key signalling hypothesis, A1. On the other 
hand, the capacity experience of the intermediary organization displays a negative and 
significant impact on the amount raised by a project on Kiva.  
Due to the dependent and independent variables both containing log values, a 1 
percent increase in the independent variable has a βi% impact on the dependent one. Thus, a 1 
percent shift in temporal experience increases the amount of money raised by 0.24 percent 
while a 1 percent raise in capacity experience decreases the amount of money raised by 0.1 
percent, indicating that we should further explore the reasons for the different effects of these 
two variables. These results are discussed relative to the findings in section 5.1.2.2.      
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4.4.1.1 Generosity 
The second signal examined was the one for generosity. This was measured by 
considering the interest rate charged by the partnership organisation to the project participant, 
arguing that a lower interest rate might capture some elements of a higher level of generosity, 
leading to hypothesis A2: Signalling increased level of generosity has a positive impact on 
the amount of funds raised. 
The empirical results, however, did not support this hypothesis, as shown in Table 4.17, 
indicating that the level of generosity, has no statistically significant impact on the amount of 
money raised by a project advertised on the Kiva platform. This suggests that: either the 
interest rate is not a good proxy for generosity, or that signalling generosity is not really 
effective at overcoming the presence of credit rationing due to the pervasiveness of 
asymmetric information, a possibility further discussed within findings section 5.1.2.3.    
4.4.1.2 Rating of the creator by the platform 
Next, we focus, as discussed in the Kiva conceptual framework, on the impact of the 
signals sent by Kiva. From a platform point of view, the reason for signalling are clearly 
different from those driving the signalling of users of the platform. The specific signal 
specifically analysed, as discussed in section 3.4.2.3, is the rating Kiva provides about each 
partnership organisation, reflecting the level of trust/confidence Kiva has in the partnership 
organisation. This role is related to stated hypotheses: A3: The platform signalling an 
increased rating for the partnership organization, exerts a positive impact on the amount of 
funds raised, by the final project. 
The results from Table 4.17 support hypothesis A3, showing that the rating given by Kiva to 
a project had a positive coefficient and was significant at 5%. Thus, a Kiva’s rating increase 
of 1 percent would increase the amount of money raised for a project by 0.16 percent, 
indicating that a two-sided crowdfunding platform, itself, can act as a relevant signalling 
agent within the crowdfunding process.  
The results from these sections regarding signalling in crowdfunding are discussed alongside 
and in comparison, to the signalling results from Kickstarter in section 5.1.1.  
4.4.2 Social capital 
4.4.2.1 Creators Internal social capital 
The hypothesis focusing on the role of internal social capital in affecting the amount 
of funds raised by final projects, is grounded on the idea that an increased amount of creators’ 
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internal social capital should be positively associated with an higher levels of funding raised 
by projects advertised on Kiva. This idea was captured by constructing a latent network based 
upon the shared backer connections among different projects and focussing on eigenvector 
centrality as a proxy for capturing social capital of the project. This hypothesis is discussed in 
detail in section 3.4.3.1 and states B1: Higher levels of internal social capital within Kiva 
have a positive impact on the amount of funds raised.  
The results from Table 4.17 show that hypothesis B1 is supported by the emprirical evidence, 
analysed through the model as eigenvector centrality having a positive and significant impact 
on the amount of money raised by projects on Kiva: with a 1 percent increase in eigenvector 
centrality leading to a 0.0946 percent increase in the amount of money raised. 
The other two centrality measure of betweenness centrality and closeness centrality, also 
showed a positive and significant impact on the amount of money raised by projects on Kiva. 
Closeness centrality has the stronger impact as, increasing closeness centrality by 1 percent 
increases amount of money raised by 0.477 percent, while betweenness centrality has the 
small impact since a 1 percent. Suggesting that a node’s independence (captured by closeness 
centrality) and control of information (captured by betweenness centrality) within the latent 
network does positively impact the amount of money raised within Kiva.   
4.4.2.2 Past internal social capital generated by other creators 
This hypothesis stemmed from the concept that social capital generated by an 
organisation or group could be utilised by new members of this group, regardless of whether 
they were involved in the original generation of the social capital. And thus, in relation to 
Kiva, social capital generated for a specific region could bring benefits for future projects 
within that region. This possibility was assessed by estimating the impact of the amount of 
money previously lent within the country where the Kiva project is occurring on this project’s 
raised amount. This mechanism, discussed in section 3.4.3.2, lead to stating hypothesis B2: 
Higher levels of social capital generated by previous creators within a geographic region 
have a positive impact on the amount of funds raised for a creator in that area. 
The results outlined in Table 4.17. provide clear support for hypothesis B2, with the amount 
of previously lent funds in the same country of the Kiva project having a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the amount of money raised for the project. Specifically, an 
increase in the country funds of 1 percent has a 0.0548 percent increase on the amount of 
money raised. Thus, the hypothesis was supported by the empirically evidence, 
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demonstrating that social capital generated for past projects within a specific geographic 
region supports future projects within the region. This has implications for the findings with 
regard to social capital generation and retention within specific subsection of crowdfunding 
platforms and later discussed in detail in section 5.2.3.  
4.4.3 Competition hypothesis 
This hypothesis was grounded in the idea that increased levels of competition within 
the platform would decrease the amount of funds received by individual projects. The amount 
of internal competition within the platform was measured through four separate proxies, as 
discussed in 3.4.4, that of the number of active loans in the country, the number of other 
projects launched on the same day, a HHI (Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) competition index 
based on the sector of the project and a secondary HHI competition index based on other 
projects launched by the same partnership organisation within the examined dataset. All four 
metrics were utilised in the testing of hypothesis C1, stating that: Increased amount of 
internal competition within the platform has a negative impact on the amount of money 
raised.  
The result from the estimations obtained with the main Kiva model, displayed in Table 4.17, 
all support the proposed hypothesis C1. With the number of actives loans and launch 
competition having negative and significant impact on the amount of money raised. 
Conversely, both the HHI index values show a positive and significant impact on the amount 
of money raised. As the index values increase with decreased levels of competition, these 
positive coefficients indicate that lower levels of competition increase the amount of money 
raised. Thus, all four of these measures support the proposed hypothesis.  
The number of actives loans has the largest impact with a 1 percent increase in the 
number of active loans decreasing the amount of money raised by 0.15 percent. The smallest 
impact was caused by the amount of launch competition whereby a 1 percent increase in the 
launch competition index led to a 1 percent decrease in the amount of money raised. The 
partner index had a larger affect than the sector index, with a 1 percent increase in partner 
index leading to a 0.0715 percent increase in the amount of money raised, while an increase 
of 1 percent in the sector increase only lead to a percentage increase of 0.0557. This result 
and the rest of the results are discussed in detail across the section 5.3.1 of the findings.  
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5 Findings: Discussion of results, recommendations and limitations 
This section is composed of six subsections, the first four consider the key findings 
and recommendations which emerged from the empirical work of the thesis. These four 
sections are divided based upon the underlying theories the findings are associated with. The 
final two sections contain recommendations derived from the empirical findings, the first 
focuses on recommendations relevant for the crowdfunding ecosystems, composed by 
creators, backers and crowdfunding platforms. The second and last section, instead, outlines 
recommendations for future research based upon the limitations of the study. These sections 
are outlined in more detail below: 
1) Signalling: Finding and Recommendations: displays the key findings and 
recommendations relating to signals sent out by the three participant groups within 
crowdfunding: creators, backers and the platform itself. Providing support for the argument 
that each party involved can act as a signalling agent within the framework of crowdfunding 
and that effectively sending signals is a key driver of success within crowdfunding.   
2) Social Capital: Findings and Recommendations: displays the key findings and 
recommendations derived from addressing the role of social capital across both the 
Kickstarter and Kiva models. It divides the findings into an examination of internal and 
external social capital and considers how both aspects of social capital impact success within 
crowdfunding.  
3) Competition: Finding and Recommendations: considers how the empirical evidence 
gathered and analysed in the thesis and supported by the existing literature, supports the 
argument that increased competition does not necessarily always have a negative impact on 
success, while, instead, increased competition can have either a negative or positive impact 
depending upon the strength of the positive and negative network externality effects due to 
additional projects being added to the platform. 
4) Backer Incentives: Finding and Recommendations: the findings and recommendations 
within this section all relate to how altering the backer’s incentives affects the likelihood of 
success within a crowdfunding platform. This section is derived from the results of the 
Kickstarter model.  
5) Recommendations to the participants of crowdfunding: outlines the key 
recommendations derived from the rest of the findings section for the three key parties 
involved in Kickstarter: the creators the backers and the platform itself.  
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6) Recommendations for future research: Outlines a set of possible extensions for the 
research based upon the limitations outlined in the rest of the findings section. 
5.1 Signalling: Finding and Recommendations 
5.1.1 Creator signals. 
This section considers the findings and recommendations emerged from the evidence 
obtained on the hypotheses which were developed according to the key insights derived from 
the review of signalling theory. 
5.1.1.1 Enforced and voluntary signals 
The results provide support for the act of distinguishing between enforced and 
voluntary signals while examining success in crowdfunding platforms. Every single 
voluntary signal, across both models, sent by either the creators, backers or platform itself, 
was found to have a positive and significant impact on the success of projects. Conversely, 
enforced signals, which were chosen by the platform, were shown to have mixed results: with 
both positive, negative and insignificant impacts on success within crowdfunding. 
The evidence provided suggest that while enforced signals may exert a negative 
impact on project success, the crowdfunding platform might still have the incentives to send 
these signals. Indeed, the platform uses these signals to distinguish between the low-quality 
and high-quality projects for the backers to be able to overcome the pervasive asymmetric 
information characterising crowdfunding platforms (Agrawal et al, 2014; Courtney et al, 
2017). Failure to do so could result in the collapse of multi-sided platforms as seen with the 
collapse of Atari in 1983, which according to Boudreau and Hagiu (2009) was driven by 
unlicensed creators releasing low-quality games onto the console, systematically eroding the 
trust generated for the platform. Furthermore, Boudreau and Hagiu (2009) examined how in 
multi-sided platforms, the platforms themselves act as self-regulators in order to stop the 
market failure which led to the collapse of Atari.  
Additionally, the results suggest that enforced signals have different effects as, 
following the incentives of the platform to sustain the long-term survival of the platform 
rather than of the projects, they are designed to identify and signal the presence of low-
quality campaigns, not to blindly ensure projects success. This can be considered an 
interesting finding from our empirical evidence: these authors observed the presence as a 
trade-off for the crowdfunding platform, the lower the amount of scrutiny provided via 
enforced signals, the higher the likelihood of a project succeeding in the short-term, however 
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lower levels of scrutiny also risk the continued stability and existence of the platform in the 
long-term. As the platforms are reasonably assumed to behave like self intererested entities, 
they need to face the key question of what is the optimal level of creators’ quality scrutiny 
which can be applied to maximise their own long-term viability. A unique factor for 
crowdfunding which can be incorporated within this calculation is the delivery rate of 
projects, as a direct way of quantifying the reliability of the platform (Mollick, 2015). 
However, the delivery rate of projects might underestimate the total number of low-quality 
projects in the platforms as, although projects may successfully deliver their rewards, this 
does not imply that they will be of sufficient quality. Nevertheless, the issue of the optimal 
level of scrutiny which should be provided by the crowdfunding platform is relevant and 
provides a key area for future research, especially considering the emergence of new types of 
co-operative platforms, which radically transform the incentives structure by transferring 
ownership from a private organisation to the users of the platform themselves (Scholz, 2016; 
Hautamäki and Oksanen, 2018), dramatically transforming the incentives structure and thus 
the optimum level of scrutiny of the platform. In further exploring this question of the 
optimum level of scrutiny, one can utilise the differences between Google Play and the Apple 
App store (Hein et al, 2016). Whereby Google Play offers high levels of accessibility with 
almost no limits to app creation, the Apple App store has much higher requirements imposed 
upon for the apps sold in the store. This difference in platform policies results in Google 
Play’s rapid development of apps with comparatively limited usability, while Apple App 
store has comparatively slower development but increased app quality and overall customer 
satisfaction (Hein et al, 2016; Fautrero and Gueguen, 2013; Pon et al, 2014). For these 
reasons these authors suggest that the more enforced signals are sent by the crowdfunding 
platform, the more restrictions, the platform will be placing upon its project creators. Hence, 
platforms sending more enforced signals seem to be adopting strategies comparable to those 
of the Apple app store, restricting project numbers to ensure project quality. On the other 
hand, platforms with fewer enforced signals can be seen to be aligning their signalling 
strategies to the Google Play Store model of having limited restrictions to increase projects 
number, while accepting the price of reduced reliability. Yet this still does not answer what 
the optimal level of scrutiny for a crowdfunding platform is, leaving the question open for 
further research.    
In contrast to enforced signals, the voluntary signals are controlled by the creators and 
backers of the crowdfunding campaigns. The creators’ incentives are clear as they obviously 
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wish the project to succeed. The backers’ signals are also clear, since signals can only be sent 
by backers who have already provided support to a project. This restriction was active across 
both platforms which were examined in this thesis; and can be seen as a filter to ensure that 
only signals concerning the project are raised. The restriction can be seen as a method for the 
platform to overcome the endless flow of internet spam as the restriction is similar to the 
actions undertaken by social networks to address the same issues (Boykin and 
Roychowdhury, 2005). Therefore, backers who are signalling have already backed a project 
and thus they are incentivised to signal their support for the project, in order to receive their 
own rewards for supporting the project. This is especially true on an all-or-nothing platform, 
assuming the backer is not willing to support the entirety of the project, then additional users 
are necessary for the original backer to receive their rewards. Even without the all or nothing 
condition, backers are still likely to wish to encourage further backing, under the assumption 
that a project with more funds is more likely to successfully deliver. Thus, the positive effects 
of the voluntary signals on success can be attributed to how the backers and creators are 
effective at persuading other potential backers to support the project through utilising 
voluntary signals.  
These findings on enforced and voluntary signals have clear implications for creators, 
backers and the platforms themselves. Firstly, the creators should consider the impact of the 
enforced signals when choosing their crowdfunding platform, especially creators with lower 
quality campaigns which may be unable to succeed in platforms with higher levels of 
scrutiny. Backers should utilise the enforced and voluntary signals when determining both 
what crowdfunding platforms they utilise and which projects they choose to support, as the 
greater the number of enforced signals the more information available to the backers, 
enabling them to make more informed decisions. Finally, the crowdfunding platform 
themselves have to carefully consider the number of signals utilised, too few could 
undermine the platforms reliability, too many and creators may be unwilling to use the 
platform.  
5.1.1.2 Creators Signals and human capital 
Throughout section 3.3.2, on methodology, the connection was drawn between 
crowdfunding creators and entrepreneurs, building upon how some creators are entrepreneurs 
(Bruton et al, 2015) and expanding upon this to consider how general principles of 
entrepreneurship can be applied to crowdfunding creators. Enabling the utilisation of the 
entrepreneurship literature in examining the specific role of human capital. For example, in 
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the development of the hypotheses surrounding the Kickstarter model five different elements 
of human capital were considered, namely: overconfidence (Astebro et al, 2014) experience 
(Gompers et al ,2010), trustworthiness (Rauch and Frese, 2007; Abdullah, 2013), patience 
(Kirby, 2004; Doepke and Zilbotti, 2014) and ambition (Davies and Giovannetti, 2019). The 
key argument discussed in the methodology chapter, was that these different dimensions of 
human capital could be studied, within crowdfunding, through the examination of the signals 
sent out by the creators, with signals, as representations of the different types of human 
capital. This approach enabled the formulation of the hypotheses about the impact of 
enforced signals by considering if the specific element of human capital captured by the 
signal was expected to have a positive or negative impact on projects’ success. A key aspect 
of the analysis of signals was on considering that, for a signal to be effective in overcoming 
asymmetric information, it needs to be observable, manipulatable and costlier for low-quality 
projects, in line with the original contributions from signalling theory outlined in Ross (1977) 
and Spence (1978). Thus, for the signals to have an impact on the success within the 
crowdfunding they must have fulfilled these three criteria.   
These core arguments were supported by the results of the models, in which all of the 
enforced signalling hypotheses were supported, apart from the two hypotheses focussing on 
experience and generosity. These were, shown to have not fulfilled the three criteria for being 
effective signals. The result of Experience and Generosity are discussed in more detail in 
section 5.1.2.3.  
If the enforced signals are being intepreted as aspects of human capital by the backers 
of crowdfunding projects, then this has clear implication for both the design of crowdfunding 
platforms and of projects themeselves. Platform should aim to design the possibilities for 
projects to send these signals, to clearly communicate aspects of human capital, while 
ensuring that the signals are effective. Creators must consider the set of enforced signals 
made possible by the crowdfunding platform design and whether these will enable them to 
effectively support their projects. The following section considers the key findings and 
recommendations derived from specific hypotheses, in comparison to the previously outlined 
general signalling findings and recommendations.  
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5.1.2 Key findings and recommendations from specific creators’ signals. 
5.1.2.1 Confidence and altering expectations 
The evidence presented in section 4.2.1.1, shows that creators can be overconfident in 
assessing their ability to raise funds on Kickstarter. With the relative level of confidence 
having a negative impact on the likelihood of a project to reach its funding goal. This 
observations lead to the recommendation that creators should consider setting a lower relative 
funding goal.  
However, this recommendation needs specific action to be taken by the crowdfunding 
platform. At the moment, within Kickstarter, it is very difficult to see the average amount of 
money raised by each project, if creators are not provided with this information, they will 
likely overestimate their abilities, in part due to the existence of blockbuster projects (Liu et 
al, 2015), which create an unrealistic expectation for the outcome of the crowdfunding 
projects. Secondly, the focus should be shifted to setting realistic funding goals by 
demonstrating how creators can use new funding rewards and objectives to enable them to 
expand past their original funding goal.   
5.1.2.2 Experience and its relation to social capital 
The results on the impact of experience were not consistent across both models; in 
fact, while experience within Kickstarter had a positive and significant impact on the 
probablity of a project success, in Kiva’s case2, increased levels of capacity experience 
showed a negative and significant impact on the amount of money raised, while increased 
levels of temporal experience had a positive and significant impact. 
These, apparently contradictory results, can be attributed to the fact that although 
experience is a desired trait and thus a should be a positive signal, experience also indicates 
that creators have utilised their internal and external social capital in support of past projects. 
The utilisation of social capital can divide the focus of social capital. Coleman (1988) key 
work on social capital in the creation of human capital, considered how social capital can be 
divided. By suggesting a single child would be better off than siblings as the siblings would 
split the social capital. In the same way, serial creators could be seen as having to split their 
social capital across multiple crowdfunding projects. However, the weakness with this 
 
2 Where experience was expressed in two forms, temporal and capacity experience, with temporal 
experience being a record of how long a creator (partnership organisation) had participated in Kiva 
and capacity experience recorded how many loans they had previously created.  
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argument is that the crowdfunding projects do not need social capital at the same time as long 
as they are not active at the same time. Thus the division of capital does not seem to fit this 
case accurately.  
Instead, it could be argued that there is some form of social capital destruction, as 
social capital can be reduced by one side deciding that they no longer wish to communicate 
with the other side (Semih, 2011). This could occur in reward-based crowdfunding when a 
project fails to deliver its rewards, people within the social network which supported the 
project may feel wronged and thus destroy that connection. In the same way that connections 
are destroyed upon the revelation of negative marketing activities which utilises social 
capital, such as Ponzi schemes (Almassi 2018). Thus past experience in the platform may 
have decreased the social capital of the creator and negatively impacted the project success.  
Furthermore, even experience in projects which deliver their rewards on time may 
still deplete social capital. To be more specific, past projects may deplete the ability of that 
specific social capital to be used to raise funds at this specific point of time. Utilising the 
concept that marginal utility of income decreases as income increases (Layard et al, 2008), if 
asked for money twice, an individual will effectively have a lower income and thus have 
higher utility cost of giving money, hence this second request will yield fewer returns to a 
project. 
To address this loss of social capital through depletion, the creator could take multiple 
steps. Butticè et al (2017) suggested a substitution tactic, arguing that you could replace one 
form of social capital with another, specifically arguing that social capital could be replaced 
through backing other projects within the platform. Conversely, the results from the 
Kickstarter model do not support backing other projects as a method of generating social 
capital within a platform as an increased number of previously backed projects had a negative 
impact on the likelihood of a project to succeed. Instead, the author proposes that creators 
should increase the time between their projects as a way of allowing social capital to 
replenish its ability to be utilised to obtain funds. However, this needs to be further examined 
as an expansion to the current work, as it is not considered within the models and thus will 
not be utilised as a recommendation. 
5.1.2.3 Generosity and impatience as insignificant signals 
Generosity and impatience, came out as not statistically significant signals. With 
regards to impatience, this was possibly caused by the fact that Kickstarter only allows a 
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maximum of sixty days for campaigns, thus high-quality creators are not able to distinguish 
themselves from low quality creators utilising this signal, as there is only limited extra cost 
for low quality campaigns in running a sixty days compared to a ten days campaign. In 
regards to Generosity, this signal did not enable discriminating between high and low-quality 
projects, as within Kiva the signalling agents were the partnership organisations, and low-
quality partnership organisations may not carry out due diligence in the selection of the loan 
recipients, lowering costs and thus enabling them to display higher levels of generosity to 
their recipients. A second point to consider with Generosity is that it may not have been 
observable to all potential backers, this is due to the information being hidden behind a drop 
box within the project page, that you need to click in order to see this information. Some 
backers may not click this box and thus the signal is unobservable to these backers. This 
raises an interesting question about observability, that observability may not be absolute and 
that it may differ between users, creating possibility of partial observability which may 
impact the effectiveness of signals.  
These two points further support the argument that signals cease to be effective if they 
are not costlier, observable and manipulatable, aligning the results with the original theory 
proposed by Ross (1977) and Spence (1978). These results enable to derive a key 
recommendation to platforms, that in order for enforced signals to be effective they must be 
manipulatable, observable (fully) and costlier for low quality projects, as otherwise they will 
have no impact on the success of the project.   
5.1.2.4 Platforms ability to send out signals 
One of the key results from the Kiva model was the positive impact of the platform 
providing a higher Rating for projects. As a higher rating signal sent out by the platform, 
increases the amount of money raised by a project. Thus, the platform itself acts as a 
signalling agent, both to the creators and to the backers, and this two-sided signalling role of 
the platform will impact the success of projects.  
This result provides further evidence in the support for the concept that platforms may 
also act as self- regulators, as the results suggest that backers consider information provided 
by the platform, about a project, as a reliable way of judging the quality of the project. This 
signalling activity can be seen as a form of soft self-regulation whereby the platforms instead 
of restricting access to the usage of the platform, on the projects side, prefer to signal their 
own knowledge to direct and focus support on specific better-quality projects. These soft self-
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regulation signalling activities can be observed across multiple crowdfunding platforms as for 
example, within Crowdcube a valuation of the company seeking to raise funds is provided 
(Crowdcube, 2019) and in Kickstarter, a set of projects are recommended each day 
(Kickstarter, 2019c). One the limitations of the collected Kickstarter dataset is that it does not 
record which projects where supported by the platform, as this information was not recorded 
on the project page of the Kickstarter platforms.  
From this result a key recommendation to platforms can be derived, emphasizing the 
relevant role that a platform can play in signalling support to higher quality projects. 
5.1.3 Backers signals: Key findings  
The results from the Kickstarter model showed that backers’ signals are vital in the 
success of the crowdfunding projects. These signals were captured in two ways, firstly by 
examining the number of comments sent by backers and, secondly, by utilising the concept of 
the early funding period, outlined initially in (Colombo et al, 2015) and further developed in 
(Skirnevskiy et al, 2017), to examine the early campaign behaviour of backers, with backing 
a project early being seen as a signal of support for the project.  
The empirical evidence on the impact of comments clearly showed that backers who 
vocally supported the campaign rather than simply silently backing it, increase the likelihood 
of the project succeeding. One reason why this occurs is due to how, within Kickstarter, only 
backers who have already supported the campaign may leave comments. Thus, the comments 
are likely to support the project as backers are incentivised to encourage further backing to 
ensure they receive their rewards as if the funding goal is not reached, no rewards are 
delivered. This, therefore, provides a clear recommendation to both the platform and backers 
that the platform should enable comments on the project from backers who have supported 
the project and that backers should leave comments on projects which they have supported.   
Three different measure of backers’ signals were utilised to capture the effects of 
support in the early funding period of a project: the amount of funds backed, the number of 
people backing and the average pledge which each backer made. Both the number of early 
backers and average pledge amount had a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of 
a project succeeding. Conversely, the early funding had a negative impact, but the variable 
was not statistically significant. In interpreting this result, it could thus be considered that the 
number of backers could be an effective signal of the initial support for the project from the 
crowds, and that a higher intensity of this signal denotes an increased general interest by the 
213   
 
crowd. On the other hand, the average amount pledged could be seen to signal how strong 
this support is by each backer. And it is this element of crowd interest and strength of support 
which is key to encouraging further support through these signals. In addressing the reasons 
underlying the results that the amount of early funds did not have a significant impact, it 
could be considered that this may not be an efficient signal, due to how low-quality 
campaigns may be able to artificially increase this value with ease. Indeed, it would be very 
easy for a low-quality campaign to artificially increase the amount of early funding, simply 
by backing the project themselves. They could then remove that backing later on if the 
project exceeds their funding goal and thus the amount of early funding would not be an 
efficient signal. This would impact early average pledges as well, however as logarithmic 
values were utilised in examining the impact of early average pledges, this would decrease 
the impact that these false signals would have. As in the case of these false signals, one 
person or a few people could add large amounts of backing, this would thus lead to a very 
high average pledge, which would be greatly reduced when logarithms were utilised. This 
finding has clear recommendations for creators of the crowdfunding campaigns that they 
should be aiming to either increase the number of early backers or increase the amount 
pledged, since simply adding to the early funds through artificial self-funding will not 
increase the likelihood of the project succeeding.  
5.1.4 Signalling and existing crowdfunding literature 
The findings discussed above provide fresh evidence in support of the existing 
literature on the positive impact of signalling sent by both creators and backers in overcoming 
asymmetric information within crowdfunding platforms, as outlined in (Ahlers et al, 2015; 
Kromidha and Robson ,2016; Kunz et al, 2017; Chakraborty and Swinney, 2017; Courtney et 
al, 2017; Vismara, 2018). Furthermore, this work expands upon these papers through the 
introduction of, and the distinction between, the concepts of enforced and voluntary signals. 
With enforced signals referring to when the crowdfunding platform demands specific signals 
to be sent by backers or creators. Conversely, voluntary signals occur when the backers and 
creators are free to decide whether to, or not to, send the signal. The findings indicate that 
voluntary signals always have a positive impact on success, while enforced signals’ effects 
are less certain, as they may increase or decrease the likelihood of a project succeeding 
depending on the specific context. The work developed in this dissertation, also contributes in 
an additional second way to the crowdfunding signalling literature: by clarifying the 
relationship between enforced signals and human capital and demonstrating that specific 
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signals sent by the creators can be seen as a representation of specific elements of human 
capital for said creators, as considered by Davies and Giovannetti (2018). Moreover, the 
impact of a signal on a project success can thus be determined through examination of that 
specific element of human capital the signal represents. Furthermore, the results derived from 
the empirical evidence confirmed that these signals, in crowdfunding platforms, would only 
be effective if they were observable, manipulatable and costlier for low-quality projects, in 
line with the signalling theory results, as originally outlined in Ross (1977) and Spence 
(1978).  
The findings on signals sent by backers provided additional evidence on the relevance 
of the early funding period, as discussed by Colombo (2015) and on utilising the average 
pledge per backer as a measure of success, as introduced in Kromidha et al (2016). This was 
shown by the number of backers, and the average amount pledged in the early funding period 
having a positive impact upon the likelihood of Kickstarter projects succeeding.  
5.2 Social capital: Findings and recommendations 
This section considers the findings and recommendations derived from results 
associated with the social capital of either the backers or creators.  
5.2.1 Utilising Facebook shares as a measure of external social capital  
One of the key challenges in considering external social capital is in selecting the 
appropriate metrics. In chapter 3, on methodology, it was proposed to utilise the number of 
Facebook shares of the specific crowdfunding project as a measurement of the external social 
capital of the project, instead of using the number of Facebook friends which had produced 
inconsistent results in past crowdfunding research (Beier and Wagner, 2015; Colombo et al, 
2015; Mollick 2014; Moisseyev, 2013). The results from the Kickstarter model supported the 
usage of the number of Facebook shares, having a positive and highly significant impact on 
the likelihood of a project successfully reaching its funding goal. This result supports earlier 
work by Kromidha and Robson (2016) who also utilised the number of Facebook shares as a 
measure of social capital, however their result was only weakly significant, in comparison to 
the highly significant result observed within this study. The difference in the significance of 
the measure could be attributed to the fact that Kromidha and Robson’s (2016) study only 
examined successful projects, compared to this thesis’s analysis that also includes failed ones. 
However, one flaw with using Facebook shares as a metric for external social capital 
is that these were captured only at the end of the project lifecycle and thus could be 
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problematic when used for predicting projects outcomes. Upon saying this, Facebook shares, 
can be adapted by focusing on the early funding period only, by examining the number of 
Facebook shares obtained within the first 1/6th of the duration of the crowdfunding project, 
therefore overcoming the predictive limitation of this metric. 
 Furthermore, the fact that the number of Facebook shares can be captured within the 
early funding period highlights how this measure may fluctuate across the duration of the 
campaign. This fluctuation enables the impact of external social capital to be examined 
across the entire duration of the campaign rather than just at one single point in time. In 
comparison, the number of Facebook friends would have far more limited variation across the 
project duration. Therefore, utilising the number of Facebook shares would enable further 
research to consider the direct impact of increased external social capital on different phases 
of the campaign. 
 As previously discussed, the early funding period is considered vital to the success of 
the campaigns (Solomon et al, 2015; Kuppuswamy et Bayus, 2018), and it could be 
considered whether this aligns with an increased focus of external social capital activation at 
the beginning of campaigns. Alternatively, perhaps external social capital activation only 
increases after a successful early funding period. These points show how the choice of 
adopting Facebook shares as a metric for external social capital leads to the identification of 
further research topics, specifically due to its data flexibility, allowing it to be examined 
across the entire temporal profile of a crowdfunding campaign.  
5.2.2 Reciprocity and internal social capital generation   
One of the mechanisms suggested for capturing a metrics of a creator’s internal social 
capital generation was the use of reciprocity. However, the empirical evidence did not 
support this possibility showing, on the contrary, a negative and significant impact on success 
within Kickstarter being associated with an increased level of backing of other projects by 
creators on Kickstarter. In understanding this result, the author considered that backing other 
projects imposes a financial cost to the creators. This cost could thus be viewed negatively by 
the backers of the campaign as to why should creators be asking for funds while also 
providing funds to other projects. The author assumed in the development of the hypothesis 
that the negative impact would overcome the indirect reciprocity effects created by backing 
other projects.  
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Furthermore, the author considers how direct reciprocity may be difficult to facilitate 
in Kickstarter, due to the amount of information which is provided to backers of the 
crowdfunding campaigns. Backers on Kickstarter are not aware of the online identity of other 
backers on Kickstarter, only the creators can see a full list of backers’ information 
(Kickstarter, 2019d). For a backer to identify that the creator has backed the same project, the 
backer must first visit the project page of the creator and then open up the previously backed 
projects tab, scroll through this tab and identify projects which they have jointly supported. 
Therefore, this information is not going to be accessed by most people; the average user visits 
2.76 pages on Kickstarter (Alexa, 2018). Thus the complex process necessary to identify 
linkages to the creator of a campaign will not be undertaken. Therefore, backing other 
projects can only encourage direct reciprocity from the creators. However each creator is 
backed by on average 112.7 backers, rounding up to 113 for ease of usage, according to the 
collected Kickstarter dataset. 
So, for a creator to support another project out of a desire to repay this original 
support, they must notice that one of their 113 backers have become a creator. There is no 
notification system that their backer has become a creator, so the creator must stumble upon 
the new project and identify that they have supported them in the past in order for them to 
facilitate direct reciprocity. For this reason, even if creators and backers wish to support 
projects based on reciprocity, the structure of Kickstarter does not provide this functionality. 
What is intriguing about this result, is that it is in complete contrast to the previous results 
surrounding reciprocity in crowdfunding as presented in Zvilchovsky et al (2015), whereby 
reciprocity both in direct and indirect forms was seen to have a positive impact on the amount 
of money raised within Kickstarter. This could suggest as the dataset of this thesis was 
captured in 2016-2017 and Zvilchovsky dataset was captured between 2009 and 2013, that 
there has been an underlying change in backers behaviour within Kickstarter over time in 
regard to reciprocity. This could have occurred due to the increase in the number of projects 
seeking funding on Kickstarter, within Zvilchovsky’s dataset 78,061 projects were identified 
in a 4 four-year process, averaging 19515 projects per year, in comparison in the single year 
of data collected for this thesis, 58,143 projects were observed to have occurred. Thus, this 
increase could have affected the ability for reciprocity to take place within the platform, by 
increasing the complexity for backers to identify projects where reciprocity occur. However, 
as there are differences between the studies in the examined variables, this can only be seen 
as a suggestion, leading to the recommendation of future research into consider whether there 
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has been a shift in the attitudes towards reciprocity behaviour among backers within the 
Kickstarter platform.   
In comparison, the other platform analysed in this dissertation, Kiva, provides this, 
critically relevant, functionality of enabling backers to clearly indicate their support for 
current and past projects. In this case, backers are now able to view the support of other 
backers on the project page of the ongoing Kiva projects. Additionally, backers have their 
own dedicated page, within Kiva, which lists every project they have supported and any team 
they belong to. The team feature encourages backers to work together by creating a group 
focused around specific nationalities or causes, providing a common focal theme around 
which backers interconnect (Kiva, 2019d).   
While the Kiva system provides backers with the possibility to remain anonymous, 
this possibility is optional and, importantly from a behavioural perspective, not the default 
one. Since Kiva’s platform structure enables backers to observe the support of projects and 
shared causes from other backers, it enables the possibility of signalling reciprocity and, even 
more interestingly, coordination in backing decisions. This functional differences between the 
two analysed platforms: Kiva and Kickstarter, demonstrates how the organizational and 
governance structure of the platform can influence the ability of backers and creators to 
engage in signalling reciprocity and ultimately, the possibility and ability of creators in 
generating internal social capital, for the benefit of the projects.  
5.2.3 Utilising social capital generated by past creators within the platform 
The Kiva model considered whether the social capital generated by past creators 
within the same country would have a significant impact on the success of an ongoing 
crowdfunding project. This potential impact due to the hypothesis that social capital 
generated within the platform for the specific country would remain within the platform, even 
after that specific project had ended, and to be thereafter still useful in reducing asymmetric 
information and hence supporting the success of future projects within the same country. The 
empirical evidence discussed in the results supported this hypothesis, as the amount of 
previously raised funds within the country of the crowdfunding project had a positive and 
significant impact on the amount of money raised in Kiva projects. This shows that internal 
social capital generated by one specific creator can be utilised by other creators within the 
same subset of the platform, once the correct platform design is adopted. 
This finding helps in explaining why blockbuster projects (highly successful projects) 
can be so impactful on the success of crowdfunding projects within the same category (Liu et 
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al, 2015) since the social capital of the blockbuster project can be utilised by other projects 
within the same category, showing how positive externalities are being generated within an 
approrpiately designed platform.  
Furthermore, through this study social capital has primarily been considered to be 
created and utilised by either the backers or creators, the results highlight how social capital 
can be captured and stored on the platform itself. Thus, indicating that the platform itself 
should be considered as a third party in the generation and storage of social capital. 
Moreover, the design of crowdfunding platforms plays a critical role in facilitating, or 
blocking, the possibility for social capital externalities to take place: for example, it is clear 
that a platform and its governance should be designed to facilitate the generation and storage 
of social capital given its potential positive impact as signalling device. However, one of the 
limitations of this study is that it does not address what process would enable optimal 
generation and storage of social capital. Leading to the suggestion that a future research topic 
should address a new question asking: does the inclusion of subcategories in Kickstarter 
enable greater social capital transfer compared to an unsorted system? This is but one of 
many possible extensions to this research which may enable greater understanding of the role 
played by social capital generation within the platform itself.  
5.2.4 Identifying internal social capital via latent connections of crowdfunding participants 
The internal social capital of creators within Kiva was captured through an 
examination of the network formed through a set of latent connections. A latent connection, 
between two projects, was assumed to be provided by backers who jointly supported these 
projects, therefore creating a latent link between these projects. With this information it was 
possible to generate and analyse an entire network of the projects, their latent links and the 
emerging topological network properties.  
In order to capture the amount of social capital for every project/node of this network 
this work advocated to use, as a working metric, the project’s eigenvector centrality. As 
discussed in section 3.4.3.1 this metric captures the relevance of the project’s location within 
the network formed by the set of projects linked by common backers. 
 The empirical evidence, discussed in section 4.4.2, showed that increased internal 
social capital, as captured via eigenvector centrality, had a positive and significant impact on 
the amount of money raised by projects within Kiva. This result rests on how internal social 
capital can be captured within crowdfunding platforms and in other online platforms, 
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expressed in the assumption that underlying relationships between participants can be utilised 
to define an otherwise undefined latent network which can be examined through network 
analysis tools to capture the centrality of projects within the network as a proxy for their 
internal social capital.  
Within this work, the specific relationship examined was in the connections formed 
by joint backers. However, the same idea can be applied to different relationships within a 
network. For example, in examining reciprocity, a network could be created based upon 
which projects were previously backed by creators of the crowdfunding projects. Creating a 
directional network where nodes (projects) would be connected based upon whether the 
creator or other backers had backed their project. Alternatively, the geographic relationships 
between backers and creators could be converted into network form, by connecting 
geographic locations based upon backers supporting projects in the other location. These 
different configurations of networks demonstrate clear routes for future research topics. This 
also highlights one of the main contributions of this research in highlighting how to utilise 
existing connections within a network to define and create a latent network enabling the 
impact of internal social capital to be captured through the usage of network analysis tools.        
5.3 Competition: Finding and recommendations 
The following section considers the key findings and recommendations relevant for the 
external and internal competition dimensions of the projects within a crowdfunding platform. 
5.3.1 Competition within the platform  
The results from the Kickstarter model provide evidence that the effects of 
competition among projects within a given category exert opposite effects from the 
competition from project belonging to a different category. For example, in regard to the 
amount of competition at the launch of a project on Kickstarter, the evidence, presented in 
Table 4.1 suggests that increased launch competition within a projects category had a 
negative impact on success, on the other hand, the presence of increased launch competition 
outside of the category had a positive impact on a project’s success. The implications of these 
findings are that within a given category, the positive cross-platform externality created by 
the increased number of backers brought in by additional projects is weaker than the same-
side negative network externalities due to the presence of additional creators, competing for 
attention and for resources, at the launch of the project. However, when focussing on the 
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entire duration of the project, the positive cross-platform externalities appear to be stronger 
than the negative same-side ones.  
From this result, one could infer that the optimum degree of competition within a 
category for a project to succeed is reached when facing a low number of other projects 
launching on the same day as the project, while having as many projects competing within 
the category over the entire duration of the project. Therefore, this result would suggest that 
creators who wish to run an optimal campaign should launch on a very active month, but on 
the least popular day within that month.  
However, the opposite effect is exerted by the presence of increased competition 
outside a specific project category, but within the same platform. With an increased number 
of Kickstarter projects on launch day having a positive impact on the success, while increased 
competition, again outside a project category but within the same platform, after the launch 
day exerting a negative impact on the probability of success of a project. Therefore, the 
positive cross-platform externalities created between the increased numbers of backers 
brought in by additional projects, outside of a project’s category, are stronger than the 
negative externalities created by these additional projects at the launch of a project. However, 
across the entire duration of the project, the positive cross-platform externalities are weaker 
than the negative externalities created by additional competition between projects belonging 
to different categories. 
From these results, the recommended behaviour for a project’s creator would be to 
launch on a day when the category is not active, but the rest of Kickstarter is, and, in a month, 
where the category is active, but the rest of Kickstarter is not. By comparing the relative 
strength of the launch competition variables, it can be stated that the overall launch 
competition will have a greater impact than launch competition within the category. Launch 
competition outside the category has a higher coefficient and a higher mean value (as 
reported in Table 3.4). Showing that across all of Kickstarter increased levels of competition 
on the launch day will have a positive impact on the likelihood of a project succeeding.  
Additionally, by comparing the coefficients of the competition index values and the 
Kickstarter index values (as shown in Table 4.6) within and outside of the category shows 
that the competition effects within the category are more impactful on the likelihood to 
succeed than the competition effects outside of the category. Therefore, for the entirety of 
Kickstarter increased competition both on the launch day and within the category has a 
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positive impact on success. The following diagram can be suggested as the recommended 
choice system regarding the effects of competition based on the amount of information which 
is available to the creator: 
Figure 5-1 Optimal launch day based upon creator information 
 
The Implications of the analysis of these competition effects within platforms, show 
that internal divisions set up within a platform can create submarkets in which the effects of 
competition are fundamentally different compared to those affecting the rest of the platform. 
This has implications for the design of platforms and demonstrates that providing clear 
categories which act as sub-platforms can enable competition to have positive impacts where 
in general it would have a negative impact.  
However, the empirical evidence and results obtained from the Kiva model 
demonstrates an opposite effect of increased competition, with increased competition having 
a negative impact across all of Kiva platform. In considering why there is such a qualitative 
difference in the results derived between the two platforms, the author suggests this is due to 
the relation between increased number of projects and external social capital on Kiva. In this 
platform, external social networks are not linked directly on the project page and projects are 
not created by new users but instead by the existing partnership organisation. Thus, additional 
projects don’t utilise external social capital and thus don’t draw in as many additional users, 
thus not leading to the otherwise negative impact of competition. There is low impact of 
external social capital due to how the majority of new projects are not created by new 
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creators. And it is the new creators who are vital in drawing additional backers to the 
platform through the utilisation of external social capital.     
5.3.2 Geographic competition 
The effects of increased competition were also considered from a geographic 
perspective, considering if the amount of competition within a specific geographical region 
would improve the chances of success for projects within the crowdfunding platforms. This 
possibility was examined both in Kiva and Kickstarter, through three different variables. The 
degree of competition within category in Kickstarter was measured through the HHI 
(Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) based on the project’s city or country. Concerning Kiva, the 
level of localised geographical competition on the platform, was measured through the 
amount of active loans occurring within the country, while the project was actively seeking 
funds.  
The results from Kickstarter which considered the impact of increased competition in 
cities, rejected the proposed hypotheses that increased competition in cities would negatively 
impact the likelihood of projects succeeding, while providing support for the argument that 
higher level of competition within a city would instead increase the likelihood of projects 
succeeding. This evidence suggests the presence of some type of positive externalities arising 
from companies within the same category being based in close proximity, which overcome 
the negative externalities of increased competition within the region from those additional 
companies. These positive externalities could be tied to some form of urban agglomeration 
whereby the creators are benefitting from being physically near to each other, enabling them 
to share resources and learn from each other and thus gain competitive advantages (Duranton 
and Puga, 2004; Porter,1996). This result could be utilised in explaining why clustering has 
been observed within Kickstarter (Mollick, 2014). This argument is further supported by 
Gallemore et al (2019) who establish that within the crowdfunding platform Indiegogo, 
project based in cities were able to raise likely to succeed than projects based in rural 
locations.  
In comparison, the results on the impact of increased competition within countries 
provided contrasting evidence across the two platforms, with no significant impact in 
Kickstarter while, for Kiva, increased levels of competition within the country resulted in a 
negative impact on the amount of funds raised by the projects. An understanding of these 
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results requires a focus on the differences between the design and governance of Kiva and 
Kickstarter. 
In Kiva, the search function enables division of projects based on the country of the 
projects, while Kickstarter does not allow projects to be searched by country, although the 
country of the project is displayed on the project page. One could argue that, as the potential 
backers in Kickstarter are not able to search projects by the country that they are based in, 
this will reduce the ability of backers to choose to support projects based on the country in 
which they are, thus leading to the insignificant impact of competition among projects in the 
same countries, as observed in the Kickstarter model. This highlights how the design of the 
crowdfunding platform may enable competition to occur based on what factors can be used to 
distinguish between the campaigns.  
5.3.3 Competition between the creator’s projects  
The results on the impact of the Kiva partner index, indicate that creators’ projects 
compete with each other if they are active at the same time. This provides a key distinction 
between Kickstarter and Kiva, whereby within Kickstarter, across the entire dataset collected, 
creators never had more than one project active at the same time. Creators may have 
previously created projects on Kickstarter, but they never ran two projects at the same time. 
Conversely, Kiva creators created multiple projects which were active at the same time and 
due to this, their success was negatively impacted by this synchronicity. This leads to the 
development of a clear recommendation to platforms: to encourage their creators to stagger 
their projects as otherwise they will compete with each other and negatively impact the 
success of the project. 
5.3.4 How the competition findings relate to the existing literature 
Within the relevant literature, the key papers which focus on competition amongst 
crowdfunding platforms are Janku and Kucerova (2018) and Wessel et al (2017). This thesis 
builds upon the original concept of separating competition into different measures, as 
outlined in Janku and Kucerova (2018), by further refining the measures to consider only 
projects that are active at the same time and introducing geographic market definitions. This 
was done by enabling both category and geography within the models rather than including 
them as dummy variables, which might lead to varying results of success due to the vast 
range of possible geographic or category variables, as discussed in Kromidha and Robson 
(2016). As a consequence, our findings showed that category competition had an opposite 
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effect to general competition and that competition at a city level had a significant impact on 
success. Furthermore, our results support those by Wessel et al (2017) in showing how the 
HHI index can be utilised, for the number of backers, to generate competition metrics, within 
each platform, category and day. 
5.4 Backers incentives: Findings and recommendations  
This section considers the key findings and limitations surrounding the reward 
hypotheses examined through the Kickstarter model. The empirical evidence from the 
Kickstarter model provides clear indications about the relevance of backers’ incentives in 
affecting the likelihood of a project succeeding, with all the relevant variables supporting the 
proposed hypotheses; H3a, H3b and, H3c.  
5.4.1 Increasing the number of reward levels 
H3a stated that; an increased number of reward levels within a campaign would have 
a positive impact on the probability of the project succeeding. This hypothesis is supported 
by the positive and significant impact that an increasing the number of reward levels had on 
the likelihood of a crowdfunding project succeeding. This result showed that the creator of 
crowdfunding campaigns should provide a wide selection of different reward levels to 
maximise the likelihood of the crowdfunding project succeeding, supporting previous results 
on the topic (An et al, 2014; Xu et al, 2014; Bretschneider and Leimeister, 2017). This result 
suggests that, by introducing additional reward levels, a project’s creator can more accurately 
match the different utility levels of individual backers, enabling them to maximise their utility 
through the possibility of better modulating the different level of demand for rewards. 
Highlighting that in reward-based crowdfunding, a single product (the campaign objective 
itself) can be set to have multiple different support levels, with each different level being 
linked to a different combination of rewards in goods or services.     
This result provides a direct and clear recommendation to project creators to increase 
the number of reward levels. However, this result also highlights one of the limitations of the 
model: that it does not address the issue of whether there is a specific point at which adding 
additional reward levels will have zero or negative impact on the likelihood of the project 
succeeding. This possibility seems likely as people are only going to physically be able to 
view so many reward levels. Xu et al (2014) addresses how additional reward levels being 
added throughout the campaign have a positive impact on the success of a campaign, 
however it does not address if there is a point at which new reward levels will have zero or 
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negative impact on success. Furthermore, reward levels are examined across the entirety of 
Kickstarter. However, as demonstrated by other results, specific subcategories can have 
different finding on what leads to success within the platform, suggesting that the impact of 
rewards levels should also be examined category by category.  
5.4.2 Decreasing wait times for rewards 
H3b stated: Increased expected delivery times of reward levels will have a negative 
impact on the probability of project success. The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis 
as increased waiting time for rewards has a negative and significant impact on the likelihood 
of the project succeeding, hence, supporting the results of Joenssen et al (2014) into the 
examination of technology projects on Kickstarter and expanding this to all categories in 
Kickstarter. 
This provides a clear recommendation to creators to offer rewards which can be 
delivered quickly. Furthermore, as this variable utilises the average waiting time across all 
rewards weighted by the number of backers which chose this reward, this also suggests that 
the impact of longer delays can be balanced out by offering rewards which are delivered 
quickly as long as these quick rewards are popular with backers. However, this also 
highlights a further limitation of the study: that there is no consideration of whether the 
amount of money required for backing the reward impacts on how long the backer is willing 
to wait for the reward. For example, do lower monetary requirements increase, decrease or 
have no effect on the length of time a backer is willing to wait for the reward? Finally, are 
these effects consistent across subcategories and reward types or are there different effects 
based on categories or reward types?   
5.4.3 Providing local or digital rewards 
H3C stated: Increased number of global reward levels will have a negative impact on 
the probability of the project success. The analysed empirical evidence supports this 
hypothesis, with an increased number of global rewards having a negative and significant 
impact on the likelihood of a project succeeding. The rewards were self-classified by the 
project creator, rewards which were not marked as global, where either local or digital in 
nature. With local rewards referring to rewards which are delivered within the same country 
or region and digital goods referring to rewards which are digital in nature and thus are 
delivered through the internet. Therefore, providing a clear recommendation that creators 
should offer rewards which are digital or local in nature. This result also highlights one of the 
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limitations of this model, namely that the discussion of the impact on success due to the type 
of rewards is limited to considering whether the reward is local or global.  
The creators in Kickstarter do not separate the rewards into specific categories, 
requiring rewards to be classified by the researcher. Which would require either a restriction 
in the examined dataset as it would be implausible to manually classify over 500,000 rewards 
or the utilisation of machine learning in classifying the rewards. These problems prompt a 
recommendation for further expansion of research into considering the relation between types 
of rewards and project success within Kickstarter, either on a more restricted dataset or 
utilising machine learning in categorising the reward text (Sebastiani, 2002). Furthermore, 
such an extension could consider if separate categories are affected differently by the types of 
rewards offered.  
5.5 Recommendations to the three parties involved within Crowdfunding. 
The following sections outline a set of recommendations derived across the earlier 
sections of the thesis. The recommendations are split into specific recommendations for each 
party involved in crowdfunding, those of creators, backers and the crowdfunding platform 
itself. Each recommendation includes the rational for the recommendation and the empirical 
or theoretical evidence used as the basis of the recommendation.  
5.5.1 Recommendations to creators (encouraging crowdfunding success) 
 
Creator recommendation 1) When carrying out reward-based crowdfunding, set 
realistic funding goals, which take into account the surrounding funding goals of other 
projects within the category: 
Rationale: The results from the Kickstarter model provide clear evidence that creators are 
overconfident in their projects and set funding goals which are too high that acting as signals 
to the backers, negatively impact the likelihood of a project succeeding. Thus, creators should 
set more realistic funding goals, to offset these effects. 
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.1.1 leading to support of H1a.  
Linked theoretical areas: Signalling theory  
Creator recommendation 2) Consider the set of signals which are requested by the 
crowdfunding platform: 
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Rationale: Each platform decides a set of enforced signals, as demonstrated throughout the 
empirical results, these signals can negatively affect success within the crowdfunding 
platforms, thus creators should consider what signals they are being forced to send and how 
these will affect their likelihoods to effectively raise money on the platform.  
Empirical evidence: Results in sections 4.2.1 and 4.4.1 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
Creator recommendation 3) Actively engage in communication with backers via updates on 
the crowdfunding platform while the campaign is ongoing: 
Rationale: Increased number of updates is shown to have a positive impact on the likelihood 
of a project succeeding within Kickstarter, signalling the trustworthiness of the creators. 
Thus, creators should update their projects continuously across their campaigns.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.1.3 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory  
Creator recommendation 4) Utilise external social capital in support of your crowdfunding 
project: 
Rationale: Evidence from our study on Kickstarter supports the argument that external social 
capital can be utilised to positively impact success within crowdfunding platforms. Thus, 
creators should utilise their external social capital in support of their crowdfunding 
campaigns.   
Linked empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.4.1 
Linked theoretical area: Social capital  
Creator recommendation 5) Demonstrate your experience on a platform by linking past and 
current projects 
Rationale: Evidence from the Kickstarter results shows that creators who signal increased 
levels of experience are more likely to succeed. While it is obviously difficult and 
unadvisable to artificially increase crowdfunding experience, it is relevant that current 
projects should be launched on the same account-page as past projects to reflect the real level 
of past experience.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.1.2 
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Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
Creator recommendation 6) Provide a large number of reward levels in reward-based 
crowdfunding: 
Rationale: Evidence from the Kickstarter model supports the argument that having an 
increased number of reward levels increases the likelihood of a project to succeed. Thus, 
creators should offer a wide range of rewards. This effect can be tied to how increased reward 
levels may enable a crowdfunding campaign to appeal to more people by tailoring specific 
rewards to specific groups of consumers.   
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.3.1 
Linked theoretical area: Backers motivation within crowdfunding, see section 2.4.1.5 
Creator recommendation 7) Minimise the expected delivery time of rewards, in reward-
based crowdfunding: 
Rationale: Evidence from the Kickstarter model supports the argument that a lower expected 
waiting time increases the likelihood of a project to succeed. 
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.3.2 
Linked theoretical area: Backers motivation within crowdfunding, see section 2.4.1.5 
Creator recommendation 8) When possible, set rewards which are local or digital in nature: 
Rationale: Evidence from the Kickstarter model suggests that rewards which are local or 
digital in nature are more likely to succeed than rewards which are global. With global 
rewards referring to rewards which are physical in nature and can be shipped to anywhere in 
the globe.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.3.2 
Linked theoretical area: Backers motivation within crowdfunding, see section 2.4.1.5 
Creator recommendation 9) In reward-based crowdfunding, launch on a day where the 
category you launch on is not busy. 
Rationale: Increased level of launch competition within the same category was shown to have 
a negative impact on the likelihood of a campaign succeeding in Kickstarter. Thus, creators 
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should launch projects when there are few other projects being launched within their 
category.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.5.1 
Linked theoretical area: Competition within platforms, see section 2.4.1.4 
5.5.2 Recommendations for backers (in supporting and choosing between projects) 
 
Recommendations for backers 1) Utilise the signals sent out by creators to compare 
crowdfunding projects: 
Rationale: The empirical results across both Kiva and Kickstarter provide support for the 
argument that success in crowdfunding is affected by the signals which are sent by the 
creators. Thus, backers can utilise this information to distinguish between crowdfunding 
campaigns.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.1 and 4.4.1 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
Recommendations for backers 2) Supporting a project early on, greatly increases the 
likelihood of a project succeeding.  
Rationale: The findings on the impact of early backing, show that projects which are 
supported earlier on are more likely to succeed. Therefore, if backers want a project to 
succeed, they should support the project as early as possible, as this acts as a signal of support 
to the project and can thus encourage other backers to support it.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
Recommendations for backers 3) Utilise backers’ external social capital in support of 
projects they wish to succeed: 
Rationale: Alongside backing projects, backers can also utilise their own external social 
capital to support projects.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.4.1 
Linked theoretical areas: Social capital theory 
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Recommendations for backers 4) Actively comment on projects to encourage other backers 
to support said project: 
Rationale: Backers can also increase the likelihood of a project succeeding by commenting 
on projects. Whereby the act of commenting can be viewed as a positive signal to potential 
backers.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.2.1 
Related theory: Signalling theory 
5.5.3 Recommendations for the crowdfunding platform  
Recommendation for platforms 1) Enforce a key set of signals to be sent by the creators 
and backers:  
Rationale: As a platform, one of the key factors which has to be considered is how much 
information is requested and presented on the project page, from both the backers and 
creators. Increasing the amount of information required may enable backers to better identify 
projects, but it also may reduce creators desire to use the platforms. This research does not 
identify a clear level of information which should be requested, but rather simply suggests 
that it should be considered as a trade-off between creator quality and creator quantity.  
Empirical evidence: Results in sections 4.2.1 and 4.4.1 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
Recommendation for platforms 2) Design signals which are observable, manipulatable and 
costlier for low-quality projects 
Rationale: For signals to be effective they must be observable, manipulatable and costlier for 
low-quality projects. Manipulatable refers to the ability of the sender to be able to adapt the 
intensity of the signal, observable refers to the ability for the public to view the signal. 
Finally, there must also be an increased cost to low quality projects compared to high quality 
projects as otherwise low-quality projects can simply send signals as if they were high quality 
projects. The results observed from both platforms support this argument, as signals which 
did not achieve these three criteria had no statistically significant impact on projects’ success.  
Empirical evidence: Results in sections 4.2.1 and 4.4.1 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
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Recommendation for platforms 3) Provide clear information on the amount of money 
raised by projects at a category level. 
Rationale: The results demonstrated that backers tend to be overconfident in their ability to 
raise funds. One way of combating this may be to provide information on the average amount 
raised within a category, as this would enable backers to more accurately predict their 
funding ability, rather than comparing themselves to blockbuster projects.  
Empirical evidence: Results in section 4.2.1.1 
Recommendation for platforms 4) Encourage projects within the same category to launch 
on different days   
Rationale: The empirical results from Kickstarter and Kiva both showed that the amount of 
launch competition had a negative impact on the likelihood of projects to succeed. Thus, this 
suggests that projects should be encouraged to launch on separate days. Perhaps this could be 
achieved by creating a pre-launch indicator showing when other projects are launching and 
thus enabling creators to better plan their launch. Or creating a system where a set number of 
projects can launch on each day, thus reducing the launch competition  
Empirical evidence: Results in sections 4.2.5.1,4.4.3 
Linked theoretical area: Competition within platforms, see section 2.4.1.4 
Recommendation for platforms 5) As a platform, you should signal support for specific 
projects that you consider high quality.  
Rationale: Within the Kiva crowdfunding projects, the platform gave every partnership 
organisation a star rating from one to five stars. The result showed that this rating had a 
significant impact on the amount of money raised within Kiva. Supporting the argument that 
the platform itself can signal support for projects and thus increase the likelihood of the 
project succeeding. 
Empirical evidence: Results from section 4.4.1.2 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
5) Enable creators to link their project pages on external social media 
Rationale: The Kickstarter model results showed how the number of Facebook shares a 
crowdfunding page had, exerted a positive impact on the likelihood of a project to succeed. 
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One contributing factor for this result was the ability of the creator to link their Facebook 
profiles to the crowdfunding campaigns. Thus, this author proposes that other platforms 
should also enable creators to link to their Facebook pages. 
Empirical evidence: Results from section 4.2.4.1 
Linked theoretical area: Social capital theory 
7) Encourage creators to stagger projects, in order to decrease competition between 
their own projects. 
Evidence from Kiva demonstrated how projects which were produced by the same creator 
could be competing with each other. Negatively decreasing the level of success of the 
projects. Thus, suggesting that serial creators should be encouraged to stagger projects to stop 
them competing with each other. 
Empirical evidence: Results from section 4.4.3 
Linked theoretical area: Competition within platforms, see section 2.4.1.4 
8) Enable backers to comment on projects, however, with the restriction that only those 
who have backed the project can comment. 
Rationale: Kickstarter results support the argument that backers’ comments have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of a project to succeed, as they can be seen to show support for the 
project. The comments should be restricted to those who have already backed the project to 
reduce internet spam. It is worth noting that many crowdfunding platforms have comments, 
however some platforms such as Kiva do not.  
Empirical evidence: Results from section 4.2.2.1 
Linked theoretical area: Signalling theory 
5.6 Recommendations for future research topics  
This section considers how the limitations within the research can be overcome by 
considering future expansion for the research. 
Research recommendation 1) Further investigation into the relation between external social 
capital generation and crowdfunding success.  
Rationale: Within this thesis, external social capital was shown to positively impact success 
in crowdfunding. However, one of the limitations of the study is that it does not consider the 
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possible reverse causality, i.e. what is the effect of crowdfunding success on external social 
capital? This author proposes that a successful crowdfunding campaign may generate 
external social capital, if this proposition is true then it could help explain the increased 
success of serial crowdfunders (Butticè et al, 2017).  
Related theoretical areas: Social capital, Serial crowdfunding.  
Research recommendation 2) Expanding upon utilising latent network in the examination 
of crowdfunding and non-crowdfunding platforms. 
Rationale: The latent network utilised with the Kiva model to capture internal social capital 
can be adapted to be utilised to examine other crowdfunding platforms. As fundamentally all 
that is necessary for the creation of such a network is to be able to identify some indicator 
which links the projects together. For example, in Kickstarter, a latent network could be built 
based upon the top ten cities which back crowdfunding projects.       
Related theoretical areas: Network analysis, Internal social capital 
Research recommendation 3) Considering the impact of rewards in different categories: 
Rationale: One of the limitations of the study is that the effects of increased reward levels and 
the waiting time for rewards is only considered at a platform level. It is not considered 
whether the category of the rewards affects the impact these variables are having. 
Furthermore, machine learning could be utilised to further categorise the rewards, enabling 
mass categorisation of the different reward levels (Sebastiani, 2002), thus, enabling the 
consideration of what is the best type of reward to be offered for each subcategory within a 
crowdfunding platform.  
Related theoretical areas: Machine learning, Backer motivations. 
Research recommendation 4) Utilising conditional crowdfunding to overcome asymmetric 
information within crowdfunding: 
Rationale: Conditional crowdfunding enables a new way of overcoming or limiting 
asymmetric information. Due to the creation of conditional requirements which have to be 
fulfilled before the creators receive their money (Elsden et al, 2019). However, to the authors 
knowledge there is very limited work within the literature onto the impact of utilising 
conditional crowdfunding and due to the theoretical framework within the thesis being 
applicable to conditional crowdfunding, serves as a natural expansion of the research.  
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Related theoretical areas: Asymmetric Information, Conditional Crowdfunding.   
Research recommendation 5) Considering the effect of competition between crowdfunding 
platforms: 
Rationale: One of the limitations with the competition effects studied within this thesis is that 
it did not capture the competition effects from other crowdfunding platforms; this was due to 
the limited availability of data on the success of other platforms. Thus, this serves as a key 
area of future expansion, utilising the expanded sub division methodology to select similar 
crowdfunding platforms and then consider if the success of one platform negatively or 
positively impacts the other crowdfunding platforms.  
Related theoretical areas: Competition on crowdfunding platforms, Subdividing 
crowdfunding. 
6 Conclusions 
In this section, we aim to derive the key conclusions from the work done and to 
summarise the main achievements of this thesis. This work was developed throughout the 
different chapters, having discussed: the relevant literature, the theoretical and contextual 
frameworks to develop the key hypotheses, the complex data collection processes and the 
identification strategies to select appropriate models utilised to test the relevant hypotheses, 
and the key recommendations derived in the previous chapter, from the multiple 
interconnections amongst all the components of this thesis. 
In summary, this thesis achieved the following:  
A broad definition of crowdfunding was introduced, which was then utilised to create 
a point of distinction at which crowdfunding becomes traditional financing, this enabled 
crowdfunding platforms to be clearly identified (section 2.1) and it enhanced the system for 
sub-dividing crowdfunding platforms based on the participation rights of the backers and 
creator in the crowdfunding platforms (section 2.2). 
A theoretical framework was developed for identifying the determinants of success 
and failure in crowdfunding based upon the concepts of social capital, competition, backer 
motivation and signalling theory (section 2.4).  
A research philosophy of pragmatism was chosen and utilised to opt for a quantitative 
research design (section 3.1). The theoretical framework was successfully applied to both 
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Kickstarter and Kiva platforms, which enabled the creation of two separate conceptual 
frameworks and a set of hypotheses for each platform (section 3.3.1; section 3.4.1).  
The thesis utilised highly customised web crawling software and techniques to 
successfully capture 54193 projects for Kickstarter (section 3.3.9) and 1,000 projects for Kiva 
(section 3.4.6). Appropriate econometrics models were chosen based upon the underlying 
characteristics of the key dependent variables within each platform: with a set of logistic 
regressions being used to model the probability of a project’s success in the Kickstarter 
platform (section 3.3.10) and a set of OLS and Truncated regression models, being used to 
model the amounts raised on the Kiva platform (section 3.4.7). A set of model specifications 
were developed for each platform with the goodness of fit of the models compared, to 
identify the best fitting model for each platform (section 4.1; section 4.3). These models were 
then utilised to empirically test each one the developed platform’s relevant hypotheses 
(section 4.2; section 4.4).  
The econometric estimations lead to the development of a set of generalised findings 
for crowdfunding platforms, based on the empirical evidence and results which were then 
used to identify the contribution, recommendations and limitations of the study (section 5).  
Furthermore, a set of key recommendations was created for each of the core 
participant groups in crowdfunding, the backers, the creators and the platform itself (section 
5.5) and, finally, a set of recommendations was made about future research topics which have 
been identified through the findings and limitations of this research (section 5.6).    
At this stage, it must be considered whether these outcomes and results have achieved 
the main research aim, as stated: “To create a broad system for identifying the key 
determinants of success within crowdfunding platforms, which is applicable regardless of the 
type of crowdfunding platforms examined”.  
The author would argue that this aim has been achieved, through the creation and 
testing of the theoretical framework. This framework was based on four key areas of research 
on social capital, competition, backers’ motivation and signalling effects. This enabled the 
identification of the main determinants of success or failure within crowdfunding platforms. 
The empirical evidence, painstakingly collected by the authors, supported the utility of this 
framework as both the specific models for the two analysed platforms, Kickstarter and Kiva, 
that were built from this theoretical framework, captured statistically significant effects of the 
main identified determinants of success (section 4.1.1; section 4.3.3).This empirical success, 
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supports this author’s belief that the theoretical framework developed in this thesis, can be 
utilised to assist in identifying key determinants of success and failure within crowdfunding 
platforms and that the primary aim of this thesis has been achieved. 
6.1 Additional key contribution 
Alongside the main contribution of the development of the theoretical framework, 
additional key contributions are also identified:  
Key Contribution 1) Construction of a broad definition of crowdfunding:  
Through the section on literature review, the following definition was created: 
Crowdfunding is the interaction between three parties: creators, backers and a platform. 
Creators seek to obtain funds for a project, backers provide those funds, and the platform acts 
as an exchange between the backers and creators, without itself making funding decisions. 
This definition enables a clear point of separation between crowdfunding platforms and 
traditional funding platforms, that point being when the platform itself starts making funding 
decisions. This definition can be utilised to decide whether a platform is a traditional 
fundraising or a crowdfunding platform, as shown through the examples created by the author 
in section 2.1.5. Thus, enabling the whole crowdfunding market, itself to be clearly defined. 
Key Contribution 2) Expanding subdivision of crowdfunding 
The thesis set out a system for subdividing crowdfunding beyond the main four 
classifications utilised within the existing literature. This is not to say that this other literature 
had not utilised different measures of subdivision, as shown in the discussed literature on 
medical crowdfunding (Renwick and Mossialos, 2017; Burtch and Chan, 2014; Snyder et al 
2017). Instead, this’ thesis’ contribution resides in the more formal method for subdividing 
crowdfunding, i.e. utilising the creator’s participation rights to identify four additional 
subdivisions for crowdfunding platforms. These categorisations enabled the subdivision of 
existing crowdfunding platforms to be expanded, as shown in Figure 2-8. This expansion can 
be utilised in future work to identify similarities and differences between crowdfunding 
platforms.  
Key Contribution 3) Distinguishing between enforced and voluntary signals on 
crowdfunding platforms 
This thesis introduced the concepts of enforced and voluntary signals, linked to how 
the platform controls the access and information exchange modalities of, and between, 
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creators and backers. This control enables the platform to force signalling information to be 
sent out by the creators and the backers. These enforced signals need to be understood as 
different, and possibly contrasting, from the voluntary signals which the creators can send out 
by their own choice. Due to enforced signals being chosen by the platform, they can have a 
positive or negative impact on the likelihood of a project to succeed and, in order to predict 
the effects of these signals, new proxy metrics for human capital were utilised. The collected 
empirical evidence, once analysed, showed that, as long as the signals had a significant 
impact, proxies for human capital would correctly predict the effect of the enforced signals. 
Moreover, non-significant signalling results occurred when signals were not efficient, i.e. 
they were not observable, manipulatable and/or costlier for low-quality projects. This finding 
helps in pointing to the relevance of distinguishing between the different types of signals sent 
within crowdfunding platforms in future work.  
 
Key Contribution 4) Construction of a latent network with crowdfunding platforms 
Within the Kiva model, it was shown that a latent network could be built from the 
inherent connections between participants within a crowdfunding platform. And that this 
latent network could be utilised to capture the impact of social capital within the platform. 
This process of creating a latent network to capture social capital can be applied to other 
crowdfunding and non-crowdfunding platforms. As all that is necessary for a latent network 
to be developed is defining a rule to connect projects based upon the actions of backers or 
creators. 
Key Contribution 5) A clear set of recommendations to creators, backers and the platforms 
itself. 
 Utilising the empirical evidence collected for each model, a set of recommendations 
was developed for each category of participants in crowdfunding. For creators, the 
recommendations consider how they can increase the likelihood of their crowdfunding 
projects succeeding. For backers, the recommendations consider how to choose between 
crowdfunding projects and how to increase the likelihood to succeed for the projects they 
supported. For the crowdfunding platform themselves, the recommendations considered ways 
to ensure platform long-term sustainability.      
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6.2 Impact of this research  
The contribution to the literature of this research can be demonstrated through the ongoing 
impact of the work, as this work has directly led to the successful publication of:  
Davies, W.E. and Giovannetti, E., 2018. “Signalling experience & reciprocity to temper 
asymmetric information in crowdfunding evidence from 10,000 projects”. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 3 CABS Impact Factor: 3.129 vol 133, pp.118-131. Whereby 
a subset of the Kickstarter dataset was utilised in the creation of this paper. 
Furthermore, the work has been presented at multiple international conferences, via the 
following conference papers: 
 “Be impatient but not overambitious, a key for success of crowdfunding campaigns: 
Evidence from 10,000 Kickstarter innovation projects” which was presented in Milan at the 
18th Institute of International Forecasters Conference (May 2016)  
“Determinants of success in crowdfunding, identifying key factors crucial to success” Which 
was presented to International Telecommunications Society Conference in Cambridge 
(September 2016).  
“The Role of Social Capital for Micro-funding: evidence from the KIVA database.” Which 
was presented at the International Telecommunications society Asia 2017, Kyoto Conference. 
Studying Crowdfunding for developing countries. 
“Network Centrality in Cryptocurrency crowdfunding: how can cryptocurrency facilitate 
social capital in supporting innovations?” Presented at the first Cryptocurrency Research 
Conference, on 24 May 2018 at Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK. 
“Transforming crowdfunding platforms into pseudo-social networks” which was presented at 
Anglia Ruskin Annual Research student conference in June 2018.   
“Capturing the Impact of Social Capital for Microfinance through Crowdfunding: A neural 
network approach” which was presented at Predictive Analytics: Theory, Applications and 
Algorithms workshop, on July 2019 at Hughes Hall, Cambridge, UK. 
Additionally, an article entitled “There are six main traits that successful crowdfunding 
campaigns had in common” was published by the World Economic Forum, demonstrating 
how this work can be used to create recommendations for participants in crowdfunding 
(World Economic Forum, 2016).  
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6.3 Final remarks 
In conclusion, this thesis has achieved the aim of creating a system to identify the key 
determinants of success and or failure, within crowdfunding platforms, this has led to the 
creation of multiple conference papers and to the successful publication on the journal 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change. Work is ongoing into developing further 
papers and studies based upon the concepts and ideas created within this thesis. Specifically, 
papers are currently developed relative to the Kiva model and a paper focusing on a 
cryptocurrency based crowdfunding platform.   
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7 Appendix  
7.1 Item 1: Excel data commands 
VLOOKUP: This command can be used to lookup other value associated with a specific cell. 
After the cell is chosen, the command requires a specific range of columns to be selected, the 
first column must contain the value which you are searching for. The command then asks for 
a column number which returns the desired value to the right of the cell. For example, with 
an input of 1 the value 1 row to the right of the specified cell is returned, 2 returns the value 2 
to the right and so forth. This was utilised in the data collection multiple times for the 
Kickstarter dataset, most notable in checking whether the url of a new campaign already 
existed. Acting to ensure that there was no duplication when collecting results. Additionally, 
it was utilised in the creation of the early backing and early funding variables, as by utilising 
the duration as the column number and dividing by a specific value, the early funding and 
early backing data could be extracted from the funding and backing tables.     
COUNTIFS: This command enables the counting of cells with specific criteria, this was 
utilised in the counting of the number of competing concurrent projects within the Kickstarter 
platform. By setting the required criteria as being between the start and end date of a single 
campaign this command was used to identify all of the other campaigns which were active in 
that time period. Thus, showing the number of competing projects on Kickstarter at that time.  
CONCATENATE: This command is used to merge two or more cells text values together. 
For example, if cell a1 contained the text hit and cell a2 had the text man, utilising the 
concatenate command enables the combination of the two text values into a singular cell that 
would contain hitman. This was utilised in creating the URLs for the web crawlers, as often 
page numbers would have to be altered in order to extract the full range of desired results.    
Custom Macro: Excel also has the ability to create custom macro for the editing of mass data, 
this was primarily used in the process of arranging data into the correct format to for data 
analysis techniques. The macros were created through utilising the record macro features, 
which enable recording of specific features, then additional lines of code were added to fine 
tune the process Figure 7-1.  the following code would use the X value cell B77 then copy the 
current selection to sheet 3 and delete that selection.   
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Figure 7-1 Example of excel macro 
 
7.2 Item 2: Logit model equations expanded 
This section considers a more expanded version of the creation of the logit model.  
The logit function is defined that as: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑥) = log (
𝑓(𝑥)
1−𝑓(𝑥)
)      (2) 
Thus, using this function, we can write 𝑦𝑖 as 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑓(𝑥)] = ln[
𝑓(𝑥)
1−𝑓(𝑥)
]      (3) 
Now if we also considered the inverse logit function that: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑖𝑛𝑣. 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑥) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥)
           (4) 
Now if we consider this for this case then using equation (1) 
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𝑓(𝑥) =
𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+ 2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
1+𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
               (5) 
If we then input this into equation (3) 
ln
𝑓(𝑥)
1−𝑓(𝑥)
= ln [
𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
1+𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
1−
𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
1+𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
]     (6) 
This can be simplified due to the following 
1= 
1+𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
1+𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
 
Therefore we can rewrite equation (6) as 
𝑙𝑛[
𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
1 + 𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
1
1 + 𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)
] 
Which simplifies to 
𝑙𝑛[𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖+𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+..+𝜀𝑖)] 
Thus 
Logit[f(x)]= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+. . +𝜀𝑖 
Yi= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2,  𝑖+. . +𝜀𝑖 
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7.3 Item 3: Models testing early funding period 
This appendix section displays the classification and comparison between the 1/6th, 1/8th and 
1/10th early funding period durations. With 1/6th referring to the duration of a project divided 
by six, 1/8th refereeing to the duration divided by eight, and 1/10th referring to the duration of 
a project divided by 10.  
Figure 7-2 Successfully classified for 1/6 duration 
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Figure 7-3 Successfully classified for 1/8th the duration 
 
Figure 7-4 Successfully classified for 1/8th the duration 
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Figure 7-5 Comparing 1/8th duration to 1/6th duration 
 
Saved model is the 1/6th early funding period and current model is 1/8th duration early funding 
period. Providing strong support for using the 1/6th early funding.  
Figure 7-6 Comparing 1/10th duration to 1/6th duration 
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Saved model is the 1/6th early funding period and current model is 1/10th duration early funding 
period. Providing strong support for using the 1/6th early funding.  
7.4 Comparison between probit and logit models for restricted Kickstarter model 
Figure 7-7 shows a comparison between probit and logit models for the restricted model of 
Kickstarter. The restricted model was utilised as the main model did not converge when utilising the 
probit model. It provides clear support for utilising the logit model.  
Figure 7-7 Comparison between probit and logit models for restricted Kickstarter model 
 
7.5 Item 5: Summarised Do file for Kickstarter model (please note Ambition was changed to 
Ambition and Relative Ambition to Ambition) 
Importing selected file, tabulating categories and dropping funding goal 
import delimited "C:\Users\wdtau\Google Drive\Will Davies PhD\April 2018 beginning of 
full write up\backups of dataset\KickstarterwithIndex.csv", clear 
drop if funding_goal>1000000 
Model 1 creators signal 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience  
eststo creator_signal 
estat classification 
fitstat, saving(mod1) 
fitstat 
Model 2, Creator and Backer Signals 
Difference of  504.832 in BIC' provides very strong support for saved model.
BIC':                     -34448.355       -34953.187          504.832
BIC:                     -430710.827      -431215.659          504.832
AIC*n:                     19442.021        18937.188          504.832
AIC:                           0.460            0.448            0.012
Adj Count R2:                  0.732            0.734           -0.002
Count R2:                      0.910            0.910           -0.001
Variance of error:             1.000            3.290           -2.290
Variance of y*:                8.296           31.091          -22.795
Efron's R2:                    0.699            0.704           -0.006
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2:     0.879            0.894           -0.015
Cragg & Uhler's R2:            0.775            0.783           -0.007
Maximum Likelihood R2:         0.560            0.565           -0.005
McFadden's Adj R2:             0.640            0.650           -0.009
McFadden's R2:                 0.641            0.650           -0.009
Prob > LR:                     0.000            0.000            0.000
LR:                        34661.395(20)    35166.227(20)     -504.832(0)
D:                         19400.021(42256)  18895.188(42256)  504.832(0)
Log-Lik Full Model:        -9700.010        -9447.594         -252.416
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -27030.708       -27030.708            0.000
N:                             42277            42277                0
Model:                        probit            logit
                             Current            Saved       Difference
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logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge  
eststo backers_signals 
estat classification 
fitstat, saving(mod2) using (mod1) 
fitstat 
***Model 3 Backers Incentives included 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time  
 
eststo Incentives 
estat classification 
fitstat, saving(mod3) using (mod2) 
fitstat 
*** Model 4 External and Internal Social Capital added 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
 
eststo Social_capital 
estat classification 
fitstat, saving(mod4) 
***model 5 competition effects unrestricted 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category averagetrendcat 
 
eststo Main_model 
estat classification 
fitstat, saving(mod5) using (mod4) 
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regress successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category averagetrendcat 
***Model 6 Restricted competition 
asdoc logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category averagetrendcat cityindex countryindex 
categoryindex kickindex if startdate<(42726-60) & startdate>(42322+60) 
 
estat classification 
eststo restricted_model 
regress successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category averagetrendcat cityindex countryindex 
categoryindex kickindex if startdate<(42726-60) & startdate>(42322+60) 
vif 
esttab, mti star label nodepvars  gaps 
*** probit vs logit 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category cityindex countryindex categoryindex 
kickindex if startdate<(42726-60) & startdate>(42322+60) 
fitstat, saving(mod4)  
 
probit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category cityindex countryindex categoryindex 
kickindex if startdate<(42726-60) & startdate>(42322+60) 
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fitstat, saving(mod5) using (mod4) force 
*** main model margin effects at mean 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category averagetrendcat 
 
margins, at (Ambition=(8.751633)) 
margins, at (Confidence=(-25.02325)) 
margins, at (Experience=(.5712915)) 
margins, at (Trustworthiness=(.9906329)) 
margins, at (Impatience=(.9906329)) 
margins, at (Campaign_Comments=(.9128139)) 
margins, at (Early_Funding=(4245.817))  
margins, at (Early_Backing= (49.37754)) 
margins, at (Early_Average_Pledge=(2.281858)) 
margins, at (Reward_levels=(7.388242)) 
margins, at (Global_rewards=(3.687063)) 
margins, at (Average_wait_time=(130.1454)) 
margins, at (Reciprocity=(3.759563)) 
margins, at (Facebook_Shares=(3.078752))  
margins, at (Launch_Comp_Category=(647.4876)) 
margins, at (Launch_Competition=(4904.628)) 
margins, at (Global_rewards=(3.687063)) 
margins, at (averagetrendcat=(48.77506)) 
*** Restricted model margin effects at mean 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category cityindex countryindex categoryindex 
kickindex if startdate<(42726-60) & startdate>(42322+60) 
margins, at (kickindex=(671.8295)) 
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margins, at (cityindex=(3986.172))  
margins, at (countryindex=(447.8236)) 
margins, at (categoryindex=(326.8946)) 
*** main model margin effects at max 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category averagetrendcat 
margins, at (Ambition=( 13.81551)) 
margins, at (Confidence=(990672.3)) 
margins, at (Experience=(74)) 
margins, at (Trustworthiness=(11.37094)) 
margins, at (Impatience=(60)) 
margins, at (Campaign_Comments=(11.27634)) 
margins, at (Early_Funding=( 9570510))  
margins, at (Early_Backing= (50311)) 
margins, at (Early_Average_Pledge=( 9.21035)) 
margins, at (Reward_levels=(179)) 
margins, at (Global_rewards=(179)) 
margins, at (Average_wait_time=( 2129)) 
margins, at (Reciprocity=( 890)) 
margins, at (Facebook_Shares=(12.71055))  
margins, at (Launch_Comp_Category=(42605)) 
margins, at (Launch_Competition=(50761)) 
margins, at (Global_rewards=(3.687063)) 
margins, at (averagetrendcat=(100)) 
*** Restricted model margin effects at max 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category cityindex countryindex categoryindex 
kickindex if startdate<(42726-60) & startdate>(42322+60) 
margins, at (kickindex=(6320.38)) 
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margins, at (cityindex=(10000))  
margins, at (countryindex=(10000)) 
margins, at (categoryindex=(6644.796)) 
*** main model margin effects at minimum 
 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category averagetrendcat 
margins, at (Ambition=(0)) 
margins, at (Confidence=(-125811.4)) 
margins, at (Experience=(0)) 
margins, at (Trustworthiness=(0)) 
margins, at (Impatience=(1)) 
margins, at (Campaign_Comments=(0)) 
margins, at (Early_Funding=(0))  
margins, at (Early_Backing= (0)) 
margins, at (Early_Average_Pledge=(-2.302585)) 
margins, at (Reward_levels=(1)) 
margins, at (Global_rewards=(0)) 
margins, at (Average_wait_time=(0)) 
margins, at (Reciprocity=(0)) 
margins, at (Facebook_Shares=(0))  
margins, at (Launch_Comp_Category=(0)) 
margins, at (Launch_Competition=(0)) 
margins, at (Global_rewards=(0)) 
margins, at (averagetrendcat=(0)) 
*** Restricted model margin effects at minimum 
logit successorfailure Ambition Confidence Experience Trustworthiness Impatience 
Campaign_Comments Early_Funding Early_Backing Early_Average_Pledge 
Reward_levels Global_rewards Average_wait_time Facebook_Shares Reciprocity 
Launch_Competition Launch_Comp_Category cityindex countryindex categoryindex 
kickindex if startdate<(42726-60) & startdate>(42322+60) 
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margins, at (kickindex=(39.99643)) 
margins, at (cityindex=(0))  
margins, at (countryindex=(0)) 
margins, at (categoryindex=(19.77083)) 
 
 
7.6 Item 6:Do file for Kiva model 
Open file and drop loans that raised less than 50 
import excel "C:\Users\wdtau\Google Drive\Will Davies PhD\April 2018 beginning of full 
write up\backups of dataset\kiva dataset.xlsx", sheet("datasetforstata") firstrow clear 
drop if loanamount<=50 
***Moded 1 Signals 
eststo clear 
asdoc regress Amount_raised Generosity  Temporal_Experience Capacity_Experience 
Rating,robust 
asdoc ovtest 
eststo Kiva_signals 
fitstat, saving(mod1) 
**** Model 2 Signals and social capital 
asdoc regress Amount_raised Generosity  Temporal_Experience Capacity_Experience 
Country_Funds  Rating Eigen_Centrality Betweeness_centrality Closeness_centrality, 
robust 
eststo Social_capital 
fitstat, saving(mod2) using (mod1) force 
*** model 3 Signals, social capital and competition 
regress Amount_raised Generosity  Temporal_Experience Capacity_Experience 
Country_Funds Active_Loans Rating Eigen_Centrality Betweeness_centrality 
Closeness_centrality launch_comp sector_index partner_index, robust 
asdoc vif 
eststo Kiva_main 
ovtest 
fitstat, saving(mod3) using (mod2) 
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vif 
predict myResiduals, r 
sktest myResiduals 
histogram myResiduals, kdensity normal 
***model 4, truncated regression 
truncreg Amount_raised Generosity  Temporal_Experience Capacity_Experience 
Country_Funds Active_Loans Rating Eigen_Centrality Betweeness_centrality 
Closeness_centrality launch_comp sector_index partner_index, ll(0) robust 
drop myResiduals 
predict myResiduals 
sktest myResiduals 
histogram myResiduals, kdensity normal 
 
eststo Tobit_model 
 
7.7 Item 7: Winsorization main model results (99 percent level and 95 percent level) 
 
Table 7.1 Winsorization of main model 99 percent level 
Logistic regression 
   
Number of 
observation 
= 54193 
    
LR chi2(17) = 43500.8 
    
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Log likelihood = -
12314.531 
   
Pseudo R2 = 0.6385 
successorfailure 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
 
Z 
 
P>|z| 
 
Conf. 
 
Interval] 
 
Ambition -1.38235 0.01840
6 
-75.1 0 -1.41843 -1.34628 
Confidence -6.49E-
06 
8.10E-07 -8.01 0 -8.08E-
06 
-4.90E-
06 
Experience_w 0.03933
4 
0.00723
1 
5.44 0 0.02516
2 
0.05350
5 
Trustworthiness_w 0.89261
6 
0.01803
7 
49.4
9 
0 0.85726
5 
0.92796
7 
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Impatience_w -0.00128 0.00160
2 
-0.8 0.425 -0.00442 0.00186
3 
Campaign_Comments_w 0.70740
8 
0.01692
6 
41.7
9 
0 0.67423
4 
0.74058
1 
Early_Funding_w -3.53E-
07 
2.12E-06 -0.17 0.867 -4.50E-
06 
3.80E-06 
Early_Backing_w 0.00103
2 
0.00026
4 
3.91 0 0.00051
5 
0.00154
9 
Early_Average_Pledge_w 0.61530
8 
0.01516 40.5
9 
0 0.58559
5 
0.64502
2 
Reward_levels_w 0.04687
9 
0.00392
6 
11.9
4 
0 0.03918
5 
0.05457
4 
Global_rewards_w -0.04334 0.00419
9 
-
10.3
2 
0 -0.05157 -0.03511 
Average_wait_time_w -0.00158 0.00018
6 
-8.47 0 -0.00194 -0.00121 
Facebook_Shares_w 0.78416
3 
0.01279
7 
61.2
8 
0 0.75908 0.80924
5 
Reciprocity_w -0.00673 0.00082 -8.21 0 -0.00834 -0.00512 
Launch_Competition_w 1.97E-05 2.87E-06 6.88 0 1.41E-05 2.54E-05 
Launch_Comp_Category_
w 
-0.0001 8.69E-06 -
11.5
9 
0 -0.00012 -8.4E-05 
averagetrendcat_w 0.00390
7 
0.00081
1 
4.82 0 0.00231
7 
0.00549
7 
_cons 3.44861
3 
0.12068
2 
28.5
8 
0 3.21208 3.68514
5 
       
 
Table 7.2 Winsorization of main model 95 percent level 
Logistic regression 
   
Number 
of obs 
= 54193 
    
LR 
chi2(17) 
= 43500.8 
    
Prob > 
chi2 
= 0 
Log likelihood = -12314.5 
  
Pseudo 
R2 
= 0.6385 
successorfailure Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
      
   
  
Confidence_w -1.38235 0.01840
6 
-75.1 0 -1.41843 -1.34628 
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Relative_confidence_w -6.49E-
06 
8.10E-07 -8.01 0 -8.08E-
06 
-4.90E-
06 
Experience_w 0.03933
4 
0.00723
1 
5.44 0 0.02516
2 
0.05350
5 
Trustworthiness_w 0.89261
6 
0.01803
7 
49.4
9 
0 0.85726
5 
0.92796
7 
Impatience_w -0.00128 0.00160
2 
-0.8 0.425 -0.00442 0.00186
3 
Campaign_Comments_w 0.70740
8 
0.01692
6 
41.7
9 
0 0.67423
4 
0.74058
1 
Early_Funding_w -3.53E-
07 
2.12E-06 -0.17 0.867 -4.50E-
06 
3.80E-06 
Early_Backing_w 0.00103
2 
0.00026
4 
3.91 0 0.00051
5 
0.00154
9 
Early_Average_Pledge_w 0.61530
8 
0.01516 40.5
9 
0 0.58559
5 
0.64502
2 
Reward_levels_w 0.04687
9 
0.00392
6 
11.9
4 
0 0.03918
5 
0.05457
4 
Global_rewards_w -0.04334 0.00419
9 
-
10.3
2 
0 -0.05157 -0.03511 
Average_wait_time_w -0.00158 0.00018
6 
-8.47 0 -0.00194 -0.00121 
Facebook_Shares_w 0.78416
3 
0.01279
7 
61.2
8 
0 0.75908 0.80924
5 
Reciprocity_w -0.00673 0.00082 -8.21 0 -0.00834 -0.00512 
Launch_Competition_w 1.97E-05 2.87E-06 6.88 0 1.41E-05 2.54E-05 
Launch_Comp_Category_w -0.0001 8.69E-06 -
11.5
9 
0 -0.00012 -8.4E-05 
averagetrendcat_w 0.00390
7 
0.00081
1 
4.82 0 0.00231
7 
0.00549
7 
_cons 3.44861
3 
0.12068
2 
28.5
8 
0 3.21208 3.68514
5 
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